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ICWA’S IRONY
Marcia Zug*
The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA or the Act) is a federal statute that
protects Indian children by keeping them connected to their families and
culture. The Act’s provisions include support for family reunification,
kinship care preferences, cultural competency considerations and
community involvement. These provisions parallel national child welfare
policies. Nevertheless, the Act is relentlessly attacked as a law that singles
out Indian children for unique and harmful treatment. This is untrue but,
ironically, it will be true if challenges to the ICWA are successful. To
prevent this from occurring, the defense of the Act needs to change. For too
long, this defense has focused on justifying the Act’s alleged different
treatment of Indian children. Now, it is time to refute this charge and
demonstrate this difference is illusory.
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The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA or the Act) is under attack, again,
and although the Act has faced numerous challenges in the past, the current
attacks are different. Today’s anti-ICWA arguments are focused on the
Act’s destruction rather than its modification. However, what is particularly
extraordinary about these attacks and their recent success is that they are
occurring at the same time that support for the protections and policies
enshrined in the ICWA is growing.
Over the past decade, numerous states have enacted child welfare laws
and policies that mirror the ICWA’s most important protections. 1
1. In fact, many states have also enacted state ICWAs, including California, Colorado,
Michigan, New Jersey, and Vermont, which have all enacted this legislation in the past
decade. CAL. FAM. CODE § 175(c) (Deering 2007); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-126 (2020);
MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 712B.1 (LexisNexis 2013); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1517
(LexisNexis 2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:10-6 (West 2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5120
(2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.38.010 (LexisNexis 2011); WIS. STAT. § 48.028
(2016). In addition, a state ICWA bill has been drafted in South Carolina and is awaiting
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Consequently, this Article argues that the ICWA’s defenders should stop
trying to justify the different treatment of Indian children and families and,
instead, demonstrate that the Act’s protections simply ensure Indian
families receive the same protections as other families.
Current attacks on the ICWA are grounded in a misunderstanding of
modern child welfare law. Anti-ICWA advocates claim the Act harms
Indian children by treating them differently than non-Indian children.
However, what the ICWA actually does is ensure Indian children receive
the same protections as non-Indian children.
Child welfare ideas have evolved drastically over the past half-century.
When the ICWA was first enacted, the ideas it embraced—family
preservation over termination of parental rights—were considered the best
child welfare practices for all children. 2 Over time, ideas about children’s
best interests changed, and the ICWA began to conflict with new child
welfare laws and policies. This conflict created the perception that the Act
harms Indian children. Today, ideas regarding child welfare best practices
are changing again, and modern child welfare policy substantially aligns
with the ICWA. Consequently, arguments that the ICWA requires the
different and harmful treatment of Indian children have no merit.
Nevertheless, these claims are being used to challenge the Act’s
constitutionality, and courts appear increasingly receptive to such
arguments.
Unfortunately, the ICWA’s defenders give credence to these arguments
when they seek to justify the Act’s alleged different treatment of Indian
families, rather than objecting to the underlying assumption of difference.
As the recent case Brackeen v. Zinke3 demonstrates, when courts accept the
claims that the ICWA requires the different treatment of Indian and nonIndian children, they may be more inclined to view the Act as harmful and
more willing to find it unconstitutional. Consequently, it is imperative to
change the narrative surrounding the ICWA and challenge the idea that the
Act mandates the different and harmful treatment of Indian children. 4
presentation to the state legislature. See A Bill to Enact the South Carolina Indian Child
Welfare Act (n.d.) (on file with author).
2. See infra Section I.A (discussing the history of the ICWA).
3. 338 F. Supp. 3d 514 (N.D. Tex. 2018).
4. One of the ironies of this argument is that the Act is commonly cited as the “gold
standard” in child welfare law. See, e.g., Danielle J. Mayberry, The Origins and Evolution of
the Indian Child Welfare Act, 14 JUD. NOTICE 34, 45 (2019) (“For over forty years, the
ICWA has been called the ‘gold standard’ of child-welfare policy due to its emphasis on
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A successful ICWA defense must establish that the Act is not just a
legally permissible exercise of Congress’s plenary power over Indian tribes,
but that it is also morally permissible. As long as the argument that the Act
encourages the harmful treatment of Indian children remains viable, the
ICWA’s future is imperiled. It is, therefore, vitally important to
demonstrate that the Act does not harm Indian children; the best way to do
this is to show that the ICWA’s provisions closely align with the child
welfare policies applicable to non-Indian children. Accordingly, the
purpose of this Article is twofold. First, it seeks to explain why the ICWA
is under attack and, second, to demonstrate why these attacks are
unjustified.
Part I of this Article will describe the recent history of child welfare
policy and show how ideas regarding children’s best interests have
fluctuated between the divergent goals of reunification and termination. It
will describe how the ICWA originally aligned with accepted notions of
best practices in the child welfare context but then diverged and that this
divergence is the basis for current ICWA challenges.
Part II will discuss recent challenges to the ICWA. It examines the
Brackeen Court’s decision finding the Act unconstitutional, the Fifth
Circuit’s reversal, and the arguments and defenses used in these types of
ICWA challenges. This Part argues that relying on federal Indian law
precedent to uphold the Act is an increasingly dangerous strategy and
suggests that ICWA advocates must do more to address and debunk the
placing children with relatives as the foremost goal.”); see also Pledge to Defend ICWA,
Nat’l Cong. of Am. Indians SD-15-011, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Ann. Sess. (2015),
http://www.ncai.org/resources/resolutions/pledge-to-defend-icwa (“WHEREAS, a coalition
of leading national child welfare organizations have declared ICWA to be a ‘gold standard’
for child welfare because as ICWA mandates, it is in every child’s best interest to be
protected from harm and to prevent the unnecessary trauma that occurs when children are
removed from their family, culture, and community . . . .”). The eighteen organizations of
this coalition can be found in the Casey Family Programs’ press release. Press Release,
Casey Fam. Programs, 18 National Child Welfare Organizations Join Supreme Court
Amicus Brief in Support of Indian Child Welfare Act (Apr. 11, 2013), https://www.
casey.org/media/ICWA-PR-FINAL-1.pdf; see also Letter from Nat’l Indian Child Welfare
Ass’n to Elizabeth Appel, Off. of Regul. Affs. & Collaborative Action, Indian Affs., U.S.
Dep’t of the Interior (May 18, 2015), https://perma.cc/D8HJ-6YYC (citing amicus brief of
Casey Family Programs, Child Welfare League of American, Children's Defense Fund,
Donaldson Adoption Institute, North American Council on Adoptable Children, Voice for
Adoption, and twelve other child welfare organizations, all noting that “ICWA has been
deemed the ‘gold standard of child welfare practice’ by mainstream organizations”).
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perception that ICWA treats Indian children different from and worse than
non-native children.
Part III demonstrates that views regarding child welfare best practices
are shifting once again and increasingly align with the ICWA. This Part
examines the most challenged and controversial provisions of the Act and
shows how they parallel current state and federal child welfare policy.
I. From Reunification to Termination
In the mid-twentieth century, child welfare practice was based on a child
rescue philosophy. 5 During this period, child welfare agencies made little
effort to prevent the breakup of families. Instead, the focus was on ensuring
children were removed from unsafe homes.6 This policy was wellintentioned, but the result was catastrophic. Children were doomed to years
of foster care with little or no hope of ever receiving a permanent home. 7 In
the 1970s, child protection experts and national panels began arguing that
the emphasis on child removals was not working and that both children and
their parents were frequently harmed by prolonged separations. 8 These
child advocates cited the growing numbers of children in foster care as
proof that child welfare policy needed to change. 9 They then recommended
a three-pronged reform program that would discourage removals, aid
5. See Alice C. Shotton, Making Reasonable Efforts in Child Abuse and Neglect
Cases: Ten Years Later, 26 CAL. W. L. REV. 223, 254–55 (1989-1990) (“Child welfare
practice in the United States prior to the passage of [the Adoption Assistance
and Child Welfare Act of 1980] was largely based on a child rescue philosophy, with little
focused effort made by agencies to prevent the breakup of families and a child's subsequent
placement into foster care.”)
6. Id. at 255.
7. Id. at 224 (describing the five years of congressional testimony covering the harms
of removal and the United States’ “dysfunctional child welfare system”); see also Kathleen
S. Bean, Reasonable Efforts: What State Courts Think, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 321, 324–25
(2005) (describing the five years of congressional testimony “that highlighted the fact that a
staggering number of children—500,000 or more—were currently residing in foster care”
and the fact that children were frequently “moved from one foster family to another while
waiting, sometimes for their entire childhoods, for the child protection agency to decide
whether they should be reunited with their parents or whether alternative permanent plans
should be implemented”).
8. See supra note 7.
9. By 1979, there were almost half a million children in foster care. Linda Lee Reimer
Stevenson, Comment, Fair Play or a Stacked Deck?: In Search of a Proper Standard of
Proof in Juvenile Dependency Hearings, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 613, 614 (1999).
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A. The Family Preservation Movement
By the 1980s, support for family preservation gained widespread
acceptance and laws and policies were enacted to identify children “at risk
of placement” and prevent them from being removed from their families
and sent to foster care.11 One family preservation policy adopted by many
states was Intensive Family Preservation Services (IFPS). IFPS was
premised on the belief that many child abuse and neglect cases resulted
from a crisis in the family and could be addressed by providing families
with intensive, short-term support services. 12
In 1974, the first IFPS program, called Homebuilders, was created. 13 It
then became a model for other IFPS programs and by 1992, the majority of
states had enacted their own versions of the Homebuilders program. 14 Such
programs were important wins for advocates of family preservation, but the

10. These experts urged
that public authorities should: 1) not place a child in foster care unless her
parents were so inadequate that the problems were impossible to resolve in the
home; 2) if foster care was required, work seriously and intensively toward
family reunification for a planned period; and, 3) if reunification efforts failed,
terminate the parent’s rights and place the child in a stable adoptive home.
Marsha Garrison, Reforming Child Protection: A Public Health Perspective, 12 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 590, 590 (2005).
11. See Elizabeth Bartholet, The Racial Disproportionality Movement in Child Welfare:
False Facts and Dangerous Directions, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 871, 896 (2009) [hereinafter
Bartholet, The Racial Disproportionality Movement].
12. Claire Houston, What Ever Happened to the “Child Maltreatment Revolution”?, 19
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 1, 32–33 (2017) (noting the goal of IFPS was to make the “home safe
for children by providing families with intensive services (a mix of counseling, skills
training, and help with basic needs) over a short period of time”); see also Elizabeth
Bartholet, Differential Response: A Dangerous Experiment in Child Welfare, 42 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 573, 582 (2015) (criticizing IFPS as based on the incorrect assumption that child
maltreatment was typically a short-term crisis) [hereinafter Bartholet, Differential
Response].
13. See, e.g., JOAN BARTHEL, FOR CHILDREN'S SAKE : THE PROMISE OF FAMILY
PRESERVATION 14-15 (1992); JILL KINNEY, KEEPING FAMILIES TOGETHER: THE
HOMEBUILDERS MODEL (1991) (describing the Homebuilders model).
14. Houston, supra note 12, at 33. “Large foundations, such as the Edna McConnell
Clark Foundation, funded and promoted IFPS, and the CDF and CWLA supported IFPS as
an important child protection strategy.” Id.
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biggest victory was the passage of the Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA).15
When the AACWA was passed, it was called “the most significant
legislation in the history of child welfare.” 16 The purpose of the AACWA
was to ensure family preservation became the basis of child protection law
and to avoid the harms caused by long-term foster care placement.17 One of
the AACWA’s most important reforms was the requirement that states
demonstrate “reasonable efforts” had been made to prevent removal of
children from their parents and, if removal was deemed necessary, that the
state had also made reasonable efforts to help the parents address the
problems that led to removal.18 Under the AACWA, alternative placements,
such as adoption, could only be considered if preservation services failed
and returning the child was deemed unsafe.19 The AACWA enforced its
requirements by tying federal foster care funding to states making
“reasonable efforts” to maintain and reunify families. 20
15. Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.); Houston, supra note 12, at 33.
16. Houston, supra note 12, at 33 (quoting RICHARD J. GELLES, THE BOOK OF DAVID:
HOW PRESERVING FAMILIES CAN COST CHILDREN’S LIVES 93 (1997)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
17. See, e.g., Bean, supra note 7, at 325 (explaining that “In response to these [foster
care] and related concerns, AACWA was designed with a focus on family preservation and
reunification” ); Sherry A. Hess, Comment, Texas Family Code Section 263.401: Improving
the Mandatory Dismissal Deadline to Be Truly in the Best Interest of the Child, 9 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 95, 101 (2002) (noting the AACWA is primarily based on a family
preservation philosophy).
18. See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, sec. 101, § 471(15), 94 Stat. at 503
(requiring that “reasonable [reunification] efforts” be made “(A) prior to the placement of a
child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his home,
and (B) to make it possible for the child to return to his home.”) Eventually this requirement
would be viewed as an impossible balancing act where “states were expected to keep
children safe while keeping them with abusive parents.” Houston, supra note 12, at 33; see
also Marcia Yablon-Zug, Separation, Deportation, Termination, 32 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST.
63, 73–75 (2012) (describing the backlash against the family preservation policies of the
AACWA).
19. See Garrison, supra note 10, at 590–91; Stevenson, supra note 9, at 614–15; see
also Hess, supra note 17, at 100–01 (describing the success and failure of the AACWA).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15). The statute states that “[i]n order for a State to be eligible
for payments under this part, it shall have a plan approved by the Secretary” providing that
in each case, reasonable efforts will be made “prior to the placement of a child in foster care,
to prevent or eliminate the need” for removal of the child from his home, and “to make it
possible for a child to safely return to the child’s home.” Id. § 671(a). Federal funds were
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The ICWA21 was enacted two years before the AACWA. 22 The ICWA’s
immediate goal was to end discrimination against Indian families, 23 but it
also sought to provide these families with additional protections grounded
in emerging ideas about family preservation and child welfare best
practices.24 Consequently, it is not surprising that many of the AACWA’s
made available to help welfare workers keep children with their families or, if they had been
removed, help them return home. S. REP. NO. 96-336, at 4 (1979), as reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1448, 1453.In addition, the AACWA required the development of a case plan
to help “improve family conditions and facilitate returning the child to his home.” H.R. REP.
NO. 96-900, at 46 (1980) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1561, 1566.
Reasonable efforts under the Act included preventative services, providing periodic case
review, and services to reunite children with their parents. See Garrison, supra note 10, at
590–91.
21. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (1978)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.).
22. The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94
Stat. 500 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
23. Before the ICWA, state child welfare agencies routinely singled Indian families out
for different treatment. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 10–11 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7533 [hereinafter 1978 HOUSE REPORT]. Indian children were removed
at significantly higher rates than non-Indian children and their parents were given fewer
resources and opportunities to regain custody of their children after removal. See id. at 9; see
also Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings, 81 Fed. Reg. 38,778, 38,780 (June 14, 2016);
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the
House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong. (1978) [hereinafter 1978
Hearings] (describing how Indian children face disproportionate high rates of family
separation and removal); Indian Child Welfare Act of 1977: Hearing on S.1214 Before the
Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong. (1977) [hereinafter 1977 Hearings]
(same); Indian Child Welfare Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of
the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93rd Cong. (1974) [hereinafter 1974
Hearings] (same). American Indian families were also less likely than non-Indian families to
receive supportive services as an alternative to removal of their children. See 1978 Hearings,
supra, at 36 (regarding “active efforts”); 1977 Hearings, supra, at 29. During this time,
approximately 25-35% of all Indian children were being removed from their parents and
placed in foster care. 1978 House Report, supra, at 9; see also Lorie M. Graham, “The Past
Never Vanishes”: A Contextual Critique of the Existing Indian Family Doctrine, 23 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 1, 24 (1998) (stating that “[c]onservative estimates indicated that one-third of
all American Indian children were being separated” from their parents in the years preceding
the passage of the ICWA). In some states, the rates were higher. For example, “Minnesota,
Montana, South Dakota, and Washington had American Indian placement rates that were
five to nineteen times greater than that of the non-Indian rate” and in Wisconsin, the rate was
“1600 times greater.” Id.
24. The Act protects Indian families by delineating a set of procedural and substantive
standards for Indian child custody proceedings. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1911–1923. These regulations
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provisions parallel the ICWA’s.25 This similarity shows the ICWA was not
an isolated piece of legislation proscribing different rules for Indian
families. Rather, the ICWA was part of a national family preservation
movement aimed at protecting all children, both Indian and non-Indian,
from unnecessary removals, prolonged separations, and preventable
terminations. 26
B. The Family Preservation Backlash
The support for family preservation enshrined in the AACWA did not
end with the law’s passage. In the decade after the AACWA’s enactment,
states continued to institute IFPS programs and support family preservation
policies.27 However, there was also a growing fear that the intense focus on
family preservation might be hurting children. 28 Much of this fear stemmed
include protections to safeguard the interests of Indian parents as well as others intended to
protect the best interests of Indian children. See, e.g., id. § 1912(a), (b), (d) (requiring
parental notice, appointment of counsel and the provision of remedial services in involuntary
termination proceedings); id. § 1913(d) (allowing any party to a child custody proceeding to
withdraw their consent to adoption and invalidate the adoption if the consent was obtained
through fraud or duress); id. § 1915(a) (giving preference to placements with the child’s
family). A handful of these regulations were unique to the Indian child welfare context. See,
e.g., id. § 1911(b) (requiring transfer to tribal court in many circumstances). However, the
majority of the ICWA’s provisions were similar to the child welfare practices and policies
that were gaining national support at the time of the Act’s passage.
25. In fact, the ICWA’s provision may have served as a model for the AACWA. See,
e.g., CATHLEEN A. LEWANDOWSKI, CHILD WELFARE : AN INTEGRATIVE PERSPECTIVE 40
(2018) (noting that the “ICWA[’s] . . . passage may have inspired further child welfare
legislation, beginning with passage of AACWA . . . .” and that both statutes “emphasized
that children’s own families could best meet the children’s needs”); see also Jordan Blair
Woods, Unaccompanied Youth and Private-Public Order Failures, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1639,
1667 n.168 (2018) (“[T]he AACWA was not the first legislative response that Congress
made to growing concerns in the 1970s surrounding foster care and adoption.”).
26. Woods, supra note 25 (describing ICWA as a precursor to AACWA); see also
Christine Diedrick Mochel, Comment, Redefining “Child” and Redefining Lives: The
Possible Beneficial Impact the Fostering Connections to Success Act and Court Involvement
Could Have on Older Foster Care Youth, 40 CAP. U. L. REV. 517, 530 (2012) (citing ICWA
and AACWA as part of the “large amounts of legislation dealing specifically with the
removal, placement in foster care, and subsequent adoptions of abused children”).
27. See, e.g., Houston, supra note 12, at 33 (“[B]y 1992, nearly thirty states had
replicated the program.”); Richard Wexler, Take the Child and Run: Tales from the Age of
ASFA, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 129, 139 (2001) (describing IFPS programs in Michigan since
1988 and in Alabama shortly thereafter).
28. Such shifts are common. As Professor Catherine Ross has noted, “The pendulum of
child welfare reform has repeatedly swung between efforts to preserve troubled families at
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from the apparent failure of policies aimed at addressing child
maltreatment. These policies included mandatory child abuse reporting
laws, expanded child protection services, and increased criminal justice
intervention in child maltreatment cases.29 When these changes failed to
curtail the rising tide of child abuse cases, 30 anti-child abuse advocates
began blaming family preservation policies and the provisions that made it
harder to remove children. 31 These concerns were then reinforced by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Santosky v. Kramer, holding that parents have

virtually all costs and a passion to rescue every child in need.” Catherine J. Ross, The
Tyranny of Time: Vulnerable Children, “Bad” Mothers, and Statutory Deadlines in Parental
Termination Proceedings, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 176, 194 (2004); see also Houston,
supra note 9, at 34 (“States and local governments were re-directing funds from more
traditional child protection services to IFPS. And in 1993, with support from the Edna
McConnell Clark Foundation, Congress passed the Family Preservation and Support
Services Act of 1993, which earmarked $1 billion for state family preservation efforts.”).
29. Other reforms from this period included laws requiring suspected child abuse
fatalities to be reported directly to district attorneys and/or medical examiners or coroners,
cross-reporting laws requiring CPAs to report sexual abuse or “serious” physical abuse to
law enforcement, and changes to state and federal laws increasing the ability of children to
testify in child abuse cases or have their evidence admitted in another form. Houston, supra
note 12, at 29. As Claire Houston has noted, during this period
[p]olice departments established specialized teams to investigate child abuse
reports, and prosecutors’ offices developed specialized units to prosecute these
cases. Prosecutors also developed strategies . . . to improve the child abuse
prosecution rate. In many communities, Child Advocacy Centers (CACs) were
established to provide multidisciplinary investigation of criminal child abuse
and support child witnesses. At the federal level, Congress passed the
Children’s Justice and Assistance Act, which allocated funding to states to
improve the investigation and prosecution of child abuse cases. Finally,
CAPTA was amended to encourage states to facilitate multidisciplinary and
interagency child abuse investigations.
Id. at 29–30.
30. Id. at 29 (“By 1985, the number of reports to CPAs had swelled to 1.5 million, of
which 500,000 were substantiated for maltreatment.”).
31. See, e.g., Houston, supra note 12, at 34 (describing the critics of family preservation
and the AACWA); John E.B. Myers, A Short History of Child Protection in America, 42
FAM. L.Q. 449, 459 (2008) (“In the 1990s . . . critics argued that over-reliance on family
preservation sometimes led to tragedy.”); Wexler, supra note 27, at 143 (“‘[F]amily
preservation’ became the scapegoat whenever any child was left in any home under any
circumstances and something went wrong – regardless of whether the child had been
anywhere near a real family preservation program.”).
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a constitutional right to family preservation, even in cases involving child
maltreatment.32
Santosky involved a challenge to New York’s civil child abuse law,
which permitted the termination of parental rights if a court determined,
based on “a preponderance of the evidence,” a child had been “permanently
neglected.”33 The Santoskys claimed this low evidentiary standard violated
their parental rights, and the Supreme Court agreed. According to the Court,
“[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody,
and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have
not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the
State.”34 The Court explained that until unfitness is proven, it must be
assumed that parents and their child speak with one voice and share an
interest in preventing termination. 35 After Santosky, a state needed to
demonstrate “clear and convincing” evidence of neglect before it could
terminate parental rights.36
Santosky was a win for family preservation. However, the case troubled
child protection advocates, many of whom were already concerned about
the effects of family preservation policies on rates of child abuse. These
advocates feared that, by making it more difficult for states to terminate
parental rights, the Santosky Court had increased the likelihood “that
children [would be] return[ed] to the care of maltreating parents.” 37 One of
the most prominent of these critics was Richard Gelles, the author of the
popular book The Book of David: How Preserving Families Can Cost
Children’s Lives.38

32. 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982), cited in Houston, supra note 9, at 33.
33. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 774.
34. Id. at 755.
35. Id. at 760 (“[U]ntil the State proves parental unfitness, the child and his parents
share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship.”); see
also Ross, supra note 28, at 184 (“[O]nly after the State proves parental unfitness, are the
interests of parent and child deemed to ‘diverge.’”). The fiction of this assumption was
emphasized by the fact that one of the children, “who had been removed from his parents
when he was only three days old, was seven when the case was argued and had never lived
with his parents” and thus could not be assumed to share their interests. “Yet even on those
facts, the Court preserved the legal fiction . . . .” Id.
36. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747–48.
37. Houston, supra note 12, at 33–34.
38. GELLES, supra note 16.
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Gelles’ book recounted numerous stories of children returned to their
families who then experienced further abuse and, in some cases, death. 39
Gelles argued these tragedies were the result of family preservation laws
and policies, which forced social workers and courts to return children to
their biological families even when such return endangered the children’s
lives.40 According to Gelles, “the basic flaw of the child protection system
is that it has two inherently contradictory goals: protecting children and
preserving families.”41 Gelles believed family preservation policies were
antithetical to children’s rights, and other child welfare advocates soon
adopted this view.
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, increasing numbers of child
welfare advocates challenged the Santosky Court’s position that children—
particularly abused children—should be assumed to share the same interests
as their abusing parents. These advocates considered such assumptions
dangerous, and they sought legal reforms requiring courts and child welfare
agencies to focus on children’s needs as separate from their family’s
needs. 42 In making these arguments, child welfare advocates relied heavily
on the “psychological parent” theory of Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and
Albert J. Solnit.43 According to this theory, “[w]hether any adult becomes
the psychological parent of a child is based . . . on day-to-day interaction,
companionship, and shared experiences.”44 Consequently, “[t]he role can be
fulfilled either by a biological parent . . . or by any other caring adult.” 45
The psychological parent theory supported child welfare advocates’
position that if a child cannot return home quickly, the best alternative is to

39. Id.; see also Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The Promise and
Failure of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REV. 637, 647 (1999)
(noting the numerous cases of children returned to abusing parents).
40. GELLES, supra note 16, at 152.
41. Id.
42. Sarah Katz, The Value of Permanency: State Implementation of Legal Guardianship
Under the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1079, 1092–93;
Houston, supra note 12, at 34.
43. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1986) (regarding
the role of child professionals in child placement decisions); JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL.,
BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979) (addressing the grounds for intervention);
JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973) [hereinafter
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS].
44. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 43, at 19.
45. Id.
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sever the child’s “ties with their biological family and formalize
attachments to the current caregivers.”46
During this period, many legal scholars also became ardent opponents of
family preservation policies. One prominent critic was Professor Elizabeth
Bartholet, who forcefully challenged the idea that family preservation
policies serve children’s interests and suggested that “children would
generally be better served by policies encouraging child protection workers
to intervene earlier and more often to remove victimized children from
maltreating parents, to terminate parental rights, and to place children in
adoption.”47 Professor Bartholet and other family preservation critics
recognized that their approach, which favored permanent removal over
reunification, could create unfairness to parents; however, they argued that
any potential unfairness was outweighed by the benefits.48 Ultimately, these

46. Katz, supra note 42, at 1093. Other medical and scientific research also seemed to
support this position. For example, in a 1996 article, Dr. Amy Henegan and her colleagues
advised:
[M]ore attention should be directed toward determining whether the child’s
overall functioning has improved because of the services received. Has abuse
or neglect reoccurred? Have the child’s growth and development been
optimized? Has the child’s cognitive and social development shown changes
for the better? These and other outcomes will need to be addressed to obtain a
clearer understanding of the benefits and limitations of family preservation . . . .
Alternatives to family preservation, such as permanency planning (adoption)
and foster care, also must be reexamined . . . Applying family preservation to
every family, as a matter of policy, may actually be placing children at risk.
Amy M. Heneghan et al., Evaluating Intensive Family Preservation Programs: A
Methodological Review, 97 PEDIATRICS 535, 541 (1996); see also 2 WESTAT ET AL.,
EVALUATION OF FAMILY PRESERVATION AND REUNIFICATION PROGRAMS: FINAL REPORT 9-1
(2002), https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/180326/report2.pdf (finding no evidence that
families receiving IFPS were better able to avoid foster care placement). But see Wexler,
supra note 27, at 136–37 (concluding that at least one of these studies was defective on
numerous grounds and thus unreliable).
47. Elizabeth Bartholet, Creating a Child-Friendly Child Welfare System: Effective
Early Intervention to Prevent Maltreatment and Protect Victimized Children, 60 BUFF. L.
REV. 1323, 1325 (2012) (citing her book ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY’S CHILDREN:
ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE (1999) [hereinafter
BARTHOLET, NOBODY’S CHILDREN]).
48. Gordon, supra note 39, at 657 (“Even when it is possible to prioritize children in a
general way, putting them first in specific situations is often ‘difficult and painful.’ It is
difficult because adults do not have children’s needs and cannot easily see what they are. It
is painful because what is good for children may be unfair to adults.”) (footnote omitted)
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arguments persuaded Congress and, in 1997, the Adoption and Safe
Families Act was passed.49
C. ASFA
When the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA)50 was
enacted, nearly half-a-million children were in foster care.51 Foster care was
designed as a temporary solution; however, by this time, it had become
increasingly clear that substantial numbers of foster children would never
rejoin their parents. Many child welfare advocates blamed family
reunification policies for this predicament. 52 They claimed that the
emphasis on reunification had doomed these children to either a childhood
in foster care53 or to the repeated dangers of an unsafe familial home. 54 The
(quoting JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD : THE LEAST
DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE 81 (1996)).
49. 143 CONG. REC. H2017 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997).
50. Pub. L. No. 105–89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
51. DONALD DUQUETTE & MARK HARDIN, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND STATE LEGISLATION GOVERNING PERMANENCE FOR
CHILDREN I-7 (1999).
52. See, e.g., Allison E. Korn, Detoxing the Child Welfare System, 23 VA. J. SOC.
POL'Y & L. 293, 336 (2016) (noting such advocates “blamed the foster care surge on ideas
of family preservation and an emphasis on reunification of children in foster care with their
families”). See generally BARTHOLET, NOBODY’S CHILDREN, supra note 47 (arguing

that the policy of family preservation is flawed, that it fails to keep children with
their families and instead, subjects them to years of harmful foster care).

53. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Is There Justice in Children's Rights?: The Critique of
Federal Family Preservation Policy, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 112, 128 (1999–2000) (“Family
preservation policies were blamed both for arbitrarily returning children to violent homes
and for inflating the foster care population.”).
54. Dorothy E. Roberts, Poverty, Race, and New Directions in Child Welfare Policy, 1
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 63, 66 (1999) (“The congressional testimony and newspaper articles
during the pre-ASFA hearings emphasized cases of children who were returned home and
killed.”); see also 143 CONG. REC. H10776-05, H10789 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement
of Rep. Pryce). When lobbying for the ASFA’s passage, “one senate member told Congress
the story of extreme abuse of an eight year old boy by his aunt in October 1997.” Kathleen
A. Bailie, Note, The Other “Neglected” Parties in Child Protective Proceedings: Parents in
Poverty and the Role of the Lawyers Who Represent Them, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2285, 2292
(1998).
Using this tragedy as an example of the danger of the family preservation
philosophy, the senator remarked: “Don’t we have to ask . . . what on Earth was
that woman doing taking care of that child? Why in the world was that child
put back into that same home, put back with that abusive woman?”
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ASFA’s remedy was to encourage speedy terminations and adoptions. 55
The law’s supporters believed this would prevent children from being
returned to unsafe familial homes while also helping them find safe and
loving adoptive families. 56
The ASFA reflected changed ideas about children’s best interests.57 By
the time it was enacted, most advocates favored a child-centered approach
to child welfare. They emphasized children’s rights over parental rights 58
and believed previous reunification policies, particularly the AACWA,
protected parents’ rights at the expense of their children. 59 This shifting
view of child welfare is apparent in the discussion surrounding the ASFA’s
passage. For example, in explaining his support for the ASFA, Senator
Mike DeWine said, “[W]e have to start worrying [more] about the
children’s rights and less about the rights of the natural parents.” 60
Similarly, Rep. Steny Hoyer said, “[O]ur child welfare system too often
protects parents’ rights rather than children’s rights.”61 The ASFA was a
clear reversal of this prior policy.
The ASFA favored adoption over reunification and did so in two
particular categories of cases. First, the ASFA favored adoption in cases
where a court could make an early determination that it would be unsafe for
the child to return home due to “aggravated circumstances,” such as severe
abuse. Second, it favored adoption in the cases of children who have “been
Id. at 2292–93 (alteration in original).
55. Garrison, supra note 10, at 591–92 (“In order to curb growth of the foster care
population, ASFA mandates parental rights termination if a child has been in state care for
fifteen of the past twenty-two months.”).
56. Id. (noting ASFA was touted as the as the best and possibly only means “to curb the
human and public costs of prolonged foster care”).
57. This change is reflected in the guidelines issued by the Department of Health and
Human Services for implementing ASFA which were “developed by a cross-disciplinary
group of experts in child welfare, comprised of administrators, lawyers, judges, advocates
and front-line workers” and “reflect their best thinking about child welfare policy
frameworks and what ought to be.” DUQUETTE & HARDIN, supra note 52, at i (quoting Carol
Williams, Assoc. Comm’r, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.), quoted in Ross, supra note 28,
at 196 n.87.
58. See Bartholet, The Racial Disproportionality Movement, supra note 11, at 928
(describing the ASFA as a “good law because it shifts the balance in child welfare law and
policy somewhat in the direction of valuing children’s rights more, and parents’ rights less”).
See generally Yablon-Zug, supra note 18 (describing the shift from the AACWA to ASFA).
59. See Yablon-Zug, supra note 18.
60. 143 CONG. REC. S3947-02 (daily ed. May 5, 1997).
61. 143 CONG. REC. H2021 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997).
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in foster care under the responsibility of the State for 15 of the most recent
22 months.”62 In both types of cases, the ASFA promotes adoption by
reducing the amount of time a child spends in foster care while waiting to
reunite with his or her birth parents. To that end, the statute also states that
“reasonable efforts” are often not required in cases of abuse and neglect, 63
and that permanency hearings must be scheduled after twelve months,
lessening the time period for reunification efforts to have an effect. 64 As

62. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105–89, § 103(a)(3)(E), 111
Stat. 2115, 2118 (codified as amended in various sections of 42 U.S.C.).
63. Under the ASFA,
states are not required to use reasonable efforts to preserve or reunify families
in cases where the child had been subject to “aggravated circumstances.”
Aggravated circumstances are defined by state law, and may include
abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, or sexual abuse. States may also forego
reasonable efforts in cases where a parent has been convicted of murder or
voluntary manslaughter of another child or felony assault resulting in serious
bodily injury to the child or another child, or where parental rights to a sibling
have been terminated involuntarily.
Houston, supra note 9, at 35.
64.
[T]he 1997 Act specifies a twelve-month period for the state to hold a
permanency hearing. This shorter period of time lessens the opportunity for any
beneficial results from state reasonable efforts expended to reunite the family;
concomitantly, the shorter time frame lessens the time that a child will spend in
foster care while waiting for parental conduct to improve.
Raymond C. O’Brien, Reasonable Efforts and Parent-Child Reunification, 2013 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 1029, 1044. In addition,
ASFA also requires states to file a petition to terminate parental rights where a
child has been in foster care for fifteen of the last twenty-two months, or where
a child has been removed from the home and a court finds that the parent has
committed murder or voluntary manslaughter of another child or felony assault
resulting in serious bodily injury to the child or another child.
Houston, supra note 9, at 35; see also Laura Grzetic Eibsen & Toni J. Gray, Dependency
and Neglect Appeals Under C.A.R. 3.4, COLO. LAW., Oct. 2007, at 55, 55 (“The federally
mandated reasonable efforts requirement underwent a transformation whereby the focus on
reunification was broadened to place greater emphasis on the health and safety of the child.
Furthermore, the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, with its mandate to place children
in permanent homes as soon as possible, recognized ‘the important element of time.’ Thus,
there was a shift in focus from family reunification per se to ‘time-limited family
reunification services.’”).
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Ohio Senator Mike DeWine noted, the ASFA represented a “historic
change” in federal child welfare law. 65
Courts interpreting the ASFA also recognized that the legislation
represented a seismic shift in child welfare policy. For example, when the
Iowa Supreme Court first applied the law, the court spoke of the
“transformation” it represented and how “the family preservation concept
which guided our general national policy for the last two decades [is now]
found to be detrimental to children in some cases.” 66 Similarly, a Delaware
family court described the ASFA’s “departure in philosophical focus from
[AACWA]”67 explaining “that the safety of the child and the child’s need
for permanency are [ASFA’s] foremost concerns, as opposed to the
inherent rights of the biological parents.”68 In addition, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court noted that the ASFA “make[s] clear that the health and
safety of the child supersede all other considerations.”69
As these courts understood, the ASFA encourages speedy terminations
and adoptions and assumes family preservation is often contrary to

65. See 143 CONG. REC. S12668, S12670 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen.
DeWine).
66. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000).
67. Bean, supra note 7, at 335 (quoting In re Rasheta D., No. 98-08-07-TN, 2000 WL
1693157, at *20 (Del. Fam. Ct. Mar. 2, 2000)); see N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v.
A.R.G., 824 A.2d 213, 233 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003), aff’d in part, modified in part
and remanded sub nom. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.R.G, 845 A.2d 106 (N.J.
2004) (rejecting mother’s argument that the agency had not made reasonable efforts to keep
the daughter in the home and finding, based on ASFA that such efforts were not on the
health and safety of the child). Similar remarks were made by the New Jersey Supreme
Court which described the statute as having “limit[ed] the reasonable efforts social service
agencies must undertake to reunite families.” In re Guardianship of DMH, 736 A.2d 1261,
1273 (N.J. 1999).
68. Bean, supra note 7, at 335 (quoting In re Rasheta D., No. 98-08-07-TN, 2000 WL
1693157, at *20 (Del. Fam. Ct. Mar. 2, 2000) (alteration in original).
69. In re Lilley, 719 A.2d 327, 333 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998); see In re Guardianship of
DMH, 736 A.2d at 1273. Post-ASFA courts viewed ASFA as a directive to interpret the
“reasonable” in “reasonable efforts,” in a manner that would allow “agency reunification
efforts [to] qualify as reasonable more quickly and easily than” prior to the ASFA’s passage.
Bean, supra note 7, at 334 (noting that the primary way in which courts lessened the
reasonable reunification efforts requirement was by focusing “on the health and safety of the
child,” which courts perceived as the ASFA’s overriding concern); see also State ex rel.
Child., Youth & Fams. Dep’t, 47 P.3d 859, 864 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002) (describing the statute
as having “unquestionably had an impact on what is regarded as a reasonable effort.”).
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children’s best interests.70 Thus, the ASFA created a problem for the ICWA
and its supporters. After the ASFA’s enactment, the ICWA no longer
aligned with state and federal child welfare policies. Indian children were
exempt from the direct application of the statute, but its passage indicated
that the policies of family preservation and reunification, the policies
undergirding the ICWA, were harmful.
Current ICWA challenges are based on this history and the continuing
perception that the ICWA contradicts child welfare best practices.
However, these cases ignore the fact that child welfare practices are
changing once again and that these practices increasingly reject the ASFA’s
policies of speedy termination and adoption.
D. Post-ASFA
Today, the ASFA is subject to significant disapproval, 71 and many of its
most important ideas are no longer considered best practices. 72 There is also
mounting evidence that the ASFA is particularly harmful for children of

70. The statute provides significant adoption subsidies while giving little
encouragement to relative placements or other non-adoptive options. A child being cared for
by a relative is one of the few exceptions to the speedy termination requirements. However,
as Professor Josh Gupta-Kagan has noted, there was no preference for kinship care or push
to place with relatives in the first instance which meant that the termination exception would
not apply even if there were relatives willing to receive the child. In addition, although
ASFA defined guardianship’s place as a permanency option, it was clearly not preferred, and
the Act provided no funds for guardianship subsidies. See Josh Gupta-Kagan, The New
Permanency, 19 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 1, 33 (2015) (“ASFA expanded adoption
subsidies, creating new adoption incentive payments that would flow directly to state
governments that increased the number of foster child adoptions.”); see also Ernestine S.
Gray, Judicial Viewpoints on ASFA, 29 CHILD L. PRAC. 62, 63 (2010) (discussing the lack of
encouragement for the other options).
71. See, e.g., Shanta Trivedi, The Harm of Child Removal, 43 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 523, 573 (2019) (“ASFA simply adopts the problems of its predecessors and
weakens the few protections . . . .”); DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF
CHILD WELFARE 113 (2002) (arguing that ASFA’s emphasis on adoption is harmful to
children and perpetuates a racist and overly-punitive child welfare system); Wexler, supra
note 27 (arguing that ASFA has made children less safe and primarily targets poor families).
72. See, e.g., Rachel Leigh, Note, Analyzing the Special Needs Designation and
Accommodation of Parental Racial Preferences in Adoption, 22 J. GENDER RACE & JUST.
375, 392 (2019) (“[T]here are many critics to ASFA, claiming it goes too far in the direction
away from family preservation.”); see also Trivedi, supra note 71, at 566 (describing “a shift
away from ASFA back towards family preservation and reunification”).
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color.73 Multiple studies demonstrate that African American children enter
and remain in foster care in numbers disproportionate to their percentage of
the general population. 74 Moreover, as Professor Tanya Washington has
noted, not only do these children enter foster care at higher rates, but
“children of color [also] tend to receive fewer services, stay in care longer,
and generally have worse outcomes than white children.”75
This over-representation problem is similar to that which spurred the
passage of the ICWA and is one of the reasons why state and federal child
welfare policies are reembracing family preservation. 76 The renewed
interest in family preservation is further encouraged by emerging research
demonstrating the importance of kinship care, cultural competency, and
community support.77 Still, despite the fact that state and federal support for
family preservation is growing, challenges to the ICWA are simultaneously
becoming more frequent and more alarming.
II. The ICWA Challenges
For over four decades, the ICWA has been subject to legal challenges.
Initially, these challenges tended to accept the Act as generally beneficial
but claimed that its application to a particular case or set of cases would be
unjust.78 Over time, this has changed. Today’s challenges focus on
eliminating the Act in its entirety and assume the Act is primarily harmful.
73. See Tanya M. Washington, Throwing Black Babies Out with the Bathwater: A
Child-Centered Challenge to Same-Sex Adoption Bans, 6 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 1,
19–20 (2009).
74.
Nationally, African-American children made up less than 15 percent of the
overall child population in the 2000 census, but that they represented 27
percent of the children who entered foster care during the fiscal year 2004, and
they represented 34 percent of the children remaining in foster care at the end
of that year.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-816, AFRICAN AMERICAN CHILDREN IN FOSTER
CARE 7 (2007), quoted in Gray, supra note 70, at 63.
75. Gray, supra note 70, at 63.
76. See infra Part III.
77. See infra Part III.
78. Although the Act is widely considered one of the most important pieces of federal
Indian legislation, proving the IWCA’s success is difficult. Judicial exceptions and agency
non-compliance, see infra notes 183–184, 191 and accompanying text, are among the
reasons it is often so difficult to determine the success of the ICWA. Nevertheless, even with
these obstacles there is significant evidence that ICWA is serving its congressional purpose.
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A. Early ICWA Challenges
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield79 was the Supreme
Court’s first ICWA case. Holyfield involved section 1911(a) of the ICWA,
which states that tribes have exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving
reservation-domiciled Indian children, so such cases must be transferred to
tribal court.80 In Holyfield, the Indian parents were both domiciled on the
reservation, but the mother left the reservation to give birth and then placed
her twin babies for adoption with a non-Indian couple.81 The potential
adoptive parents were fit and loving82 and, under state law, the adoptive
placement would have been permissible. 83 However, because the case was
governed by the ICWA, the state court lacked jurisdiction84 and the Tribe
had exclusive jurisdiction to determine the children’s placement. 85 The
Holyfields challenged the Tribe’s exclusive jurisdiction and argued that
permitting the Tribe to determine the children’s placement was contrary to
the children’s best interests.86
See Sarah Krakoff, They Were Here First: American Indian Tribes, Race, and the
Constitutional Minimum, 69 STAN. L. REV. 491, 508 (2017) (“[T]he assessments to date
indicate that ICWA, when properly implemented, achieves its goals.”) (citing Gordon E.
Limb et al., An Empirical Examination of the Indian Child Welfare Act and Its Impact on
Cultural and Familial Preservation for American Indian Children, 28 CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 1279, 1280–82 (2004); Ann E. MacEachron et al., The Effectiveness of the Indian
Child Welfare Act of 1978, 70 SOC. SERV. REV. 451, 454–60 (1996)). Professor Krakoff
further notes that “[m]ost studies of ICWA, including a 2005 Government Accountability
Office report, note that insufficient recordkeeping and data collection hamper assessments of
ICWA compliance and outcomes.” Id. at 508 n.94 (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFF., GAO-05-290, INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT : EXISTING INFORMATION ON
IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES COULD BE USED TO TARGET GUIDANCE AND ASSISTANCE TO STATES
4–5 (2005), https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-05-290 [hereinafter GAO, INDIAN CHILD
WELFARE ACT]; Margaret C. Plantz et al., Indian Child Welfare: A Status Report, 18 CHILD.
TODAY 24 (1989)).
79. 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
80. Id. at 36.
81. Id. at 37–38.
82. Solangel Maldonado, Race, Culture, and Adoption: Lessons from Mississippi Band
of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 17 (2008) (“[B]y all
accounts, [Joan Holyfield] was a loving parent who provided a stable home environment.”).
83. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 38.
84. Id. at 52–53.
85. Id. at 53.
86. The irony of this custody case, is that the after winning on the jurisdictional issue
and thus, winning the right to decide the children’s placement, the Tribe ultimately made the
same placement determination as the state court would have. The fear that the tribal court
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The Holyfield couple lost, but many subsequent challenges were
successful and resulted in the creation of significant exceptions to the Act’s
application. The two most notable exceptions used during this period were
the “existing Indian family” exception and the “good cause” exception. 87
1. Existing Indian Family (EIF) Exception
One of the earliest ICWA exception cases was The Kansas Supreme
Court case In re Adoption of Baby Boy L.88 Baby Boy L concerned the
adoption of an Indian child by a non-Indian family.89 The adoption would
have been permissible under state law, but not under ICWA. 90 The Baby
Boy L court considered this difference problematic and contrary to the
child’s best interests.91 As a result, the court created an exception to the
ICWA for Indian children who have never spent time as part of an Indian

would not consider the children’s best interests was unfounded. See Maldonado, supra note
82, at 17 (“[O]ne might have expected the Tribal Court to return the twins to the Tribe.
However, the Tribal Court balanced the Tribes' interest in keeping tribal children in tribal
communities against the children's interests in continuity and stability.”).
87. See, e.g., Kirk Albertson, Applying Twenty-Five Years of Experience: The Iowa
Indian Child Welfare Act, 29 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 193, 195 (2004-2005) (“State courts have
created exceptions to the applicability of ICWA, most notably the ‘existing Indian family’
exception[, . . . [and] have taken great liberty with the ‘good cause’ language in § 1915 to
deviate from the stated placement preferences.”).
88. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982), overruled by In re A.J.S.,
204 P.3d 543 (Kan. 2009).
89. Baby Boy L involved a child of mixed heritage:
In that dispute, the unmarried non-Indian mother sought to voluntarily
relinquish her child for adoption by a non-Indian couple. The Indian father and
the tribe objected, arguing that the tribe had a right to intervene in the
proceedings and that the trial court should comply with the placement priorities
of the ICWA. Rejecting the application of the ICWA outright, the Kansas
Supreme Court reasoned that because the child was not being removed from an
existing Indian family no legislative purpose of the ICWA would be served by
allowing intervention by the tribe.
Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare Act: Toward a New
Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J. 587, 626 (2002) [hereinafter
Atwood, Flashpoints]; see also Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 174.
90. Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 175–76.
91. Id. at 174 (finding that the ICWA “if applied as requested by the appellants, would
also be inconsistent, contradictory, and would accomplish no worthwhile or useful
purpose.”).
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family.92 Under this exception, the court determines whether the Indian
child is part of an “existing Indian family” and, if they are not, the court
finds the ICWA inapplicable. 93 For decades, this exception meant the
ICWA was not protecting a sizable portion of Indian children. Eventually,
after tireless advocacy, this exception was eliminated. 94
92. Id. at 175–76. Typically, these cases involved bi-racial children who have only been
in the custody of their non-Indian parents or relatives. See Atwood, Flashpoints, supra note
89, at 626 (“[C]ourts that have followed the lead of the Kansas Supreme Court have invoked
the exception in a variety of circumstances, the exception has been asserted most often in
disputes involving children of mixed heritage, with the Baby Boy L. factual paradigm
appearing with particular prominence.”).
93. After decades of litigation and advocacy work, the EIF exception has now mostly
been repudiated. See infra note 93 and accompanying text. However, this victory was short
lived. In 2013 the Supreme Court decided Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, which created a
new exception based on reasoning similar to the EIF doctrine. 570 U.S. 637 (2013). The
Court’s discussion of the importance of prior custody is very similar to EIF, see id. at 649
(explaining that when an Indian parent has never had legal or physical custody the ICWA is
inapplicable because “the ICWA’s primary goal of preventing the unwarranted removal of
Indian children and the dissolution of Indian families is not implicated.”). However, the
exception created under Adoptive Couple is narrower than the EIF exception since, unlike
previous EIF cases, it does not prevent the applicability of other ICWA provisions to
children not previously in the custody of an Indian parent.. Marcia A. Zug, The Real Impact
of Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl: The Existing Indian Family Doctrine Is Not Affirmed, but
the Future of the ICWA's Placement Preferences Is Jeopardized, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 327,
338–39 (2014).
Some scholars have argued that although Adoptive Couple does not specifically endorse
the EIF, anti-ICWA groups “may view the Court’s reasoning as at least an indirect basis for
renewing efforts in states that have never addressed the issue or have rejected the
exception.” Caroline M. Turner, Implementing and Defending the Indian Child Welfare Act
Through Revised State Requirements, 49 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 501, 525 (2016).
94. See 25 C.F.R. § 23.103 (2016). Although the rule does not use the exact
nomenclature of the EIF exception, it includes a “mandatory prohibition on consideration of
certain listed factors, because they are not relevant to the inquiry of whether the statute
applies.” Bureau of Indian Affs., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, RIN 1076-AF25, Indian Child
Welfare Act Proceedings 93 (2016), https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/bia/ois/
pdf/idc1-034238.pdf [hereinafter BIA, ICWA PROCEEDINGS], quoted in Elizabeth
MacLachlan, Comment, Tensions Underlying the Indian Child Welfare Act: Tribal
Jurisdiction over Traditional State Court Family Law Matters, 2018 BYU L. REV. 455, 494.
These prohibited factors include “the participation of the parents or the Indian child in Tribal
cultural, social, religious, or political activities, the relationship between the Indian child and
his or her parents, whether the parent ever had custody of the child, or the Indian child's
blood quantum.” Id. § 23.103(c). However, even before the codification of the BIA
regulations, the EIF exception was no longer widely accepted. See BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFS.,
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE
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2. Good Cause Exception
The second exception courts employed in response to the ICWA
challenges was the “good cause” exception. The ICWA permits deviation
from the ICWA’s placement preferences for “good cause,” but does not
define the term. 95 As a result, courts began crafting their own definition,
which was frequently little more than a best interests standard. 96 Like many
existing Indian family cases, the good cause exception is often used when
the court seeks to place an Indian child in a non-Indian home that would be
acceptable under state law but is impermissible under the ICWA. 97 In such
cases, courts use good cause as an end run around the ICWA
requirements. 98 In 2016, the problem of courts abusing the good cause
exception was addressed through the codification of Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) regulations defining “good cause.” 99 Now, courts must use
this mandated definition to decide whether good cause exists to deviate

ACT 15 (2016), https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/bia/ois/pdf/idc2-056831.pdf
[hereinafter BIA, ICWA GUIDELINES]; BIA, ICWA PROCEEDINGS, supra, at 92 (noting that
only a handful of states still applied the exception).
95. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b).
96. See, e.g., In re Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-8287, 828 P.2d 1245, 1251 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1991); Adoption of N.P.S., 868 P.2d 934, 936 (Alaska 1994).
97. These cases typically involve children of mixed Indian heritage and the exception is
frequently used to keep these children in a non-Indian home in which they have been living
for a period of time. Atwood, Flashpoints, supra note 89, at 645 (“[S]tate courts concluding
that the child’s best interests require a permanent placement that will preserve existing
emotional bonds and attachments.”).
98. See, e.g., In re Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d 1361 (Alaska 1993) (finding that the
child’s attachment to the non-Indian adoptive mother and other considerations constituted
good cause for placing the child with non-Indian parents); In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d
507, 526 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (holding the children have a “constitutionally protected
interest in their relationship with the only family they have ever known” and refusing to
apply the ICWA) (superseded by statute on another ground, as stated in In re Santos Y., 92
Cal. App. 4th 1274, 1312 (2001), but that statute, 2006 Cal. Stat. ch. 838, § 47, was then
subsequently repealed); In re Custody of S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d 872 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993), rev'd, 521 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. 1994) (finding good cause to place the children in the
non-Indian adoptive home because the children had bonded with the potential adoptive
parents and an Indian adoptive home was not available); see also Albertson, supra note
87, at 208–09 (“State courts most often find good cause to deviate from the Act's placement
preferences because they apply a best interests test, ‘and then make an Anglo determination
of the Indian child's best interests.’”).
99. 25 C.F.R. § 23.132 (2016).
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from the placement preferences. As a result, this change has limited courts’
ability to use good cause to circumvent the ICWA’s requirements.100
B. Post-ASFA ICWA Cases
After the passage of the ASFA, the concern that the ICWA might be bad
for most Indian children, not just some, increasingly appeared in court
decisions applying the Act. Cases decided shortly after the ASFA’s
enactment show courts struggling to explain how the ICWA could protect
the best interests of Indian children while conflicting with otherwise
applicable state or federal child welfare policies. This struggle is apparent
in cases like In re W.H.D,101 in which a Texas appeals court explained “it is
not possible to comply” with both the best interest standard under the Texas
code and the best interest requirement under the ICWA because “the term
‘best interests of Indian children,’ as found in the ICWA, is different than
the general Anglo American ‘best interest of the child’ standard used in
cases involving non-Indian children.”102
The W.H.D. court held that it could still protect the best interests of
Indian children while applying the ICWA’s standard, but other courts found
the ASFA and ICWA standards impossible to reconcile. 103 For example, in
J.S. v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court acknowledged that the child
custody case was governed by the ICWA, yet it refused to apply the
applicable ICWA provision. Instead, the court looked to the ASFA for
guidance and explained that the congressional policy underlying the ASFA
is, or should be, the policy underlying the ICWA. 104
100. Id.
101. In re W.D.H., 43 S.W.3d 30, 36–37, 40 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001).
102. Id. at 36.
[I]t is not possible to comply with both the two-prong test of the Family Code,
which requires a determination of the best interest of the child under the
‘Anglo’ standard, and the ICWA, which views the best interest of the Indian
child in the context of maintaining the child’s relationship with the Indian
Tribe, culture, and family.
Id. at 36–37.
103. “[W]hat is best for an Indian child is to maintain ties with the Indian Tribe, culture,
and family.” Id. at 36.
104. J.S. v. State, 50 P.3d 388, 391–92 (Alaska 2002). As a result, the court refused to
apply ICWA’s active efforts requirement and replaced it was the aggravated circumstances
of ASFA. Id.; see Sheri L. Hazeltine, Speedy Termination of Alaska Native Parental Rights:
The 1998 Changes to Alaska’s Child in Need of Aid Statutes and Their Inherent Conflict
with the Mandates of the Federal Indian Child Welfare Act, 19 ALASKA L. REV. 57, 68 n.67
(2002).
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C. ICWA’s Statutory Differences
As the J.S. decision demonstrates, the ICWA is most vulnerable when it
differs from otherwise applicable child welfare laws. 105 The most
significant potential differences between the ICWA and the laws governing
non-ICWA cases concern “different burdens of proof,” “different
requirements regarding remedial services,” “different required sources of
proof,” and a different prioritization system governing the placement of a
child.106
1. Burden of Proof
The ICWA heightens the evidentiary burden needed to terminate parental
rights.107 Section 1912(f) of the Act states:
No termination of parental rights may be ordered in such
proceeding in the absence of a determination, supported by
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, . . . that the continued
custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to
result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. 108
In contrast, most state termination laws only require a showing of clear and
convincing evidence that remaining with the parent is not in the child’s best
interest.109
105. This includes both federal child welfare statutes like the ASFA as well as state child
welfare laws. J.S., 50 P.3d at 391–92.
106. Peter K. Wahl, Little Power to Help Brenda? A Defense of the Indian Child Welfare
Act and Its Continued Implementation in Minnesota, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 811, 827
(2000). This list is just referring to state court child custody cases involving Indian children.
Many Indian child custody cases are never heard in state court. The custody cases of
reservation domiciled children are under the exclusive jurisdiction of tribal courts.
Determining when a child is considered a domiciliary of an Indian reservation was the
subject of Mississippi Band of Choctaw v. Holyfield, the Supreme Court’s first ICWA case.
490 U.S. 30 (1989).
107. This is only for termination. Foster care placements are governed by a clear and
convincing evidence standard. See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e) (“No foster care placement may be
ordered in such proceeding in the absence of a determination, supported by clear and
convincing evidence, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued
custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional
or physical damage to the child.”).
108. Id. § 1912(f),
109. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11180 (West 2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2250 (West 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260C.163
(West 2017); W. VA. CODE § 49-4-601(i) (West 2019); see also Camille Workman, The
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2. Remedial Services
The ICWA also requires a different level of family reunification efforts
than is required in non-ICWA cases. In an ICWA proceeding, a court must
ensure the state-employed “active efforts” to remedy the problems that led
to removal and return the child to the child’s parents.110 In most non-ICWA
child welfare proceedings, the state is only required to show it made
“reasonable efforts.”111
3. Sources of Proof
In an ICWA proceeding in state court, the court must admit and consider
testimony by a qualified expert in Indian culture before it may order foster
care or terminate a parent’s rights over an Indian child. 112 For individuals to
be considered “qualified” under the Act, they must have particularized
knowledge regarding Indian culture.113 Such experts typically testify as to
whether an Indian child’s cultural needs can be met through a non-Indian
placement. 114 Cultural experts are not mandated in any other category of
child welfare proceedings.
4. Placement Preferences
Lastly, § 1915(a) of the ICWA provides an order of placement
preferences for adoptions. 115 Under this provision, first preference is to “be
2017 Uniform Parentage Act: A Response to the Changing Definition of Family?, 32 J. AM.
ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 233, 247 (2019) (“Most states now incorporate the use of
the clear and convincing standard in a termination hearing.”).
110. 25 U.S.C § 1912(d).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (effective Oct. 1, 2019) (requiring only reasonable
efforts); see also, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 419B.340(1) (West 2020) (making the explicit
distinction between “whether the department has made reasonable efforts or, if the Indian
Child Welfare Act applies, active efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the
ward from the home”).
112. See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f); Barbara Ann Atwood, Achieving Permanency for
American Indian and Alaska Native Children: Lessons from Tribal Traditions, 37 CAP. U. L.
REV. 239, 249 (2008) [hereinafter Atwood, Achieving Permanency].
113. Atwood, Achieving Permanency, supra note 112, at 249; see 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f).
114. Atwood, Achieving Permanency, supra note 112, at 249 n.48 (citing In re Adoption
of Sara J., 123 P.3d 1017, 1032 (Alaska 2005) (considering competing expert testimony on
whether the cultural needs of the Yup’ik children involved the case could be satisfied by a
non-Indian placement)).
115. “It is one of the most controversial sections of the ICWA because it necessarily
requires the consideration of race when placing children in adoptive homes.” Kathleena
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given to a member of the child’s extended family, then to other members of
the child’s tribe, and, finally, to other Indian families.”116 No state has this
type of explicit tiered placement requirement. 117 As a result, this provision
is often seen as mandating adoptive placements that differ greatly from
what would be expected in a non-ICWA case.
D. Baby Girl and the ICWA Backlash
The difference between the ICWA and state child welfare law was
vividly and emotionally highlighted in the 2015 Supreme Court case of
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl.118 Initially, Baby Girl appeared to be a
straight-forward ICWA violation case. Baby Girl was an Indian child as
defined by the ICWA, and her placement with a non-Indian adoptive
couple, instead of her biological father, appeared to be a clear violation of
the Act. 119 Her father had not consented to her adoption120 and, although the

Kruck, Note, The Indian Child Welfare Act’s Waning Power After Adoptive Couple v. Baby
Girl, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 445, 453 (2015).
116. Wahl, supra note 106, at 829.
ICWA is more specific in the placement preferences when Indian children are
placed in out-of-home foster care. Section 1915(b) of ICWA first requires that
the child be placed in the least restrictive setting which most resembles a
family. Second, the child must be placed within reasonable proximity to his or
her home. Finally, barring any good cause, the child first is to be placed with
extended family. If extended family is unavailable or unsuitable, the child is to
be placed in a foster home approved by the child’s tribe, then to a licensed
Indian foster home, and finally to an institution approved by the child’s tribe or
run by an Indian organization.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
117. The Act also requires a similar, although not identical, set of placement options that
apply when Indian children are placed in foster care. See 25 U.S.C. § 1915(b).
118. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 644 (2013) (“[F]or the duration of the
pregnancy and the first four months after Baby Girl's birth, Biological Father provided no
financial assistance to Birth Mother or Baby Girl . . . .”).
119. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 560 (S.C. 2012).
120. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. at 644–45.
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father’s consent wasn’t necessary under South Carolina law, 121 the family
court held that it was required under the ICWA. 122
On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the family
court’s decision, stating that the ICWA “mandates state courts consider
heightened federal requirements to terminate parental rights as to ICWA
parents.”123 Given this interpretation of the ICWA, the court agreed there
was no basis to terminate the father’s rights. 124 In addition, it noted that
even if there were termination grounds, the § 1915 placement preferences
meant the adoptive couple would still not be eligible to adopt the child. 125
The court then ordered Baby Girl returned to her father. 126
The Baby Girl decision led to a national outcry. 127 There were protests in
front of courthouses, teary interviews on national television, and hundreds
of thousands of dollars collected through fundraising appeals.128 In these
forums, the adoptive couple repeatedly argued that the ICWA was unfair
and harmful, and the non-Indian public responded with sympathy and

121. Under South Carolina law, failure to financially support the mother during
pregnancy constitutes ground for involuntary termination. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-2570(4)
(2017); cf. id. § 63-9-310 (2010) (establishing that, if the father supported the mother during
pregnancy, the father must consent to the adoption); see also Zug, supra note 93, at 340
(“Under South Carolina law, a parent's failure to provide financial support for a child
constitutes grounds for involuntary termination of that parent's parental rights.”).
122. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d at 556, 561.
123. Id. at 560.
124. Id. at 567.
125. Id. at 566–67.
126. Id. at 567.
127. See, e.g., Allyson Bird, Broken Home: The Save Veronica Story, CHARLESTON CITY
PAPER (Sept. 26, 2012, 4:01 AM), http://www.charlestoncitypaper.com/charleston/brokenhome/Content?oid=4185523; Veronica May Not Be Saved, ABC NEWS 4 (July 26, 2012),
http://www.abcnews4.com/story/19121303/veronica-may-not-be-saved; Anderson Cooper
360°: Baby Veronica's Story (CNN television broadcast Feb. 21, 2012); Adoption
Controversy: Battle over Baby Veronica, DR. PHIL (June 6, 2013), https://www.drphil.com/
shows/1895/.
128. Jane Burke, Note, The “Baby Veronica” Case: Current Implementation Problems of
the Indian Child Welfare Act, 60 WAYNE L. REV. 307 (2014) (“‘Save Veronica’ has become
a common phrase in the American South over the past year. It appears on the signs of local
businesses, is stamped on light purple bracelets, and is the rallying cry for fundraisers,
candlelight vigils, and cupcake sales on holidays. It is the topic of many newspaper articles
and television news broadcasts and was recently featured on an episode of the television
show ‘Dr. Phil’.”).
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agreement.129 Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the
case.
Ostensibly, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
the ICWA’s “reasonable doubt” standard, “active efforts” requirement, and
placement preferences were applicable to an unmarried father whose child
was placed for adoption at birth without his consent. 130 Nevertheless, it is
clear from the Court’s decision that it was also moved by the adoptive
couple’s arguments regarding the dangers of the ICWA. Like the adoptive
couple, the Court was extremely concerned that the Act harmed Indian
children by treating them differently from non-Indian children. 131 This
concern is evident in the majority’s declaration that “[i]t is undisputed that,
had Baby Girl not been 3/256 Cherokee, Biological Father would have had
no right to object to her adoption under South Carolina law.”132 It is also
revealed in the concurrence’s statement that “[ICWA’s] requirements often
lead to different outcomes than would result under state law. That is
precisely what happened here.”133
The Baby Girl Court worried that different outcomes meant the ICWA
was harming Baby Girl.134 As a result, the Court employed a tortured
reading of the Act to permit termination of the father’s parental rights and
prevent him from “play[ing] his ICWA trump card at the eleventh hour to
override the mother’s decision and the child’s best interests.” 135
Baby Girl was a turning point in ICWA litigation. The case brought the
ICWA and its “injustices” to national prominence. In addition, the Court’s
decision and sympathy with anti-ICWA arguments emboldened the Act’s
129. See supra note 127.
130. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 646 (2013).
131. In the years preceding Baby Girl, ICWA advocates had worked tirelessly to
eliminate the existing Indian family exception and, although the Court did not exactly bring
it back, it was a reversal in the efforts to ensure the Act’s protections apply to all Indian
parents. See, e.g., 10 OKLA. STAT. § 40.4 (2011); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232B.5(13) (West
2020); see also Philip (Jay) McCarthy, Jr., The Oncoming Storm: State Indian Child Welfare
Act Laws and the Clash of Tribal, Parental, and Child Rights, 15 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 43, 55
(2013) (describing this trend toward eliminating the EIF).
132. See Baby Girl, 570 U.S. at 646.
133. Id. at 658 (Thomas, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 655 (“The Indian Child Welfare Act was enacted to help preserve the cultural
identity and heritage of Indian tribes, but under the State Supreme Court's reading, the Act
would put certain vulnerable children at a great disadvantage solely because an ancestor—
even a remote one—was an Indian.”).
135. Id. at 656 (majority opinion).
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opponents.136 In the years since Baby Girl, challenges to the Act have
become more frequent and more dangerous. Constitutional objections to the
Act are now filed yearly and, unlike earlier ICWA lawsuits, current
challenges focus on eliminating the Act entirely. 137
Many of these lawsuits are brought by the Goldwater Institute, an
organization unapologetically dedicated to eliminating the ICWA. In fact,
since the anti-ICWA victory in Baby Girl, the Goldwater Institute has filed
thirteen complaints challenging the Act as a form of unconstitutional racial
discrimination.138 So far, nine of these suits have been unsuccessful; the
others remain pending.139 However, these suits are not the only ICWA
challenges. Goldwater’s aggressive anti-ICWA tactics have also been
adopted by other ICWA litigants. On October 4, 2018, in Brackeen v.
Zinke,140 anti-ICWA efforts finally succeeded. The Texas district court in
Brackeen became the first court to accept the claim that the ICWA is
discriminatory and unconstitutional.141
The Brackeen decision was reversed on appeal and then reheard before
an en banc panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 142 The Fifth
Circuit’s decision is currently pending.143 Still, regardless of the outcome,
Brackeen represents a turning point in ICWA litigation. For the first time, a

136. In addition, tribes have had increasing success fighting the application of the good
cause exception through the passage of state statutes which restrict the use of the good cause
exception and most recently through the codification of the BIA guidelines into binding
regulations. See BIA, ICWA GUIDELINES, supra note 94, at 49; see also 10 OKLA. STAT.
§ 40.4; IOWA CODE ANN. § 232B.5(13); McCarthy, supra note 131, at 55 (describing this
trend).
137. See infra notes 138–141 and accompanying text.
138. Bethany R. Berger, Savage Equalities, 94 WASH. L. REV. 583, 625 (2019) (citing
Civil Rights Class Action Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 15, A.D. v.
Washburn, No. 15-01259, 2016 WL 5464582 (D. Ariz. Sept. 29, 2016); Kathryn Fort &
Victoria Sweet, Outlier Outsiders: The ICWA Lawsuits and What Is Really Going On,
FEDBAR.ORG (May 8, 2019, 12:16 PM), https://perma.cc/DC8T-JVDU (slideshow)).
139. See id. at 626.
140. Brackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514 (N.D. Tex. 2018).
141. This case was not initiated by the Goldwater Institute, but they strongly support it
and did file an amicus brief in the Brackeen case. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Goldater [sic]
Institute, Brackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (No. 4:17-cv-868-O),
https://goldwaterinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/GIs-Brief-Amicus-Curiae.pdf.
142. Reversed by Brackeen v. Berhardt, 937 F.3d 406 (Tex. 5th Cir.), rehearing en banc
granted by 942 F.3d 287 (Tex. 5th Cir. 2019).
143. Id.
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federal district court accepted the argument that the ICWA, as a whole, is
harmful to Indian children and should be abolished. 144
E. Brackeen v. Zinke
Brackeen was a challenge to the constitutionality of the ICWA. The
court’s decision was based on the assumption that the Act requires different
outcomes in ICWA and non-ICWA cases and that these differences harm
Indian children. 145 Such arguments are not new and, in the past, these
concerns often led courts to create exceptions to the Act. 146 However, the
Brackeen court was the first to use this reasoning to invalidate the entire
Act. 147
The specific issue in Brackeen was whether the ICWA prevented the
Brackeens, a non-Indian couple, from adopting an Indian child when the
child also had an Indian family wishing to adopt him. 148 Under § 1915(a),
the tribal couple should have been a preferred placement and received
custody.149 However, the Brackeens objected. 150 They claimed that without
the ICWA, they would have been entitled to adopt the child. 151
Consequently, placement with the Indian family was both racially
discriminatory, because the ICWA only applied to Indian children, 152 and
harmful, because it was contrary to state child welfare law. 153
144. The district court found that “[t]he specific classification at issue in this case mirrors
the impermissible racial classification in Rice, and is legally and factually distinguishable
from the political classification in Mancari.” Brackeen, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 533. The court
therefore “concluded sections 1901–23 and 1951–52 of the ICWA are unconstitutional.” Id.
at 541-42.
145. Id. at 528–29 (noting the difference between a case decided under ICWA compared
with one evaluated under Texas law)..
146. See supra Sections II.A.1-.2 (discussing the Existing Indian Family exception and
the Good Cause exception).
147. “This decision is significant for the child welfare field because the district court’s
decision marked the first time a federal court found ICWA unconstitutional since its
enactment more than 40 years ago.” Fifth Circuit Holds Indian Child Welfare Act Is
Constitutional, AM. BAR ASS’N: CHILD L. PRAC. TODAY (Sept. 17, 2010), https://www.
americanbar.org/groups/public_interest/child_law/resources/child_law_practiceonline/januar
y---december-2019/fifth-circuit-holds-indian-child-welfare-act-is-constitutional/.
148. Brackeen, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 526.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 531.
153. Id. at 529.
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The Brackeens’ argument that the ICWA is a form of unconstitutional
racial discrimination should have been easily dismissed. As the government
noted, such racial discrimination arguments were settled by the Supreme
Court decades ago. 154 Well-established judicial precedent supported the
government’s argument that “Indian” is not a racial classification155 and that
154. In 1974, the Supreme Court decided Morton v. Mancari, and upheld a BIA hiring
preference which favored Indian candidates over non-Indian ones. 417 U.S. 535 (1974). The
Court held that the term “Indian” in this context was a political rather than racial
classification. Id. at 553 n.24. Moreover, in the decades since Mancari was decided, this
distinction has been repeatedly reaffirmed and also specifically held to apply to domestic
relations. For example, in Fisher v. District Court, the Court held that the state must
relinquish jurisdiction over and Indian adoption case because the tribe possessed exclusive
jurisdiction. 424 U.S. 382, 390–91 (1976). The Court explained that this jurisdictional
treatment was not due to race, but stemmed from the “quasi-sovereign status of
the . . . [t]ribe” and was therefore constitutional. Id. at 390. The Brackeen plaintiffs argued
that this precedent doesn’t apply and that the ICWA provisions were unconstitutional racial
classifications. Brief of Individual Plaintiffs-Appellees at 33–34, Brackeen, 338 F. Supp. 3d
514 (No. 4:17-cv-868-O), 2019 WL 571398.
155. The court accepted the Brackeens’ argument that ICWA should be treated like the
voter statute in Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000). Brackeen, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 531–
34. However, Rice is a rare exception to the Mancari doctrine. Nevertheless, the Brackeen
court held that ICWA had more in common with the statute at issue in Rice than the one in
Mancari. According to the court, eligibility for tribal membership is nothing like the actual
tribal membership at issue in Mancari. The Brackeen court held that eligibility for tribal
membership is akin to saying, “one is an Indian child if the child is related to a tribal
ancestor by blood” and, thus, according to the Brackeen court, is “similar to the ‘blanket
exemption for Indians,’ which Mancari noted would raise the difficult issue of racial
preferences.” Id. at 533. Therefore, because the Brackeen court held that ICWA uses
ancestry as a proxy for race, it must be analyzed under strict scrutiny. The Brackeen court’s
understanding of “eligibility” under the Act is, as a factual matter, wrong. One is not an
“Indian child” under the statute simply by having a tribal ancestor. Such an ancestor is a
necessary but far from sufficient condition for tribal membership. Under the Act, an “Indian
child” is a child who is already a member of a federally recognized tribe, or one “who is
eligible for membership and is the biological child” of a tribal member. Atwood,
Flashpoints, supra note 89, at 608 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4)). Children who have Native
ancestry but are neither members nor eligible for membership are not “Indian children”
under the Act. Id. Therefore, ICWA only applies to children that have a political connection
to a federally recognized tribe. The Act’s definition means that a child can be 100% Native
American yet exempt from ICWA’s coverage if neither parent is an enrolled tribal member.
See Brief for Indian Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants at 24–25,
Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2019) (No. 18-11479), https://turtletalk.
files.wordpress.com/2019/01/indian-law-scholars-amicus-as-filed.pdf (noting that by
omitting the part of the definition that requires children eligible for membership to have a
biological parent who is a “member of an Indian tribe,” 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4)(b) (emphasis
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the designation “Indian” as used in the Act is a political, and not racial,
classification.156 Based on this precedent, the government correctly noted
that laws singling out Indians are permissible as long as it can be
demonstrated that such laws are “rationally” related to “the fulfillment of
Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indians.” 157 In addition, the
government also pointed out that numerous court decisions had rejected the
Brackeens’ specific claim that the ICWA is unconstitutional race
discrimination,158 and that there was nothing in the facts of the Brackeen
case to distinguish it from these previous challenges. 159 In fact, the only
added), the court lopped off the part of the statute that plants it firmly on the “political” side
of Mancari’s distinction). The district court therefore incorrectly concluded that ICWA’s
distinction was based on “blood” rather than political membership. Brackeen, 937 F.3d at
425–29. The comparison with Rice is also incorrect. The Rice Court refused to extend
Mancari in that case because it would have permitted the State, “by racial classification, to
fence out whole classes of its citizens from decisionmaking in critical state affairs.” Rice,
528 U.S. at 522. In contrast, as Atwood notes, the ICWA
is designed precisely to benefit Indian children as tribal members and to protect
tribal survival by ensuring the prominence of the tribe’s voice in child welfare
proceedings. Unlike the scheme involved in Rice, tribal self-government is
directly served by the jurisdictional and procedural protections afforded tribes
under the Act. So long as the Act’s key definition of “Indian child” remains
intact, the constitutionality would seem secure, even when applied to cases
involving children whose families have not maintained meaningful affiliation
with their tribes.
Atwood, Flashpoints, supra note 89, at 632.
156. Brackeen, 937 F.3d at 427; Mancari, 417 U.S. 535.
157. Brackeen, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 531 (citing Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554–55).
158. The district court first held that ICWA’s preference to place Indian children in
Indian homes is race-based, and under “strict scrutiny” review, the law is not narrowly
tailored to further a compelling government interest. Id. at 534. The district court held that
ICWA, therefore, violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause. Id. This holding ignores well-established Supreme Court precedent
regarding American Indian tribes as political entities, not racial groups, to which the federal
government owes a unique trust responsibility. See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554–55. It is also
noteworthy that just one year earlier, the Supreme Court declined to review the argument
that ICWA is a race-based law, resulting in the upholding of an Arizona Court of Appeals’
decision that ICWA is not based on race. See S.S. v. Stephanie H., 388 P.3d 569, 576 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. S.S. v. Colo. River Indian Tribes, 138 S. Ct. 380
(2017).
159. In its decision, the court also held the ICWA was unconstitutional because it
violated the anti-commandeering clause of the constitution by making the states implement
ICWA. However, although this argument has not been made before in the ICWA context, it
is also easily dismissed. As the Fifth Circuit noted, long-standing constitutional precedent
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novel aspect of the Brackeen case was that these regurgitated anti-ICWA
arguments were accepted. 160
The Brackeen decision rejected long-accepted arguments that the quasisovereign status of Indian tribes permits the different treatment of Indian
children and that this different treatment is beneficial. It showed that such
claims are now being met with judicial skepticism and disbelief and that the
traditional defenses of the Act are no longer sufficient. Consequently, to
ensure the ICWA’s future, the argument that the Act is a justifiable
exception to normally applicable child welfare law needs to be discarded.
Instead of defending the ICWA’s differences from state and federal child
welfare law, future defenses of the Act must emphasize its similarities. 161
The remainder of this Article argues that the alleged differences between
ICWA and non-ICWA cases are much greater than the actual differences.
Today, state welfare policies favoring quick separations and terminations
are being replaced with practices that closely align with the ICWA. Future
ICWA advocacy must highlight these similarities and work to increase
them. The strongest argument in favor of the ICWA is not that it is good for
Indian families, but that its policies are good for all families.

gives congress the right to pass laws and have state courts and agencies enforce them. See
Brackeen, 937 F.3d at 431 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178–79
(1992) (“Federal statutes enforceable in state courts do, in a sense, direct state judges to
enforce them, but this sort of federal ‘direction’ of state judges is mandated by the text of the
Supremacy Clause.”)).
160. This is not to concede any argument that potential differences are unconstitutional.
In fact, even harmful differences would be constitutional, but such arguments are not
winning the war of public opinion. In addition to the above line of Indian law cases, there
are also strong constitutional arguments that different treatment, even potentially harmful
treatment is constitutional under Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), Burt v. Oneida
Community, 33 N.E. 307 (N.Y. 1893), Smith v. Community Board No.14, 491 N.Y.S.2d 584
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985); and recognized by the New York legislature in Board of Education of
Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994). Glen O. Robinson,
Communities, 83 VA. L. REV. 269, 342 (1997) (“The accommodation of distinctive
communities is an essential part of what it means to be a liberal society. This tenet has been
central to the spirit of American pluralism from the founding of the Republic to the present.
On this principle there is no apparent basis for distinguishing between Indians and, say,
Amish, or Orthodox Jews.”).
161. See infra Part III.
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III. ICWA’s Shrinking Difference
Equal protection challenges to the ICWA, such as those made in
Brackeen, are premised on the assumption that Indian and non-Indian
children are being treated differently, and that this different treatment is
race-based and harmful. In addressing these arguments, ICWA advocates
contend that such differences are both constitutionally permissible and
beneficial. To support these arguments, many note the Act’s similarities
with current child welfare practices, 162 such as relative placements 163 and
family preservation.164 However, such arguments don’t go far enough. To
change the current perception that the ICWA is harmful, the Act’s
defenders must address directly the accusation of difference. They must
show that the similarities between the Act and current child welfare law are
not limited to one or two provisions but reflect an overall confluence of
purpose. 165
After the passage of the ASFA, the difference between ICWA and nonICWA cases was significant; thus, for many years, a claim of similarity
would have been incorrect. This is no longer the case. Rapid changes to
child welfare law and policy have eliminated many of the former
differences between ICWA and non-ICWA cases and recognizing these
changes is crucial to defending the Act. The growing alignment between
ICWA and non-ICWA cases means it is now easier to refute equal
protection challenges and the argument that the Act harms Indian children.
As discussed in Part II, the ICWA provisions that appear to differ the
most from state law are the burden of proof for termination, the need for
162. See, e.g., Brief of Casey Family Programs and 30 Other Organizations Working
with Children, Families, and Courts to Support Children’s Welfare as Amici Curiae in
Support of Appellants at 4, Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2019) (No. 1811479), https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2019/01/caseyamicusbrief.pdf (“Undoing the
careful work Congress has done to enact ICWA standards—which are grounded in bestpractices for all children—would cause enormous harm to Indian children and undermine the
ability of child welfare agencies and courts to serve them.”).
163. Id. at 9–10 (noting that all but two states give relative preference and such
preference is widely accepted as best for children who have to be removed from their
families).
164. Id. at 9 (“[The] most frequent guiding principle in state statutes for determining a
child’s best interests is the ‘importance of family integrity and preference for avoiding
removal of the child from his/her home.’”) (quoting CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY,
DETERMINING THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 2 (2016)).
165. One of the benefits of this approach is it would also permit ICWA’s defenders to
sidestep the question of whether Indians are a political or racial group.
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expert testimony, the level of remedial efforts required, and the placement
preferences. Upon closer examination, these apparent differences largely
disappear.
A. Different Burdens of Proofs
The ICWA requires a higher standard of proof for the termination of
Indian parents’ rights than required under state law. Specifically, under the
ICWA, parental rights may not be terminated without a showing beyond a
reasonable doubt “that the continued custody of the child by the parent or
Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage
to the child.”166 Conversely, most states only require clear and convincing
evidence that remaining with the parent is not in the child’s best interest
before permitting the termination of parental rights. At first glance, this
seems to be a significant difference, but this difference is illusory. Many
state termination cases employ a higher termination standard than clear and
convincing, while many ICWA cases are decided under a standard lower
than reasonable doubt.
1. Reinstatement of Parental Rights
In the decades since the ASFA’s passage, many states acknowledged that
the ASFA’s termination standard, which permits termination when a child
has been in state care for fifteen out of the previous twenty-two months, is
too lax.167 To remedy this problem, these states enacted statutes permitting
the reinstatement of parental rights after termination. 168 In 2005, California
166. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f).
167. Scholars have also argued for a higher termination standard, arguing to establish a
higher threshold “before terminating parental rights,” specifically a showing that child will
be adopted. See Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the
Termination of Parental Rights of Children in Foster Care—An Empirical Analysis in Two
States, 29 FAM. L.Q. 121, 135 (1995) (“[E]ven when preconditions to termination have been
proven by clear and convincing evidence, parental rights should not be terminated if reasons
exist to maintain the parent/child relationship. Termination of parental rights should only be
ordered upon a specific showing that termination is necessary to promote the child’s
welfare.”); see also Kirstin Andreasen, Eliminating the Legal Orphan Problem, 16 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 351, 353 (2007); Stephanie Smith Ledesma, The Vanishing of the
African-American Family: “Reasonable Efforts” and Its Connection To the
Disproportionality of the Child Welfare System, 9 CHARLESTON L. REV. 29, 71 (2014)
(suggesting that ICWA’s clear and convincing standard of removal should be applied to all
removal cases).
168. Cynthia Godsoe, Parsing Parenthood, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 113, 150 (2013)
(“The impetus behind reinstatement statutes is largely uniform: they are an attempt to
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was the first state to enact such legislation; 169 other states soon followed.
Currently, eighteen states have statutes permitting “rehabilitated” biological
parents to resume or assume parenting responsibilities for their children
after their parental rights were legally terminated. 170 Many of the cases
deemed appropriate for reinstatement are cases that would not have resulted
in termination under a higher evidentiary standard.
In her article, The Sky Is Not Falling: Lessons and Recommendations
from Ten Years of Reinstating Parental Rights, Professor Meredith L.
Schalick groups parental-rights reinstatement cases into three categories.
The first involves hard-to-locate parents. In these cases, parental rights are
terminated when a child has been removed to state care and the noncustodial parent cannot be quickly located. 171 For example, Professor
Schalick describes a particularly illustrative case involving a child who lost
contact with his father following the mother’s relocation to a new state. 172
The child was later removed from his mother due to neglect.173 Child
welfare officials then attempted to locate the father as a potential placement
and, when they failed to find him, his parental rights were terminated. 174
Several years later, through the use of social media, the child found his
father.175 The child’s lawyer then filed a successful petition to reinstate the
father’s rights.176 By reinstating the father’s rights, the court acknowledged
that termination had not been in the child’s best interest and, in effect,
retroactively increased the applicable termination standard.
The second category of reinstatement cases involves children living with
relatives, who continue to maintain contact with a parent despite the
termination of the parent’s rights.177 In these cases, the children seek to
return to their parent’s custody after their relative caregiver becomes unable

address the large number of legal orphans created by the increase in terminations under
ASFA.”).
169. CAL.WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(i)(3) (2017)..
170. For a complete list of states, see Meredith L. Schalick, The Sky Is Not Falling:
Lessons and Recommendations from Ten Years of Reinstating Parental Rights, 51 FAM. L.Q.
219, 220–21 (2017).
171. Id. at 226.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 226-27.
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to care for them, usually due to illness.178 Typically, the court then
reinstates the parent’s rights based on the fact that the child and parent
maintained their relationship despite termination. 179 By reinstating the
parent’s rights, these courts acknowledge that termination was not in the
child’s best interest and that a higher termination standard would have been
preferable.180
The third category of reinstatement cases involves teenagers who are
unlikely to be adopted and wish to maintain a relationship or reengage with
their biological parents. Courts reinstating parental rights in these cases
recognize that, although a child may not be able to return to his or her
parent’s care, he or she can still benefit from resuming a legal relationship
with the parents and extended family. Like the previous two categories of
cases, these reinstatement cases acknowledge the problems with speedy
terminations, and indicate that a higher standard of proof would have
benefitted the child.181
States that address the above situations through the enactment of
reinstatement statutes182 are, in effect, retroactively raising the applicable
termination standard.183 Reinstatement statutes bring state termination
policy closer to the ICWA’s policy by recognizing that the clear and
convincing termination standard may be inadequate to protect children from
the significant harm caused by the loss of the parental relationship.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. In one such example,
parental rights were reinstated for the biological mother of her client who had
an emancipation goal but who was living with the maternal grandmother in a
kinship foster care home. The grandmother was diagnosed with cancer and
became very ill. Because the biological mother had been seeing the child
several times a year for family holiday celebrations already, the court agreed
that reinstatement of parental rights was appropriate.
Id. at 227.
181. Id. at 227–28.
182. Until recently, most states barred biological parents from seeking to adopt their
children after the termination of their parental rights. Paula Polasky, Customary Adoptions
for Non-Indian Children: Borrowing from Tribal Traditions to Encourage Permanency for
Legal Orphans Through Bypassing Termination of Parental Rights, 30 LAW & INEQ. 401,
410 (2012) (“This would mean that if parental rights were terminated and the adoption of the
child failed, the birth parents would be barred from re-adopting their own child.”).
183. They are also moving closer to the tribal conception of the parent child relationship
which is the belief that the “natural parent-child relationship as something the court cannot
permanently and legally sever.” Id. at 410–11.
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2. EIF and Baby Girl
Reinstatement statutes reveal how states are raising their terminations
statutes above a clear and convincing standard. At the same time, ICWA
exceptions—such as the former EIF and good faith doctrines, and current
exceptions, such as that created in Baby Girl—illustrate how states are
often able to avoid the ICWA’s reasonable doubt standard. 184 As Teresa
Legere notes, “Because the evidentiary standard is so high, one might
conclude that the Indian families are adequately protected. The reality,
however, is that many state courts have created exceptions to the ICWA
and have interpreted the ICWA in a way that ‘renders many of its
provisions superfluous.’”185
When such exceptions apply, parental rights terminations occur under
the clear and convincing standard. 186 However, exceptions are not the only
way this lower standard is applied to an ICWA case. Even without an
applicable exception, many courts still apply the lower clear and convincing
evidentiary standard to ICWA cases. For example, in the Michigan case In
re Lee,187 an Indian mother argued that the court terminated her rights based
on “anticipatory neglect” and that this did not meet the ICWA’s reasonable

184. Scholars have noted the similarities between the Baby Girl exception. See, e.g.,
Courtney Hodge, Note, Is the Indian Child Welfare Act Losing Steam?: Narrowing NonCustodial Parental Rights After Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 7 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 191,
229 (2016) (noting “how the analysis in [Baby Girl] is very similar to the logic used in the
Existing Indian Family Exception cases”); Kelsey Vujnich, Comment, A Brief Overview of
the Indian Child Welfare Act, State Court Responses, and Actions Taken in the Past Decade
to Improve Implementation Outcomes, 26 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 183, 205 (2013)
(“[T]he [Baby Girl] Court essentially agrees with the ‘existing Indian family’ doctrine.”).
However, the EIF, and the exceptions carved out in Baby Girl are different thus, the Baby
Girl exceptions continue despite the elimination of the EIF exception. See, e.g., Zug, supra
note 93 (explaining why Baby Girl is not an affirmation of the EIF doctrine but creates its
own unique exceptions); see also Joshua B. Fischman, Politics and Authority in the U.S.
Supreme Court, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 1513, 1578 (2019) (“[The] majority carved out two
narrow exceptions to ICWA in cases where the Indian parent had not previously had custody
of the child.”).
185. Theresa D. Legere, Note, Preventing Judicially Mandated Orphans, 38 FAM. &
CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 260, 269 (2000).
186. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 650 (2013) (finding the ICWA
termination standard inapplicable because the child was not being removed from the father’s
continued custody and thus state termination standards applied.)
187. Lee v. Lee (In re Lee), No. 283038, 2008 WL 4603740 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 16,
2008), aff’d sub nom. JL v. Lee (In re JL), 770 N.W.2d 853 (Mich. 2009).
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doubt standard.188 The Michigan Supreme Court agreed that anticipatory
neglect would not meet the ICWA standard.189 Yet, it upheld the
termination based on the mother’s “lack of maturity” which, as the
concurrence noted, also does not meet the ICWA’s “‘beyond a reasonable
doubt’ standard.”190
State court non-compliance with the ICWA, such as that demonstrated in
In re Lee, is both common and ongoing. 191 There are numerous, welldocumented instances of courts refusing to comply with the Act. 192 For
example, in 2015, two South Dakota Indian tribes sued the state of South
Dakota for violating the ICWA.193 The case revealed that the removal rate
for South Dakota’s Indian children was over 80%.194 In addition, it was
shown that one particularly egregious judge had an Indian child removal
rate of 100%.195 Such cases demonstrate that many parental rights
termination decisions are being made using a standard far below reasonable
doubt.

188. Id. at *22.
189. In re JL, 770 N.W.2d 853, 870 (Mich. 2009).
190. Id. at 874–77 (Cavanagh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (rejecting the
majority’s termination decision).
191. See Atwood, Flashpoints, supra note 89, at 587 (“By some accounts the Act has
been the victim of entrenched state court hostility ever since its enactment more than two
decades ago.”).
192. See Bethany R. Berger, In the Name of the Child: Race, Gender, and Economics in
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 67 FLA. L. REV. 295, 301–10 (2015) (“Studies have
found widespread noncompliance with ICWA. Some of this non-compliance is due to
ignorance or carelessness, but there is evidence that it is also part of a common technique to
facilitate private adoptions of Indian children by non-Indians.”).
193. Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Van Hunnik, 100 F. Supp. 3d 749, 753, 757 (D.S.D. 2015).
194. Marcia Zug, Traditional Problems: How Tribal Same-Sex Marriage Bans Threaten
Tribal Sovereignty, 43 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 761, 796 n.206 (2017) (citing
Laura Sullivan, Native American Tribes Win Child Welfare Case in South Dakota, NPR
(Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/03/31/396636927/native-american-tribes-winchild-welfare-case-in-south-dakota). Sullivan notes that in South Dakota, “[m]ore than 80
percent of native children are placed in white foster homes” and that “[o]ne of the biggest
complaints of native families who lost children is that they were never allowed to present
their side.” Sullivan, supra.
195. See, e.g., Judge in South Dakota Sanctioned in Indian Child Welfare Act Case,
INDIANZ (Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.indianz.com/News/2016/04/18/judge-in-south-dakotasanction.asp (noting Judge Davis “rule[d] against tribes and Indian guardians in 100 percent
of the cases involving Indian children”); see also Oglala Sioux Tribe, 100 F. Supp. 3d at
753–54, 757.
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The irony of the widespread non-compliance with the ICWA’s
reasonable doubt standard is that, despite the complaint that the ICWA’s
termination standard is too high, it is likely too low. If there is a difference
in termination standards between ICWA and non-ICWA cases, it is that
Indian parents are more likely than non-Indian parents to have their rights
terminated.196 Despite the seemingly higher evidentiary standard required
under the ICWA, cases such as those out of South Dakota reveal that many
Indian families do not even receive the protection of the clear and
convincing standard applicable in non-ICWA cases.
B. Remedial Services
The second seeming difference between ICWA and non-ICWA cases
concerns the provision of remedial services. Under the ICWA, a state is
required to employ “active efforts” to prevent the break-up of an Indian
family. In non-ICWA cases, the standard is “reasonable efforts.”
“Reasonable efforts” is viewed as a lower standard that is deemed satisfied
when a family is referred to remedial services. 197 In contrast, the term
“active efforts” is typically defined as significant assistance provided
196. The actual termination rates for Indian parents is often much higher than for nonIndian parents. See Elizabeth MacLachlan, Comment, Tensions Underlying the Indian Child
Welfare Act: Tribal Jurisdiction over Traditional State Court Family Law Matters, 2018
BYU L. REV. 455, 487 (“In February 2015, former assistant secretary of Indian Affairs
Kevin Washburn announced that the BIA had published revised ICWA guidelines to protect
the rights of Indian families and children under the Act and to prevent the breakup of Indian
families and destruction of tribes. Washburn stated that these updates have become
necessary due to the continued noncompliance of ICWA by state and federal courts.”).
197. See In re Brianna C., 912 A.2d 505, 512 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006) (“While the
department, perhaps, didn't do everything that it reasonably could have done to prevent
removal from the home, the court is satisfied that the department did make reasonable
efforts, not all efforts, not all that perhaps should have been done, but made reasonable
efforts to prevent removal from the home.”) (quoting the trial court order) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also In re Kristen B., 558 A.2d 200, 204 (R.I. 1989) (“This court does
not expect the impossible from the various agencies that deal with child protection and
placement. Nor shall we burden the agency with the additional responsibility of holding the
hand of a recalcitrant parent.”) (citation omitted); Jeanne M. Kaiser, Finding A Reasonable
Way to Enforce the Reasonable Efforts Requirement in Child Protection Cases, 7 RUTGERS
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 100, 116 (2009) (“[In Massachusetts] [t]he Appeals Court has also made
it clear that the Department's efforts are limited to linking parents to existing services and
that it is not required to fill the gaps in available services on its own. In fact, the Department
is not even required to look very hard for available services and instead can rely on an expert
opinion asserting that there are no services that would fill a particular need of a parent.”).
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directly to families by case workers and agencies. 198 Using these
definitions, there is a clear difference between the terms “active efforts” and
“reasonable efforts,”199 yet courts and welfare workers are increasingly
discarding the traditional definition of reasonable efforts in favor of one
more akin to active efforts.200 Moreover, as the trend toward family
preservation continues, any remaining difference between the two standards
should disappear.
1. Case Law on Reasonable Efforts
The Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) directs states to make
“reasonable efforts” to prevent the removal of children from their families
and to effectuate their return home as quickly as possible. 201 However,
“reasonable efforts” is not defined. 202 Consequently, states are free to
determine what constitutes “reasonable efforts.”203 More importantly, they

198. See GAO, INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT, supra note 78, at 39 (describing that active
efforts under the ICWA often includes “extra assistance” such as help with transportation,
providing culturally sensitive hearings or spending more time attempting reunification).
199. See Will L. Crossley, Defining Reasonable Efforts: Demystifying the State’s Burden
Under Federal Child Protection Legislation, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 259, 302 (2003)
(discussing how states define reasonable efforts).
200. See infra Section III.B.1.
201. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A)–(B)(ii).
202. As the Department of Health and Human Services detailed in its Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking regarding ASFA, the lack of definition regarding the term “reasonable efforts”
was deliberate. 63 Fed. Reg. 50058, 50073 (1998). It explained:
During our consultation with the field, some recommended that we define
reasonable efforts in implementing the ASFA. We do not intend to define
“reasonable efforts.” To do so would be a direct contradiction of the intent of
the law. The statute requires that reasonable efforts determinations be made on
a case-by-case basis. We think any regulatory definition would either limit the
courts’ ability to make determinations on a case-by-case basis or be so broad as
to be ineffective. In the absence of a definition, courts may entertain actions
such as the following in determining whether reasonable efforts were
made . . . .
Id.
203. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-301(10) (West 2015); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.086
(West 2015); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5 (West 2013); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 39.521(1)(f) (West 2012); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-292 (West 2009); MINN. STAT. §
260.012(b) (2020); N.Y. SOC. SERV. L. § 384-b (McKinney 2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2151.419 (West 2015); 10A OKLA. STAT. § 1-4-808 (2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1102(1)(A) (West 2020); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-440 (West 2015).
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are free to define it similarly or even identically to “active efforts.”204 Some
states, such as California and Colorado, have done so explicitly 205 while
many others claim the two terms are different, yet treat them the same in
practice.206 For example, in In re RJF,207 the Montana Supreme Court
explained that, “[t]o meet its requirements to provide reasonable efforts, the
[child welfare] Department must in good faith develop and implement
voluntary services plans and treatment plans designed to preserve the
parent-child relationship and the family unit.”208 Additionally, the court
stated that the department must abide by its own “policy to provide ‘the
child maximum opportunity for visits with his/her birth parents while
services are provided to the family.’”209 Lastly, it explained that “the
Department must, in good faith, assist a parent in completing his or her
voluntary services and treatment plan.”.210
In Dunlap v. Department of Family Services (In re B.A.D.), the
Wyoming Supreme Court also articulated a rigorous “reasonable efforts”

204. Bob Friend & Kelly Beck, How “Reasonable Efforts” Leads to Emotional and
Legal Permanence, 45 CAP. U. L. REV. 249, 274 (2017) (“Allowing the court to determine
reasonable efforts on a case-by-case basis leaves room for these types of innovative practices
to be utilized prior to the time of removal and at the same time as reunification services are
being offered, in order to better ensure permanency for the child.”).
205. See Adoption of Hannah S. v. Walter S., 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 605, 612 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006); see also People ex rel. K.D., 155 P.3d 634, 637 (Colo. App. 2007); see also Scanlon,
supra note 198, at 630 (“States like California and Colorado treat active efforts the same as
‘reasonable efforts,’ the standard used in proceedings that do not involve the ICWA.”).
206. For example, in In re Eden F., 741 A.2d 873 (Conn. 1999), the Connecticut trial
court’s reasonable efforts determinations likely met the ASFA standard. However, the
termination was reversed because Connecticut’s appellate courts have defined reasonable
efforts in a manner that exceeds minimal federal requirements. To satisfy Connecticut’s
reasonable efforts requirement, the court must prove through “clear and convincing
evidence” that reasonable efforts were provided and this evidence must include significant
detail about the nature of services and the specific party (parent, child, or other person)
receiving those services. In re Eden F., 710 A.2d 771, 785–86 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998), rev’d,
741 A.2d 873 (Conn. 1999).
207. In re R.J.F., 2019 MT 113, 395 Mont. 454, 443 P.3d 387; see also In re Welfare of
Children of S.W., 727 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) (“‘Reasonable efforts’ at
rehabilitation are services that ‘go beyond mere matters of form so as to include real,
genuine assistance.’”) (quoting In re Welfare of H.K., 455 N.W.2d 529, 532 (Minn. Ct. App.
1990)).
208. In re R.J.F., 2019 MT 113, ¶ 28.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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standard more akin to active efforts.211 Specifically, the court noted that
“reasonable efforts” must “go beyond mere matters of form, such as the
scheduling of appointments, so as to include real, genuine help to see that
all things are done that might conceivably improve the circumstances of the
parent and the relationship of the parent with the child.”212
Legal scholars note the substantial overlap between reasonable and
active efforts requirements. For example, in his article “Active” Versus
“Reasonable” Efforts: The Duties to Reunify the Family Under the Indian
Child Welfare Act and the Alaska Child in Need of Aid Statutes, Mark
Andrews examined over 500 Alaskan cases involving families facing
parental rights termination and found that, regardless of whether the cases
were ICWA or non-ICWA, the efforts requirement was the same. 213
According to Andrews, “the Alaska Supreme Court has applied a single
standard fairly consistently over the past quarter century.” 214 Andrews
concludes that it is “[t]he court’s failure to succinctly articulate” that there
is only one standard that “has created an appearance of uncertainty where it
does not exist.”215 A 2005 report by the U.S. Government and
Accountability Office also remarked on the shrinking difference between
these two standards.216 According to the report, state child welfare officials
noted that “the level of services offered to the general child welfare
population has been increasing, blurring the line between active efforts and
the ‘reasonable efforts’ states are required to provide to all families whose
children are taken into state custody.”217

211. 2019 WY 83, ¶ 37, 446 P.3d 222, 232 (Wyo. 2019).
212. Id. A number of states use the term “diligent efforts.” See, e.g., In re Zyrrius Q., 161
A.D.3d 1233, 1233–34 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018), leave denied, 109 N.E.3d 1156 (N.Y. 2018);
see also In re Cordell M., 150 A.D.3d 1424, 1425 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017); Tyler K. v. State,
No. S-16310, 2017 WL 464380, at *4 (Alaska Feb. 1, 2017) (“‘[R]easonable efforts’ must
include locating support services to assist the parent, referring the parent to those services
where available, and documenting its efforts.”). See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8533(B)(8)–(11) (2014); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.§ 2151.414(E)(1) (West 2016) (requiring
“diligent efforts,” rather than “reasonable efforts”).
213. Mark Andrews, “Active” Versus “Reasonable” Efforts: The Duties to Reunify the
Family Under the Indian Child Welfare Act and the Alaska Child in Need of Aid Statutes, 19
ALASKA L. REV. 85 (2002).
214. Id. at 116.
215. Id.
216. GAO, INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT, supra note 78, at 37.
217. Id.
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2. Differential Response
The difference between active and reasonable efforts is disappearing as
state child welfare agencies increasingly implement policies requiring a
higher level of reunification services similar to the active efforts
requirement under the ICWA. One of the most important of these policies is
“differential response.” The purpose of differential response is to provide
families involved in the child welfare system, but considered low-risk for
child maltreatment, an alternate pathway for achieving reunification. 218
Families that choose differential response work cooperatively with the state
child welfare department to develop a family assessment and service plan to
address their needs and the needs of their children. 219 The goal of
differential response is to provide as many services as possible to keep
families together.220 Differential response programs recognize that families
may have multiple needs and attempt to meet these needs through better
identification and service delivery than the traditional child welfare
system. 221
So far, the results of differential response programs are positive. 222
Recent studies of families in these programs confirm they receive greater

218. See Cynthia Godsoe, Just Intervention: Differential Response in Child Protection,
21 J.L. & POL’Y 73, 74 (2012).
219. CASEY FAM. SERVS., CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES
DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE SYSTEM (2010), https://business.ct.gov/-/media/DCF/DRS/pdf/
CFSExecutiveReportDRSFinalReprintpdf.pdf.
220. Services can include
 . . . financial assistance, food stamps, food banks, clothing closets, diaper
banks, utilities assistance, transitional and subsidized housing, furniture,
health care, public benefits enrollment, and coordination;
$ Mental health (chronic, situational, trauma-informed);
$ Alcohol and drug abuse treatment;
$ Employment and training assistance;
$ Child care (drop-in, after school, special needs, hours to accommodate
shift workers)
$ Transportation;
$ Parenting education and skill development/life coaching and mentoring;
$ Parent leadership, peer support, parent advocacy;
$ Social supports, enrichment, and recreational activities; and
$ Legal services.
Id. at 10.
221. Id. at 4–8.
222. Id. at 6.
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services and feel more satisfied and involved in the process. 223 Studies also
indicate that differential response families experienced fewer repeat reports
of child maltreatment and fewer out-of-home placements.224
In 2010, the success of differential response programs garnered the
attention of Congress. In its reauthorization of the Child Abuse Prevention
and Treatment Act (CAPTA),225 Congress specifically encouraged states to
adopt differential response. 226 The CAPTA mandates that states adopt
“triage procedures, including the use of differential response, for the
appropriate referral of a child not at risk of imminent harm to a community
organization or voluntary preventive service.” 227
Given the success and encouragement of differential response programs,
it is not surprising that a majority of states have implemented these
programs as part of their child welfare policy. 228 In fact, one comprehensive
analysis of differential response described it as “one of the more widely
replicated child welfare reform efforts in recent history.” 229 Consequently,
more and more families are receiving heightened reunification services, and
the number should continue to grow. 230
3. Federal Encouragement of “Active Efforts”
The CAPTA’s encouragement of differential response was not the only
way the federal government has sought to increase services for families at
risk of child removal or parental rights termination. Most notably, in
February of 2018, Congress passed the Family First Prevention Services
Act (FFPSA) and made federal foster care funds available for preventive
services.231 Specifically, the FFPSA “reforms the federal child welfare
223. Id.
224. See id.
225. CAPTA Reauthorization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-320, 124 Stat. 3459.
226. Id. § 115, 124 Stat. at 3467-70.
227. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(v).
228. Houston, supra note 12, at 36. A number of states have created pilot programs. For
example, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, Washington, and Hawaii all have statewide
programs. Godsoe, supra note 218, at 75. In March 2019, Connecticut began a pilot program
in certain counties and New York City is also set to begin one soon. Id.
229. Bartholet, Differential Response, supra note 12, at 575.
230. Studies indicate that provision of significant services is among the reunification
approaches that are the most effective. See Kaiser, supra note 197, at 136–37. However, it
should be noted that studies of reunification service are limited. Id. at 136.
231. Pub. L. No. 115-123, 132 Stat. 232 (2018) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.) (title VII of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, 132 Stat. 64).
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financing streams, Titles IV-E and IV-B of the Social Security Act, to
provide services to families who are at risk of entering the child welfare
system.”232 Such services include reimbursement for mental health services,
substance abuse prevention and treatment, and parenting skills training. 233
Under the FFPSA, states can receive reimbursement for providing up to
twelve months of prevention services. 234 The FFPSA allows other program
funds “to be used for unlimited family reunification services for children in
foster care,”235 and it permits an additional fifteen months of family
reunification services to be used by families after their children return
home. 236
The CAPTA and the FFPSA reflect an overall shift in federal policy
away from speedy terminations and, once again, toward family
preservation. In July of 2018, Associate Commissioner of the Children’s
Bureau at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS),
Jerry Milner, wrote an editorial for the ABA encouraging this change and
advocating for the return to a family-centered approach to child welfare. 237

232. Sarah Katz, Trauma-Informed Practice: The Future of Child Welfare?, 28 WIDENER
COMMONWEALTH L. REV. 51, 81 (2019); see Family First Prevention Services Act §§ 5071150713, 50721-50723, 132 Stat. at 232-51.
233. Katz, supra note 232, at 81 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 671(e)(1)).
234. Family First Prevention Services Act §§ 50712, 132 Stat. at 244. Moreover, states
may only be reimbursed for children placed in group care settings for more than two weeks.
Fabiola Villalpando, Family First Prevention Services Act: An Overhaul of National Child
Welfare Policies, 39 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 283, 285 (2019) (“Beginning in 2020, Title IV-E
reimbursements for group homes will only be available for two weeks unless a child is in a
qualified residential treatment program . . . .”).
235. Children’s Def. Fund, The Family First Prevention Services Act: Historic Reforms
to the Child Welfare System Will Improve Outcomes for Vulnerable Children 2 (Feb. 2018),
https://www.childrensdefense.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/ffpsa-short-summary.pdf.
These funds come from the Promoting Safe and Stable Families Program. See CHILDREN’S
BUREAU, PROMOTING SAFE AND STABLE FAMILIES 2 (n.d.), https://library.childwelfare.
gov/cwig/ws/library/docs/capacity/Blob/105742.pdf?r=1&rpp=10&upp=0&w=+NATIVE%
28%27recno%3D105742%27%29&m=1.
236. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 235, at 5.
237. Jerry Milner, Reshaping Child Welfare in the United States: Lawyers as Partners in
Prevention, AM. BAR ASS’N: CHILD L. PRAC. TODAY (July 4, 2018), https://www.
americanbar.org/groups/public_interest/child_law/resources/child_law_practiceonline/januar
y-december-2018/reshaping-child-welfare-in-the-united-states--lawyers-as-partner/ (“[T]he
evidence is clear that child welfare in the United States needs a radical transformation in its
funding, programs, and its definition of what child welfare can and should achieve. Too
often, we use foster care as our primary intervention to protect children, and lack the
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Milner advocated for this return as a way to prevent “the unnecessary
removal of children from their homes[.]” 238 In particular, Milner noted the
importance of increased services to families, stating the DHHS believes
“services that strengthen critical protective factors should be available to all
families, in their communities, when families need and desire
assistance.”239 A few months later, “in November [of] 2018, the Children’s
Bureau issued an information memorandum to ‘strongly encourage’ child
protective agencies to focus more on preventive efforts.”240
Due to changing state and federal child welfare policy, non-Indian
children are increasingly receiving family reunification services akin to the
ICWA’s active efforts requirement. This change undermines the anti-ICWA
argument that applying active efforts to Indian families means Indian
children are treated differently and worse than non-Indian children.
Receiving a high level of reunification services is now viewed as good for
all children. Consequently, it is the families that only receive reasonable
efforts that now have the strongest claim of harm.
C. Sources of Proof
The third frequently cited difference between ICWA and non-ICWA
cases is that the ICWA requires the testimony of an expert in Indian culture.
Originally, one of the main problems the ICWA sought to alleviate was the

flexibility in funding and services to respond to families’ needs before they are in crisis and
harm to children has occurred.”).
238. Id.
239. Id. In a different editorial, Jerry Milner and David Kelly, who is Special Assistant to
the Associate Commissioner/Child Welfare Program Specialist for Court Improvement at the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, called on attorneys for children and parents
to be “active voices for preventing the trauma of unnecessary family separation in and out of
the courtroom” and “[a]dvocat[e] vigorously for reasonable efforts to be made to prevent
removal or for a finding that reasonable efforts have not been made to prevent removal when
that is the situation.” Jerry Milner & David Kelly, Reasonable Efforts as Prevention, AM.
BAR ASS’N: CHILD L. PRAC. TODAY (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/public_interest/child_law/resources/child_law_practiceonline/january-december2018/reasonable-efforts-as-prevention/.
240. Stephanie K. Glaberson, Coding over the Cracks: Predictive Analytics and Child
Protection, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 307, 362 (2019); see ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMS., U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., LOG NO. ACYF-CB-IM-18-05, RESHAPING CHILD
WELFARE IN THE UNITED STATES TO FOCUS ON STRENGTHENING FAMILIES THROUGH PRIMARY
PREVENTION OF CHILD MALTREATMENT AND UNNECESSARY PARENT-CHILD SEPARATION
(2018), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/im1805.pdf.
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removal of children due to biases about Indian parenting. 241 The purpose of
the expert testimony was to provide a cultural perspective on an Indian
parent’s actions and prevent cultural bias from causing unwarranted
interference with the parent-child relationship.242 Today, the expert’s role is
still to prevent biased removals from occurring but, increasingly, this
testimony is also used to ensure the child is placed in an environment that
meets their cultural needs and provides exposure and connection to their
Indian heritage. 243 In many cases, this objective means the expert is asked
to testify as to whether the placement of an Indian child in a non-Indian
home can meet these needs.244

241. For example,
In one 1977 California case, a child was removed from the custody of her aunt
by a social worker on the sole ground that “an Indian reservation is an
unsuitable environment for a child and that the pre-adoptive parents were
financially able to provide a home and a way of life superior to the one
furnished by the natural mother.”
Graham, supra note 23, at 27 (quoting THE DESTRUCTION OF AMERICAN INDIAN FAMILIES 3
(Steven Unger ed., 1977)). In a different case, a Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux mother, faced
termination of her parental rights “on the grounds that she often left [her son] with his sixtynine-year-old great grandmother,” id. at 25–26, and in a third, an Indian mother from Oregon
faced termination because her son went to live with his aunt while his mother recovered
from a broken leg, id. at 26.
242. Kacy Wothe, Comment, The Ambiguity of Culture as a Best Interests Factor:
Finding Guidance in the Indian Child Welfare Act’s Qualified Expert Witness, 35 HAMLINE
L. REV. 729, 771 (2012).
243. Id.; see also Solangel Maldonado, Bias in the Family: Race, Ethnicity, and Culture
in Custody Disputes, 55 FAM. CT. REV. 213, 223 (2017) [hereinafter Maldonado, Bias in the
Family] (noting that studies also demonstrate that a connection with their Indian heritage
may be important for the healthy development of Indian children).
244. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Sara J., 123 P.3d 1017, 1032 (Alaska 2005) (weighing
conflicting testimony of two different qualified expert witnesses to determine if the
children’s placement outside the tribe could meet their cultural needs); In re Custody of
S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d 357, 360–61 (Minn. 1994) (using the testimony of a qualified expert
witness to hold that it was unlikely the non-native family could adequately meet the Indian
children’s cultural needs); see In re Adoption of M.T.S., 489 N.W.2d 285, 287 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1992) (considering the testimony of a qualified expert witness to determine if an Indian
child’s extended family would better meet their emotional and cultural needs than placement
with a non-Indian foster family); In re Ashley B., No. H12CP02008297A, 2004 WL
3106084, at *45 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 2004) (considering testimony from a qualified
expert witness regarding whether placement in a non-Indian home would still permit the
child access “to information about her Indian background and what that culture is”).
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ICWA cases mandate the use of cultural perspective testimony. 245
However, all child welfare cases require courts to consider evidence
regarding a child’s best interest 246 and many courts have held this means
factoring cultural considerations into their child custody determinations. 247
Consequently, the ICWA is not particularly unique when it comes to
considering culture in child welfare decisions.
1. Cultural Competence
In the child custody context, cultural competency is defined as the
willingness and ability of a prospective parent to meet the special needs of a
child who does not share their racial or cultural background. Consideration
of cultural competency is widespread and frequently viewed as an
important factor in determining whether a particular placement will serve
the child’s best interest. In some states, the importance of cultural
competency is built into the family law code. For example, Minnesota
explicitly mandates consideration of the “capacity and disposition of the
parties to . . . continue educating and raising the child in the child’s culture”
as well as consideration of the “child’s cultural background.” 248
245. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(d); see also Linda K. Thomas, Child Custody, Community and
Autonomy: The Ties That Bind?, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 645, 653 (1997)
(noting most of the cases “taking into account the importance of culture and a
child's cultural community occur in the context of child custody decisions relating to Indian
children” and attributing that to the ICWA’s mandate).
246. Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic Violence
on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1058–59 (1991) (“In virtually all
states, child custody decisions require . . . determination of a custody arrangement that is in
the best interest of the child.”); John Thomas Halloran, Families First: Reframing Parental
Rights As Familial Rights in Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings, 18 U.C. DAVIS J.
JUV. L. & POL'Y 51, 69 (2014) (“The best interest standard is found within the statutory
schemes pertaining to the termination of parental rights in each of the fifty states.”).
247. See generally Katie Eyer, Constitutional Colorblindness and the Family, 162 U. PA.
L. REV. 537, 538 (2014) (noting that race is commonly used in family law cases and that
courts have been reluctant to limit these race-based practices, indicating that such uses are
either benign or even desirable); see also Thomas, supra note 245, at 655 (“In a smaller
subset of cases which appear to import considerations of cultural context into the traditional
‘best interests of the child’ standard, courts sometimes take into account a child's racial or
other cultural community in child custody decisions.”).
248. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17 subdiv. l(a)(10)-(l1) (West 2014) (repealed 2015),
quoted in Maldonado, Bias in the Family, supra note 243, at 215. In addition, many states
require that parties include provisions for religious training, if applicable, in their parenting
plans. See also D.C. CODE § 16-914(c)(7) (2012).
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In other states, the importance of cultural competency has been
developed by the courts. These courts consider which parent is more likely
to expose the child to its culture and hold it is an important factor in their
best interest determinations. 249 For example, in Jones v. Jones, the South
Dakota Supreme Court explained that “it is proper for a trial court . . . to
consider the matter of race as it relates to a child’s ethnic heritage and
which parent is more prepared to expose the child to it.”250 The Jones court
further reasoned:
All of us form our own personal identities, based in part, on our
religious, racial and cultural backgrounds [and] [t]o say . . . that
a court should never consider whether a parent is willing and
able to expose to and educate children on their heritage, is to say
that society is not interested in whether children ever learn who
they are.251
Similarly, in In re Marriage of Gambla, a divorce case involving an
African American mother, Caucasian father, and biracial daughter, the
Illinois court viewed cultural competency as an extremely important factor
in making its custody determination.252 The court admitted testimony from
a university professor who specialized in multiculturalism and child
development to help it determine which of the child’s parents would be
better equipped to meet her cultural needs.253 The father objected to this
testimony and appealed its inclusion, but the court of appeals affirmed the
family court.254 The court explained that the use of testimony regarding
cultural competency was permissible because it aided the trial court in
determining the child’s best interests. 255

249. “Some other states’ statutes, without mentioning culture, also require that parties
include provisions for religious training, if applicable, in their parenting plans.” Cynthia R.
Mabry, Blending Cultures and Religions: Effects That the Changing Makeup of Families in
Our Nation Have on Child Custody Determinations, 26 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAWS. 31, 34
(2013) (describing such laws).
250. 542 N.W.2d 119, 123–24 (S.D. 1996). Although Jones involved an Indian child, it
was not an ICWA case because it involved a custody dispute between two biological
parents.
251. Id. at 123.
252. 853 N.E.2d 847 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
253. Id. at 857–58.
254. Id. at 862–64.
255. Id. at 864; see Wothe, supra note 242, at 749–50.
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Both Gambla and Jones involved custody disputes between biological
parents.256 However, the issue of cultural competence also arises in foster
and adoption cases. For example, in In re Guardianship of L.S., the court
considered the cultural competency of the potential adoptive parents and
their ability to meet both the racial257 and religious258 aspects of a differentrace child before approving the adoption. 259 Similarly in In re Q.B., a
Massachusetts court considered the potential adoptive parent’s willingness
“to accept and nurture the culture and heritage of a child of a different race
or background” in determining whether to permit the adoption of Q.B. 260
These cases are not unique.
Cultural competency considerations are also increasingly common
outside of court cases. For example, many states now have provisions
permitting birth parents to express a preference for the placement of their
child with a foster or adoptive parent of the same religious background or

256. Maldonado, Bias in the Family, supra note 243, at 216; see also Rooney v. Rooney,
914 P.2d 212, 218 (Alaska 1996) (“[T]he opportunities for [the child] to be exposed to his
Tlingit heritage are greater in Sitka than in Wrangell . . . . [T]he court must consider the
child’s cultural needs as one factor in the overall context of his best interests.”); Foster v.
Waterman, 738 N.W.2d 662 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007) (considering the cultural competence of
the non-Korean mother to exposure her part-Koran daughter to her Korean culture); In re
Marriage of Mikelson, 299 N.W.2d 670 (Iowa 1980) (upholding the lower court’s decision
to award custody to the mother after consideration of the ability of each of the parents, who
were white, to provide their adopted children, who were half African-American and half
white, with frequent association with other African Americans). But see Beazley v. Davis,
545 P.2d 206 (Nev. 1976) (reversing an award of custody of two children to AfricanAmerican father rather than Caucasian mother which was based on the fact that the
children’s physical characteristics were African-American because it constituted
impermissible discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment).
257. In re Guardianship of L.S., No. 4-13-0766, 2014 WL 272665, at *5, ¶ 29 (Ill. App.
Ct. Jan. 23, 2014) (“With respect to race, Emily testified she and Scott agreed it was
important for their children, especially their adopted biracial son, to be exposed to ‘many
different people, many different cultures.’ Emily said she does not ‘not see color,’ but rather,
‘see[s] color’ and ‘think[s] it’s wonderful.’”).
258. “As to the question of religion, the court noted the evidence demonstrated L.S. was
‘very involved’ with respondents in their faith and L.S. was not familiar with any other
faith.” Id. at *6, ¶ 40.
259. See also In re Adoption of Persephone, No. 13–P–188, 2013 WL 5628820, at *1
(Mass. App. Ct. Oct. 16, 2013) (“[J]udges must be sensitive to the backgrounds of the
children before them, and to the potential value of cultural connections . . . .”).
260. Nos. 2-11-0736, 2-11-0966, 2012 WL 6969764, at *11, ¶ 34 (Ill. App. Ct., Mar. 13,
2012).
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knowledgeable and appreciative of that background. 261 Similarly, in
domestic adoptions, public and private adoption agencies frequently offer
cultural competency training for parents seeking to adopt cross-racially262
and, in international adoptions, cultural competency training is required. 263
The importance of cultural competency is supported by research
demonstrating that cultural dissimilarity between foster or adopted children
and their caregivers can result in negative psychosocial outcomes. These
harms are particularly significant for minority children. 264 Transracially
adopted minority children often report growing up fearing people of their
own race and trying to avoid them. 265 At the same time, a lack of exposure
to people of the same race or background leaves many minority adoptees
feeling isolated or with low self-esteem. 266 Studies do not suggest that all
transracial adoptions are harmful, but they do highlight the importance of
placing children with parents willing and able to provide the cultural
support their children need to thrive. 267As Professor Solangel Maldonado
notes, “[A]doptive families can and do raise children of other races with
high self-esteem and a strong self-identity and sense of belonging.” 268
261. In this regard, a number of states permit placement based on families of the same
religion. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-102(b) (West 2011); CAL. FAM. CODE § 8709(a) (West
2012) (“may consider the child's religious background in determining an appropriate
placement”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.29 (West 1995).
262. A parent’s decision to refuse such training can be considered in a parental
competency assessment. Tanya Washington, Loving Grutter: Recognizing Race in
Transracial Adoptions, 16 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 1, 3 n.7 (2005) (“While the required
training would not dispositively inform the placement determination, it would certainly be
relevant to parental competency.”).
263. Hague Conference on Private International Law: Final Act of the 17th Session,
Including the Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-51, 1870 U.N.T.S. 167.
264. Sarah A. Font, Kinship and Nonrelative Foster Care: The Effect of Placement Type
on Child Well-Being, 85 CHILD DEV. 2074, 2075 (2014).
265. Solangel Maldonado, Permanency v. Biology: Making the Case for Post-Adoption
Contact, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 321, 338 (2008) [hereinafter Maldonado, Permanency].
266. “For example, in one study an African-American transracial adoptee reported
feeling ‘different from black people’ and having ‘different feelings’ than them. Another
child reported feeling more connected to whites because the African-Americans she knew
‘act ghetto’ and dress differently from her.” Id.
267. Id. at 338–39; see also RITA SIMON ET AL., THE CASE FOR TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION
48, 51 (1994); David D. Meyer, Palmore Comes of Age: The Place of Race in the Placement
of Children, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 183, 202 (2007) (citing studies).
268. Maldonado, Permanency, supra note 265, at 338–39; see also In re M.F., 1 S.W.3d
524, 534–35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (granting preference to a Caucasian couple over the
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Nevertheless, Professor Maldonado cautions that “parents must be sensitive
to society’s racial biases and ensure that children are exposed to their racial
and ethnic background and communities.” 269 This means parents must do
more than simply expose children to their birth cultures through books and
cultural events. They must also provide them with opportunities for
significant contact with persons of the child’s racial or ethnic background
and ensure this exposure continues as the child ages. 270
Professor Maldonado further notes that “[a]lthough some families
adopting transracially recognize the salience of race and ethnicity to their
children’s self-identities and make efforts to expose the children to their
birth culture or people of their own race, not all do.”271 For example, one
study on transracial adoption found that their parents “tended to minimize
the importance of race and downplay incidents of racial slurs or
discrimination.”272 As one parent in the study remarked:
People say, “Stay in touch with his racial heritage.” I don’t even
know what that is. What is his racial heritage? Some people say
we are “denying him his culture,” but from what I can see, if we
hadn’t come along, he would be dead. He was malnourished. He
was neglected. What really is his culture?273

child’s African-American aunt because it found the Caucasian couple had demonstrated
cultural competency and was equally able to meet the child’s needs with respect to her
cultural and racial background).
269. Maldonado, Permanency, supra note 265, at 339.
270.
[A]doptive parents’ efforts to expose their children to their birth parents’
culture decreases as children grow older. For example, one study of AfricanAmerican transracial adoptees found that when the children were seven years
old, forty-two percent of families emphasized bicultural socialization.
However, by the time the children were seventeen, only twenty percent of
families did so.
Id. at 338 (citing Kimberly M. DeBerry et al., Family Racial Socialization and Ecological
Competence: Longitudinal Assessments of African-American Transracial Adoptees, 67
CHILD. DEV. 2378, 2380 (1996)).
271. Id. at 337. According to Professor Maldonado, the “parenting styles and values that
are perceived as functional for Caucasian, middle-income families may be inappropriate in
other cultural contexts.” Maldonado, Bias in the Family, supra note 243, at 225.
272. Id. (quoting Maria Vidal de Haymes & Shirley Simon, Transracial Adoption:
Families Identify Issues and Needed Support Services, 82 CHILD WELFARE 251, 252 (2003)).
273. Id. (quoting Haymes & Simon, supra note 272, at 264).
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Given the strong negative effects of failing to expose adopted children to
their culture and heritage, a potential parent’s cultural competence is
increasingly recognized as an important factor in determining a child’s best
interest in all custody cases, and not simply those involving Indian children.
2. Transmitting “American” Culture
The ICWA’s critics object to the Act’s emphasis on the transmission of
Indian culture, but this may be a disagreement about whose culture gets
transmitted rather than an objection to the importance of cultural connection
in general. 274 In the non-ICWA context, courts are often quite open to
considering the importance of transmitting American culture to an
American child. For example, in custody cases in which “one parent intends
to raise the child outside the United States,” it is common for courts to
compare the relative advantages of the foreign culture versus American
culture and presume continued exposure to American culture is in the best
interests of an American-born child.275
In Schultz v. Elremmash, the Louisiana Court of Appeal awarded an
American Catholic mother sole custody of her daughter over the objection
of the child’s Libyan Muslim father. 276 The court reached this decision
because it found custody with the mother would give the child a better
opportunity “to explore her heritage.”277 In explaining its decision, the court
highlighted the father’s lack of U.S. citizenship and added, disapprovingly,

274. Many transracial adoptee parents object to exposing their adopted children to the
children’s birth culture because they prefer to pass their own culture and family legacy to
their adopted child. Professor Jessica Weaver has suggested that
one factor that may impact the desire of white couples to adopt Asian and
Hispanic children is their maintenance of family legacy. Asian and Hispanic
children are perceived to be able to assimilate into white culture easier.
Statistically, they enter into interracial marriages with whites in larger
percentages than blacks; therefore, the property of the family will essentially be
kept within the race. While there are obviously other more immediate reasons
that whites prefer Asian and Hispanic children over African American children,
the fact that their adopted children will inherit their wealth, and therefore
perpetuate their form of community, should not be overlooked.
Jessica Dixon Weaver, The Changing Tides of Adoption: Why Marriage, Race, and Family
Identity Still Matter, 71 SMU L. REV. 159, 174–75 (2018).
275. Thomas, supra note 245, at 656–57, quoted in Maldonado, Bias in the Family, supra
note 243, at 223.
276. 615 So. 2d 396 (La. Ct. App. 1993).
277. Id. at 399.
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that “[h]e appears to be extremely critical of American ways.” 278 In
particular, the court implied that the father’s refusal to allow the child to
participate in American cultural events, such as the school Christmas
pageant or the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance was “inappropriate.”279
The consideration of and preference for American culture is also present
in adoption cases—particularly those between an American potential
adoptive parent and an immigrant birth parent. For instance, in In re
Adoption of C.M.B.R., an undocumented mother lost custody of her
American-born son in large part because the court compared the child’s
potential life with his mother in Guatemala with the benefits he would have
as an American child growing up in the United States. 280 Similarly, in
Nebraska v. Maria L. (In re Angelica L.),281 which also involved the
termination of an undocumented immigrant mother’s parental rights, the
lower court terminated the mother’s rights because it determined that
“living in Guatemala would put [the American children] at a disadvantage
compared to living in the United States.”282 This case was ultimately
reversed on appeal yet, the Nebraska Supreme Court was sympathetic to the
“culture clash” the case presented. 283
American courts routinely consider the role of culture in non-Indian
family law cases. Thus, there is little merit to the argument that cultural
considerations are uniquely or unfairly applied to Indian child custody
cases. In fact, such cases indicate that not only is the consideration of
cultural competency widespread and not unique to ICWA cases, but that
278. Id. at 400.
279. Id. at 399. The court concluded that the child’s mother had her “best interest at
heart” because she wanted her daughter “to experience life in a carefree manner.” It then
contrasted this desire with the father, whom the court believed wanted the child “to be raised
in a very restricted manner.” Id. at 400, quoted in Maldonado, Bias in the Family, supra note
243, at 220.
280. No. SD 30342, 2010 WL 2841486, at *8 (Mo. Ct. App. July 21, 2010) (“While the
trial court did not expressly say that Respondents could provide a better home in the United
States for Child, it did so through its actions because it found for Respondents even though it
had no knowledge of the type of home Mother could offer to Child in Guatemala.”); Marcia
Zug, Should I Stay or Should I Go: Why Immigrant Reunification Decisions Should Be
Based on the Best Interest of the Child, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1139, 1144–47 (discussing
whether the potential benefits of life in the United States should factor into immigrant child
custody determinations).
281. 767 N.W.2d 74, 94 (Neb. 2009).
282. Id. The trial court’s decision was overturned because the Nebraska Supreme Court
held that such considerations “not determinative of the children's best interests.”. Id.
283. Id.
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court preference for American culture means cultural competency
considerations are especially needed in ICWA cases.
D. Placement Preferences
The ICWA’s placement preferences set out an order of preference for the
placement of Indian children. First preference is with the child’s immediate
family, second preference is with a member of the child’s tribe, and third
preference is with any other Indian.284 This preference provision is
contentious because potential adoptive parents may find themselves passed
over in favor of caregivers who satisfy one of the preferences categories.
Not surprisingly, many ICWA challenges are brought by potential adoptive
parents who did not meet the ICWA preference categories. These parents
claim the preferences are racially discriminatory and harm Indian children.
The merit of such claims must be evaluated for each of the three categories
separately.
1. Relative Preference Under State Law
The first preference category under the ICWA is for placement with the
child’s relatives.285 However, preference for relative placement is not
unique to the ICWA. As Professor Sarah Krakoff notes, “ICWA’s goal of
ensuring that children are placed with their relatives rather than in foster
care or institutions is, according to many schools of thought, the best

284. This section states that in any adoptive placement, “a preference shall be given, in
the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with (1) a member of the child’s
extended family; (2) other members of the Indian child’s tribe; (3) other Indian families.” 25
U.S.C. § 1915(a). The ICWA also specifies the following preferences for foster placement
proceedings:
In any foster care or preadoptive placement, a preference shall be given, in
the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with—
(i) a member of the Indian child’s extended family;
(ii) a foster home licensed, approved, or specified by the Indian child’s
tribe;
(iii) an Indian foster home licensed or approved by an authorized non-Indian
licensing authority; or
(iv) an institution for children approved by an Indian tribe or operated by an
Indian organization which has a program suitable to meet the Indian child’s
needs.
See id. § 1915(b).
285. See id.
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approach for all children, not only American Indian children.” 286 Studies
consistently demonstrate that children placed in kinship care experience
greater placement stability and are less likely to return to foster care as
compared to children living with foster families. 287 Therefore, it is not
surprising that both state and federal laws strongly support relative
placement. For example, in South Carolina, “[r]elatives are given
preference in placement options provided such placement is in the best
interest of the child(ren).”288 Similarly, Colorado’s family law code states
“the court shall place the child with a relative . . . if such placement is in the
child’s best interests.”289 Louisiana’s code is also similar and states that
“[t]he court shall place the child in the custody of a relative unless the court
has made a specific finding that such placement is not in the best interest of
the child.”290
In addition to explicit kinship care preferences, such as the ones noted
above, many states are enacting laws and policies encouraging relative
caregiving. Two of the most prominent examples of this trend are the
increasing support for legal guardianship and the growth of grandparent
visitation statutes.
(a) Legal Guardianship
A legal guardian is a person who assumes legal responsibility for a child
in place of a birth parent.291 However, under a legal guardianship
arrangement, the birth parent’s rights are not terminated.292 Instead, parents
retain various rights and obligations including visitation rights and the

286. Sarah Krakoff, They Were Here First: American Indian Tribes, Race, and the
Constitutional Minimum, 69 STAN. L. REV. 491, 509 (2017).
287. William Vesneski et al., An Analysis of State Law and Policy Regarding Subsidized
Guardianship for Children: Innovations in Permanency, 21 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y
27, 37 (2017).
288. Licensure for Foster Care, S.C. CODE ANN. § 114-550(L)(2) (2003).
289. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-508(5)(b)(I) (2018).
290. LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 683 (B) (2014); see also In re JW, 2010 WY 28, ¶ 22,
226 P.3d 873, 879 (Wyo. 2010) (citing DFS Policy 5.7 (2008) which states “ Relative and
kinship placements are less restrictive and therefore preferable to other types of out-of-home
care. The DFS caseworker is responsible for conducting an ongoing diligent search for
relatives and kin for any child in DFS custody until permanency is achieved.”).
291. Eliza Patten, The Subordination of Subsidized Guardianship in Child Welfare
Proceedings, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 237, 255 (2004).
292. Id.
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obligation to provide child support.293 In addition, under a legal
guardianship arrangement, the state fully relinquishes “custody of the child
and the permanent guardian is not subject to continuing state
supervision.”294 For these reasons, kinship caregivers often prefer legal
guardianship; yet, until recently, states considered it an inferior custody
option.
Legal guardianship was first identified as a permanency outcome under
the ASFA but was not strongly encouraged. 295 The ASFA’s hierarchy of
“permanency goals” prioritizes “reunification with the biological parent,
then adoption, then legal guardianship with a relative or other caregiver.” 296
The ASFA considers adoption more permanent and, thus, more desirable
than other custody options; for decades, this influenced state treatment of
kinship care.297 Nevertheless, the ASFA’s assumptions about permanency
are flawed. As Professor Sacha Coupet notes, the ASFA’s presumption
favoring adoption
fails to account for the fact that adoption within kinship
networks “is [inherently] complicated by the complex and
ambivalent nature” of the relationship between the caregiver and
both the birth parent and the other members of the family.
Indeed, “[o]ne of the most difficult challenges facing child
welfare caseworkers is discussing adoption and [permanent]
guardianship with [kinship caregivers] who [legitimately] do not
believe that” changes in their legal status vis-à-vis their wards
will help them or make the “children feel [more] safe or
secure.”298
Similarly, in their work on kinship caregiving families, Professors
Patricia O’Brien, Carol Rippey Massat, and James P. Gleeson note that
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. See Katz, supra note 42, at 1085 n.22 (“ASFA was originally titled the ‘Adoption
Promotion Act of 1997.’ See H.R. Rep. No. 105-77, at 1 (1997).”).
296. Id. at 1085–86.
297. This preference was based on acceptance of the ASFA’s view that adoption
provided the most permanency and was compounded by the absence of federal
reimbursement for guardianships commensurate to that applicable to adoption. See infra
Section III.D.2 (discussing current federal support for legal guardianship). See also Patten,
supra note 294, at 254.
298. Sacha Coupet, Swimming Upstream Against the Great Adoption Tide: Making the
Case for “Impermanence”, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 405, 440 (2005) (alterations in original).
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“[a]lthough it is commonly believed that adoption . . . increases the sense of
permanence, security, and belonging of children adopted by nonrelative
foster parents, caregivers in this and other studies point out that these
children are already members of their families.”299
The circumstances surrounding kinship care are significantly different
than traditional adoption in which the adoptive parent’s rights and
connection to the child are grounded in the termination of the birth parent’s
rights. Only recently have states begun to recognize that a lack of parental
rights termination cannot be assumed to make kinship care less permanent.
This new understanding of legal guardianship, combined with the growing
recognition of the other benefits of kinship care, has led to a dramatic
increase in state subsidized legal guardianship. “In 1996, only six states had
subsidized legal guardianship programs . . . [b]y 2002, [thirty-four] states
and the District of Columbia had some form of subsidized legal
guardianship program for children in foster care.” 300 Today, due to the
availability of federal support, the numbers are even higher. 301 As a result, a
kinship care preference is now commonplace in child placement
decisions.302
(b) Grandparent Visitation
The nationwide existence of grandparent visitation statutes,303 even after
the Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel v. Granville, further highlights state
299. Patricia O’Brien et al., Upping the Ante: Relative Caregivers’ Perceptions of
Changes in Child Welfare Policies, 80 CHILD WELFARE 719, 742 (2001).
300. Patten, supra note 294, at 257.
301. See infra Section III.D.2.
302. See Jill Duerr Berrick, When Children Cannot Remain Home: Foster Family Care
and Kinship Care, 8 FUTURE CHILD. 72–74 (1998) (describing the trend towards placement
within the family, the rapid growth of kinship foster care nationwide and the impact of
financial incentives).
303. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-3-4.2 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-409 (2013);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-103 (West 2019); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3103 (West 1994 & Supp.
2001); COLO. REV. STAT. § 190-1-117 (West 2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-59 (West
2013)); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1031(7) (West 2016); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 752.011 (West
2015), IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-5-2 (West 2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600C.1 (West 2012);
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-102 (West 1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 39D
(West 1998); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-16-1 (1999 & Supp. 2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-9102 (2015); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1802 (1998); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125C.050 (West
2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 461-A:13 (2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-2 (West 1999);
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (McKinney 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.2(b1) (West
2017); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-202 (West 2013).
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recognition of the importance of helping children maintain their familial
relationships in the event of family disruption. 304 In Troxel, the Supreme
Court held that Washington state’s relative visitation statute was overly
broad and unconstitutional. 305 After Troxel, many states revised their
visitation statutes, but all continued to permit relative visitation under
certain circumstances, such as the death of a parent or parental divorce. 306
Louisiana’s visitation statute is typical; it permits grandparents to seek
visitation if the parents are not married or are divorced and the court deems
such visitation in the child’s “best interest.” 307 The statute also states that, in
extraordinary circumstances such as the opioid crisis, visitation may be
sought by “any other relative, by blood or affinity, or a former stepparent or
stepgrandparent.”308
Visitation is not same as custody. Nevertheless, state protection and
encouragement of relative visitation rights should be viewed as part of
states’ overall preference for kinship care placements. 309
2. Federal Support for Relative Preference
Relative preference is also supported by federal law. The two most
important statutes are the 2008 Fostering Connections to Success and
Increasing Adoptions Act (FCA) and the Family First Prevention Services
Act (FFPSA).310
304. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
305. Id. at 75.
306. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.11 (West 2000) (relative can seek visitation
after the death of the child’s parent); see also In re RV, 470 P.3d 531, 538–39 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2020) (“The death of a parent is not infrequently the source of visitation disputes” and
may be “consider[ed] . . . as an ‘other factor relevant to the child's best interest.’”).
307. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 136 (2018).
308. Id. § 136(B)(2). In Esasky v. Ford, 743 S.E.2d 550, 551 (2013), the court even
awarded visitation after the child had been adopted (this, however, was a limited exception
to cases where the child has been adopted by a blood relative).
309. These state statutes acknowledge that abruptly ending these emotional ties through
denial of visitation can cause severe psychological harm, stressing continuity and stability in
a child’s life. Granting nonparental visitation is necessary to prevent this harm. Rachel
Roberson, Nonparent Visitation: Science Says It’s in the Child’s Best Interests, TENN. B.J.,
Apr. 2018, at 23–24 (“[S]everal state laws use statutory or equitable power to grant visitation
to nonparents in cases involving cohabitation, loco parentis, or a ‘psychological
parent[,]’ . . . when a substantial personal relationship between the child and nonparent
exists.”).
310. Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008 (FCA),
Pub. L. No 110-351, 122 Stat. 3949 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.,
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a) Fostering Connections Act
One of the major hurdles for increasing legal guardianship was that the
ASFA provides financial incentives for adoption311 but not for legal
guardianship. The FCA’s passage remedied this imbalance. The FCA seeks
to incentivize relative caregiving by allowing federal Title IV-E foster care
maintenance money to be used by states to provide kinship legal guardians
with subsidies similar to those received by adoptive parents under the
ASFA. 312 However, the FCA’s support for relative caregiving went beyond
funding equalization. For example, the FCA also demonstrated its
preference for relative caregiving through the creation of family finding
programs. Such programs help locate biological family members to care for
children removed from their parents’ custody. Additionally, the FCA
created “Kinship Navigator” programs, which provide relative caregivers
with information and support services. 313 Most importantly, although the
FCA sets out a basic framework for subsidized guardianship programs, it
also grants states the discretion to shape their programs in the way they
believe will be the most beneficial to relative caregivers in their states. 314
b) Family First Prevention Services Act
The ASFA and its preference for adoption remains current federal policy.
Nevertheless, the increasing federal support for relative caregivers
including 42 U.S.C. § 671(a) and 42 U.S.C. § 673(d)); Family First Prevention Services Act,
Pub. L. No. 115-123, 132 Stat. 232 (2018) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.) (title VII of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, 132 Stat. 64).
311. 42 U.S.C. § 673(a)(1)(B)(i); see also Katz, supra note 42, at 1086 (“Once
reunification is ruled out, ASFA creates strong financial incentives for states to pursue
adoption, over legal guardianship, as a permanency goal through the open-ended entitlement
program known as the Adoption Assistance Program.”).
312. See Christina McClurg Riehl & Tara Shuman, Children Placed in Kinship Care:
Recommended Policy Changes to Provide Adequate Support for Kinship Families, 39
CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 101, 115 (2019) (describing federal funding for kinship care); Katz,
supra note 42, at 1087 (noting that the FCA helped subsidize “some kinship legal
guardians . . . similar to the subsidy adoptive parents receive through the Adoption
Assistance Program.”); see also Vesneski et al., supra note 287, at 33 (stating that “[a]s of
this writing, 32 states, the District of Columbia and six tribes” offer these federal subsidies).
313. Riehl & Shuman, supra note 312 (noting such services may include “links to local
county resources, connections to needed referrals, and a forum to answer questions regarding
kinship caregiving”).
314. For example, states may “modify some eligibility requirements, provide [additional
monetary] supports . . . and formulate the terms of the agreement between guardians and the
states.” Vesneski et al., supra note 287, at 34.
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demonstrates that the federal government no longer regards adoption as the
preferred permanency option when relative care is available. In particular,
the Family First Prevention Services Act, 315 which permits family
preservation and reunification funds to be used for relative caregivers,
strongly demonstrates the federal government’s growing endorsement of
relative caregiving.316 In addition, the FFPSA supports relative caregiving
by mandating that states demonstrate how their foster care licensing
standards encourage and accommodate kinship care,317 requiring agencies
to identify potential relative caregivers within thirty days after a child’s
removal, 318 and permitting states to waive non-safety related foster care
licensing requirements. 319
The above state and federal laws supporting kinship care demonstrate
that the ICWA’s relative preference is neither unique nor harmful. Today,
relative preference is considered best practices for all children removed
from parental care. This preference is not limited to Indian children and
families.
3. Community Preference
The second ICWA preference requires states to place an Indian child
with a member of their tribe if a relative placement is not available. NonIndian children are rarely members of Indian tribes. However, these
children are members of other types of communities and child welfare
policy is finally recognizing the importance of the child’s community.
Today, growing numbers of states seek community support to help families
facing child removal and provide potential caregivers when removal is
necessary.

315. Pub. L. No. 115-123, 132 Stat. 232 (2018) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.) (title VII of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, 132 Stat. 64)
316. The need for such programs became clear as the number of children living with
relative foster caregivers rose rapidly. For example, “[i]n 2014, 29 percent of the 415,000
children in care were living in relative foster homes.” Vesneski et al., supra note 287, at 35.
317. Children’s Def. Fund, supra note 235, at 2. For children currently residing in foster
care, the Act sets no limit on the amount of Promoting Safe and Stable Families Program
funds that may be used for family reunification services. Id. In addition, it permits “an
additional 15 months of family reunification services” after these children are returned to
their families. Id. Such programs include the evidence-based Kinship Navigator program. Id.
318. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(10)(D).
319. Id. § 671(a)(29).
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a) Family Group Decisions-Making
Many of the family support programs used by states to prevent child
removals are now community-based. Community-based, in this context, has
a dual meaning: it means that community resources are used to support
families facing removal and that the community takes responsibility for the
family and makes child welfare determinations in collaboration with the
child’s family. This process is termed Family Group Decision-Making
(FGDM).
FGDM acknowledges the importance of including both the family320 and
the larger community in child welfare decision-making.321 Consequently,
when a critical child welfare decision is required, FGDM can be initiated
and overseen either by service providers or by community organizations. 322
By including the community in child welfare decisions, FGDM
demonstrates that the welfare of children is not just the parents’
responsibility but also the responsibility of the child’s community. 323
Extensive studies prove the success and benefits of FGDM. As Professor
Charisa Smith notes, FGDM has “reduced the number of children in foster
320. Family Group Decision Making in Child Welfare: Purpose, Values and Processes,
KEMPE CTR. FOR THE PREVENTION & TREATMENT OF CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT (May 2013),
https://perma.cc/XG73-CN3B, quoted in Friend & Beck, supra note 204, at 278 (“When
agency concerns are adequately addressed, preference is given to a family group’s plan over
any other possible plan.”).
321. “FGDM affirms the culture of the family group, recognizes a family’s spirituality,
fully acknowledges the rights and abilities of the family group to make sound decisions for
and with its young relatives and actively engages the community as a vital support for
families.” AM HUMANE ASS’N & FGDM GUIDELINES COMM., GUIDELINES FOR FAMILY
GROUP DECISION MAKING IN CHILD WELFARE 8 (2010) [hereinafter GUIDELINES],
http://www.pacwrc.pitt.edu/Curriculum/207RemoteFGDMPart2/TableResources/TBLR01_
GdlnsFrFmlyGrpDcsnMknginChldWlfre.pdf, cited in Friend & Beck, supra note 204, at
277. For example, Connecticut DCF “began implementing a family conferencing model in
2005.” CASEY FAM. SERVS., supra note 219, at 3 (“The primary goal of this initiative was to
increase the level of family involvement in case planning by engaging parents and their
networks in problem solving and identifying the strengths and needs of each family.”)
322. Charisa Smith, The Conundrum of Family Reunification: A Theoretical, Legal, and
Practical Approach to Reunification Services for Parents with Mental Disabilities, 26 STAN.
L. & POL’Y REV. 307, 343 (2015) (“FGDM is typically initiated by service providers or
community organizations and includes social services agencies and governmental authorities
who assure that any plans created adequately address agency concerns.”).
323. Id. (“In the words of FGDM experts, ‘children have a right to maintain their kinship
and cultural connections throughout their lives. Children and their parents belong to a wider
family system that both nurtures them and is responsible for them.’”).
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care, decreased instances of maltreatment, kept biological families intact,
and improved holistic family wellbeing.” 324 FGDM recognizes the
important caregiving role that can be played by the child’s community. Its
similarities to the ICWA have also been noted. As Michigan Judge Michael
Cavanagh explains, FGDM is a great tool “to achieve a central goal of
ICWA” and to “use in proceedings involving non-Indian children.”325
b) Fictive Kin
The idea behind the ICWA’s second placement preference is that
placement with a member of the child’s tribe helps the child stay connected
to his or her family and culture during a time of tremendous upheaval. A
non-Indian parallel is state statutes permitting placement with “fictive kin,”
meaning non-relatives who have established a close relationship with a
relative of the child. 326 Rights for fictive kin are an outgrowth of state
recognition of the importance of placing children with relative caregivers
and an acknowledgment that the definition of relative may be more about
relationships than biology.327
324. Id.
325. Justice Michael F. Cavanagh, State Court Administrative Office—Court
Improvement Program: Indian Child Welfare Act Forum Remarks, October 6, 2008, 89
MICH. B.J. 23, 25 (2010); see also C. Quince Hopkins et al., Applying Restorative Justice to
Ongoing Intimate Violence: Problems and Possibilities, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 289,
309 (2004) (“[O]ne commentator has questioned whether restorative justice methods,
originally the province of indigenous peoples, would ultimately prove feasible or effective in
non-indigenous contexts.”). Others have also noted that FGDM is based on more traditional
decision-making practices. See GUIDELINES, supra note 321, at 6. Supporters of this
community-based approach to child welfare decision-making note that “[t]he practice is
informed by traditional decision-making processes in many cultures that accent the
importance of custom, communality, collectivity, consensus and taking time in arriving at
sound and lasting resolutions to issues affecting family life.” Id.
326. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-28-108(a) (West 2019) (defining “Fictive kin” as a
person “who . . . [i]s not related to a child by blood or marriage; and . . . [h]as a strong,
positive, and emotional tie or role in the . . . [c]hild's life; or [c]hild's parent's life if the child
is an infant”); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-2 (West 2020) (“‘Fictive kin’ means a person who is
not related to the child by blood, marriage, or adoption but who prior to his or her placement
in foster care is known to the family, has a substantial and positive relationship with the
child, and is willing and able to provide a suitable home for the child.”); N.M. CODE R. §
8.26.4.7(R) (LexisNexis 2020) (defining fictive kin as a “person not related by birth,
adoption or marriage with whom the child has an emotionally significant relationship.”).
327. Under the FCA, “states have the discretion to limit the definition of relatives to
those people related by blood, marriage, or adoption, or to further expand their definitions to
fictive kin—individuals with whom the child has a close relationship, such as close family

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021

66

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

Numerous states now allow fictive kin to serve as relative caregivers. 328
In these states, the term “relative caregiver” is broadly defined. In
California, such caregivers “may include relatives of the child, teachers,
medical professionals, clergy, neighbors, and family friends.”329 In
Montana, the definition of “kinship caregiver” is particularly interesting. It
lists “the child’s godparents; . . . the child’s stepparents; or . . . a person to
whom the child, child’s parents, or family ascribe a family relationship and
with whom the child has had a significant emotional tie.” 330 In addition, it
includes “a member of the child’s or family’s tribe.”331 By including tribal
members in this list, the Montana Code recognizes the similarities between
members of the child’s tribe and other non-relatives with whom the child
shares an important relationship.
Supporters of expansive definitions of relative caregivers cite the
significant research demonstrating that children’s successful development is
closely tied to relationships with their family of origin and with other
persons with whom they have close or meaningful relationships. 332 In
friends.” Vesneski et al., supra note 287, at 43; see also Patten, supra note 291, at 259
(noting the majority of states employ an expanded definition of kin).
328. “Twenty-eight states have statutes that grant preference to placement with ‘fictive
kin,’ or extended family, over strangers.” Rosie Frihart-Lusby, Note, Unconstitutional or
Just Bad Policy?: Title IV-E's AFDC “Lookback” and the Constitutional Guarantee of
Equal Protection, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 1069, 1081 n.84 (2020). Notably, many of these states
also make the explicit comparison between tribal members and fictive kin by considering
tribal members fictive kin even if they are strangers to the child. Id. In addition, forty-one
states currently permit fictive kin to serve as guardians under Guardian Assistance Programs.
Vesneski et al., supra note 287, at 43.
329. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 362.7 (West 2014); see also ALASKA STAT. ANN. §
47.10.080 (West 2018) (permitting placement with a “family friend”); HAW. REV. STAT. §
587A-4 (2017) (using the Hawaiian term “hanai relative,” to indicate unrelated adults found
“to perform or to have performed a substantial role in the upbringing or material support of a
child”); MINN. STAT. § 257.85 (2015) (permitting children to be placed with a “relative or
important friend with whom the child has resided or had significant contact”); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 3B:12A-2 (West 2002) (defining “Kinship relationship” to include a
“family friend”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-505 (West 2017) (permitting placement with
“nonrelative kin”).
330. MONT. CODE ANN. § 52-2-602 (West 2003).
331. Defining “Kinship foster home” to include “a member of the child’s or family’s
tribe.” Id. § 52-2-602(4).
332. See, e.g., Rosemary J. Avery, An Examination of Theory and Promising Practice for
Achieving Permanency for Teens Before They Age Out of Foster Care, 32 CHILD. & YOUTH
SERVS. REV. 399, 399–402 (2010) (citing JEFFREY ARNETT & JENNIFER LYNN TANNER,
EMERGING ADULTS IN AMERICA: COMING OF AGE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 27–28 (2006); Teresa
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arguing for this expanded definition of “kin,” advocates note that not all
communities and cultures define family based on blood relations. 333 In fact,
many tribes do not.334 The ICWA’s tribal preference reflects tribal
conceptions of family but, as the state definitions of kinship caregiver
demonstrate, it reflects non-Indian definitions of family as well.335
c) Geographic Barriers to Adoption
The ICWA placement preferences seek to keep children connected to
their communities and tribes by preferencing tribal placements over nontribal placements, with the exception of non-tribal family placements.
Critics of the ICWA assume that this preference to keep children in their
geographic community is unique to Indian children but, in fact, the majority
of states have in-state adoption preferences, many of which are quite strong.
For example, more than one third of the states, as well as Guam,336 the
Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands require
adoption petitioners to be state residents.337
M. Cooney & Jane Kurz, Mental Health Outcomes Following Recent Parental Divorce: The
Case of Young Adult Offspring, 17 J. FAM. ISSUES 495, 496 (1996)).
333. See, e.g., Patten, supra note 294, at 259 (“Not all cultures or communities delegate
or assume child-rearing responsibilities based on blood relations. Where a family has
demonstrated a commitment to a child and she is bonded to that family, it is incumbent upon
agencies and courts to respect those affective bonds.”).
334. For example, “the Tlingit and Haida tribes traditionally define family broadly.
Alaska Native tribes do not limit the definition of family to blood-ties or marriage links;
family includes communal relationships within the tribe.” Laverne F. Hill, Family Group
Conferencing: An Alternative Approach to the Placement of Alaska Native Children Under
the Indian Child Welfare Act, 22 ALASKA L. REV. 89, 95 (2005); see also Addie C. Rolnick,
Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction Beyond Citizenship and Blood, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 337, 442
(2014-2015) (“Before formal enrollment rules, membership in a tribal community was based
on kinship, residence, and sometimes choice of affiliation.”).
335. Jeffrey A. Parness & Amanda Beveroth, The ICWA’s Pre-Existing Custody
Requirement: A Flexible Approach to Better Protect the Interests of Indian Fathers,
Children, and Tribes, 35 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 25, 37 n.144 (2015) (noting “the emphasis
Congress placed on tribal culture, where an Indian child may have a close relationship with
extended family members, who could provide care to the child while maintaining the child’s
relationship with the tribal community”); see also Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25
U.S.C. § 1901(5) (noting the need for ICWA was due to the fact that state “failed to
recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social standards
prevailing in Indian communities and families”).
336. Who May Adopt, 19 GUAM CODE ANN. § 4203 (2020).
337. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-103 (LexisNexis 2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 903 (2019); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.207 (LexisNexis 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-3
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State courts have upheld these preferences and explained the benefits of
keeping children in state. For example, in Adoptive Parents v. Biological
Parents,338 the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld restrictions on nonresident adoptions, explaining that such restrictions help the state protect its
children from the dangers of “baby selling.”339 Similar reasoning was used
to uphold Rhode Island’s residency requirement. In In re Jeramie N., the
Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld residency requirements imposed on
private adoptions and explained that such requirements allow the state to
protect children’s best interest and ensure “children are not ‘“sold to the
highest bidder and shuffled around like objects on an auction block.”’” 340
The Indiana Supreme Court has also used similar reasoning. As the court
explained in In re Adoption of Infants H., “Residency does matter as
respects the delicate question of adopting a child . . . [because] it is more

(2018); IDAHO CODE § 16-1501 (2014); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/2 (LexisNexis 2015);
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-2-2 (LexisNexis 2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.470
(LexisNexis 2018); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.22 (West 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-11
(LexisNexis 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.309 (2003); 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-4 (1998);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-60 (2018); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-115 (2018); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 63.2-1201 (2017); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.82, 882.01 (West 1991); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 122-103 (1986); CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., WHO M AY ADOPT, BE ADOPTED, OR PLACE A CHILD FOR
ADOPTION ? 2 & n.6 (Jan. 2020), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/parties.pdf (noting
requirements for the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and Virgin Islands). In these
states, “the required period of residency ranges from 60 days to 1 year.” Id. However, some
of these states make exceptions for non-residents under certain circumstances. For example,
in Indiana and South Carolina, a nonresident can adopt a child with special needs; “in
Illinois, Mississippi, New Mexico, and Rhode Island, a nonresident may adopt through an
agency”; and Illinois, Tennessee and South Carolina all make exceptions for members of the
military. Id. “Some states make exceptions to the residency requirements for members of the
military.” Id.; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-60 (2018) (excepting military personnel
stationed in South Carolina).
338. 446 S.E.2d 404 (S.C. 1994).
339. Id. at 407, 410–11.
340. 688 A.2d 825, 830 (R.I. 1997). In addition, the Interstate Compact on the Placement
of Children was created specifically because states recognized the dangers of placing
children out of state due to the home state’s limited ability to continue to monitor that child’s
safety. See, e.g., Bernadette W. Hartfield, The Role of the Interstate Compact on the
Placement of Children in Interstate Adoption, 68 NEB. L. REV. 292, 296 (1989) (“The ICPC
was intended to extend the jurisdictional reach of a party state into the borders of another
party state for the purpose of investigating a proposed placement and supervising a
placement once it has been made.”).
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difficult for an Indiana court to evaluate whether adoption by a non-resident
is in a child's best interest.”341
As the courts in the above cases understood, it is much easier for a
community to protect its children when the children remain within its
jurisdiction. Tribal governments share this desire to keep an eye on their
children and ensure they are protected and well cared for.342 The ICWA’s
tribal placement preference simply ensures tribes, have the same ability as
states to safeguard their children.343
d) Open Adoptions
The ICWA’s tribal placement preference keeps Indian children
connected to their tribal communities—regardless of whether the child’s
birth parents believe this connection is in the child’s best interest. In
voluntary adoptions, this means the placement wishes of a fit custodial
parent can be overridden. The ICWA’s critics claim this is unusual344 and
note that fit custodial parents should have the right to make decisions

341. 904 N.E.2d 203, 206 (Ind. 2009).
342. In addition, such restrictions are common in the international context. Many
countries give preference to citizens and some completely prohibit their citizen children to
be adopted by non-citizens. See generally Bernie D. Jones, International and Transracial
Adoptions: Toward a Global Critical Race Feminist Practice?, 10 WASH. & LEE RACE &
ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 43, 58 (2004). See also infra Section III.E (discussing international
adoption).
343. It should also be noted that tribes have similar concerns about “baby selling” but
that these concerns are alleviated by the application of the tribal placement preference. See
Berger, supra note 192, at 356 (noting that tribal placement preferences “will likely result in
a child becoming entirely unavailable for a high-priced adoption”).
344. During a hearing in 1988 to consider amendments to the ICWA, one witness
testified that the ICWA infringes on a mother’s rights to “determin[e] what the best interests
of the child are . . . [and] subject[s] the interests of the child to the interests of the tribe.” To
Amend the Indian Child Welfare Act: Hearings on S. 1976 Before the S. Select Comm. on
Indian Affs., 100th Cong. 48 (1988), https://narf.org/nill/documents/icwa/federal/lh/
hear051188/hear051188.pdf (testimony of Ross Swimmer, Asst. Sec’ for Indian Affairs,
Dep’t of the Interior); see also Christine D. Bakeis, The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978:
Violating Personal Rights for the Sake of the Tribe, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 543, 568 (1996) (“The ICWA permits tribes and courts to blatantly disregard a natural
parent’s deliberate and thoughtful decision to have their child adopted by a specific family of
their choice. Even more frightening is the fact that under the ICWA courts and tribes can
disregard a parent’s conscious decision not to have their child raised in the same social
setting to which they belong.”).
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regarding the care and control of their children. 345 In general, this is true,
but this right is not absolute and may be infringed to protect the health and
welfare of the child.
The ICWA applies to both involuntary and voluntary adoptions because
Congress determined Indian children would continue to be harmed if
voluntary adoption provided an exception to the Act. 346 Congress
recognized that Indian children benefit from a connection to their tribes and
relatives. The growth of open adoption laws supports this conclusion.
The ICWA is premised on the belief that it is in the best interests of
Indian children to remain connected to their families and tribes. 347 The
tribal placement preferences help ensure that even if children cannot be
placed with a relative, they will remain connected to their tribal culture and
345. For cases discussing a parent’s constitutionally protected right to raise a child free
from governmental intrusion, see Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Soc’y
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
346. ICWA applies to both because Congress recognized that voluntary placements could
otherwise be used as a way to circumvent the Act. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 11 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7533 (anticipating the dangers posed by voluntary
actions) (“[T]he voluntary waiver of parental rights is a device widely employed by social
workers to gain custody of children.”). For a compelling disclosure of the use of voluntary
adoptions by private adoption agencies as a device to place Native children outside the
Native American community, see Oversight Hearings on the Indian Child Welfare Act:
Before the S. Select Comm. on Indian Affs., 100th Cong. 362–66 (1987), https://narf.org/
nill/documents/icwa/federal/lh/hear111087/hear111087.pdf (stating that private adoption
agencies in Alaska “consistently show an utter disregard for the Indian Child Welfare Act
and the values it embodies” and that the Alaskan agencies “are in the adoption business”);
see Erik W. Aamot-Snapp, When Judicial Flexibility Becomes Abuse of Discretion:
Eliminating the “Good Cause” Exception in Indian Child Welfare Act Adoptive Placements,
79 MINN. L. REV. 1167, 1196 (1995); see also Oversight on the Implementation of the Indian
Child Welfare Act of 1978: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Indian Affs., 98th Cong.
107–08 (1984) (statement of Ethel C. Krepps, President, Okla. Indian Child Welfare Ass’n)
(describing an affidavit used by independent adoption agencies to bypass the ICWA).
347. Open adoption is similar to the long-standing tribal practice of customary adoption.
[T]ribal customary adoption (TCA), is a legal adoption where the adopting
parents receive all the rights any other adoptive parent would, but where TPR
does not occur. California, Minnesota, and Washington have laws recognizing
and requiring TCAs to be an option in pursuing permanent placement for
Indian juveniles. If the government is seeking to alleviate the negative impacts
of TPRs on children and their families, customary adoptions should be a
permanent option for all juveniles.
Polasky, supra note 182, at 403.
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heritage. The goal of open adoption is similar.348 Open adoptions seek to
keep children connected to their birth communities and culture. 349
Studies show that most adoptees want to have some contact with their
birth parents350 and that contact strongly contributes to adoptees’ wellbeing.351 Specifically, such studies indicate that post-adoption contact helps
children avoid feelings of conflict between their birth families and adoptive
families,352 helps them resolve identity struggles, 353 reduces anxiety about
348. See Annette R. Appell, Increasing Options to Improve Permanency: Considerations
in Drafting an Adoption with Contact Statute, CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J., Fall 1998, at 24, 42 n.2
[hereinafter Appell, Increasing Options] (defining open adoption as “a broad and flexible
concept encompassing a spectrum of relationships that range from preadotion [sic] exchange
of information among the birth and adoptive parents to ongoing postadoption contact
between the birth family and the adoptive family”). It is also important to note that while
open adoptions are a relatively recent development in American family courts, there is a
long-standing tradition of open adoption in many tribal communities. See, e.g., Atwood,
Flashpoints, supra note 89, at 670 (“In this regard, state courts would do well to learn from
their tribal counterparts in designing placements for children that avoid the head-to-head
collision of interests.”).
349. One of the additional benefits of open adoption is that by ensuring adoptive parents
have contact with birth parents or relatives makes them less likely to think poorly of the
child’s birth relations, and thus avoid “perceptions that the child may absorb as negative
messages about the child’s worth or that might produce cognitive dissonance for the child
who has loyalties to the birth family.” Annette Ruth Appell, Reflections on the Movement
Toward a More Child-Centered Adoption, 32 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 7 (2010) [hereinafter
Appell, Reflections].
350. “This study indicated that: ‘having contact is generally associated with satisfaction
with that contact; not having contact is generally associated with dissatisfaction about not
having contact . . . .’” Maldonado, Permanency, supra note 265, at 327 (quoting Tai J.
Mendenhall et al., Adolescents' Satisfaction with Contact in Adoption, 21 CHILD &
ADOLESCENT SOC. WORK J. 175, 186 (2004)).
351. “[O]ne longitudinal study of children adopted as infants concluded ‘that ongoing
contact with a birth parent contributes to [children’s] overall well-being as they grow up.’”
Maldonado, Permanency, supra note 265, at 327 (quoting Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Overview
of Legal Status of Post-Adoption Contact Agreements, in FAMILIES BY LAW: AN ADOPTION
READER 159, 159 (Naomi R. Cahn & Joan Heifetz Hollinger eds., 2004)) (alteration in
original); see also Malinda L. Seymore, Openness in International Adoption, 46 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 163, 178 (2015) (“[T]he growing body of research paints a positive
picture of how well open adoptions of various forms tend to work for their participants.”)
(quoting DEBORAH H. SIEGEL & SUSAN LIVINGSTON SMITH, EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION
INST., OPENNESS IN ADOPTION: FROM SECRECY AND STIGMA TO KNOWLEDGE AND
CONNECTIONS 16 (2012)).
352. Maldonado, Permanency, supra note 265, at 328; see also Carol Sanger, Bargaining
for Motherhood: Postadoption Visitation Agreements, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 309, 322 (2012)
(“Adoptive parents are also understood to benefit from the arrangement. As already noted,
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their birth families,354 and enables children to address feelings of
rejection. 355 Studies also suggest that post-adoption contact may be
especially important in transracial adoption. 356
The similarities between open adoption and the tribal placement
preference are most strongly exemplified by the fact that the availability of
open adoptions has repeatedly been used as good cause for deviating from
the Act’s placement preferences. For example, in the Minnesota adoption
case of Christian Good Bird, the mother initially objected to her son’s
adoption by a non-Indian couple he had been living with since birth.357 The
child’s tribe also intervened to contest the adoption.358 The result was a
highly contentious two-year custody battle.359 This case, however, was
the practice of open adoption is understood to contribute to an ongoing supply of desirable
newborns. Open adoption may also benefit the adoptive parents and their child from a
developmental perspective. The adoptive parents accept, as evidenced by their willingness to
open adoption, that transparency about origins is good for their child and that it will not
threaten their own status as legal parents.”).
353. Contact can enable children to incorporate birth-families into their identity. See
Sanger, supra note 352, at 322.
354. Appell, Reflections, supra note 349, at 22 (“Children’s accounts of their feelings
about adoption and contact suggest that, for most of them, their everyday lives were not
clouded by a significant sense of loss. However, when we asked them if they ever worried
about anything[,] thirty-six (61 per cent) children identified issues associated with adoption
or their birth families . . . . Direct contact went some way towards quelling these worries for
many children and adoptive parents were aware of its importance in this respect.”)
(alterations in original) (quoting CAROLE SMITH & J ANETTE LOGAN, AFTER ADOPTION:
DIRECT CONTACT AND RELATIONSHIPS 144 (2004)).
355. Annette Baran & Reuben Pannor, Perspectives on Open Adoption, FUTURE CHILD.,
Spring 1993, at 119, 122 (noting that one of the benefits of open adoptions is that “adoptees’
feelings of rejection by the birthparents also can be greatly diminished”).
356. Open adoption can help provide adopted children with same-race role models who
can help with racial identity formation. See Seymore, supra note 351, at 179; see also
Barbara Yngvesson, Negotiating Motherhood: Identity and Difference in “Open” Adoptions,
31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 31, 67–76 (1997) (exploring the practice of “other” mothering in
African American communities).
357. Ronald M. Walters, Comment, Goodbye to Good Bird: Considering the Use of
Contact Agreements to Settle Contested Adoptions Arising Under the Indian Child Welfare
Act, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 270, 271 (2008); see also In re Adoption of Baby Boy J., 944
N.Y.S.2d 871, 877 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2012) (using a post adoption contract agreement as part of
its determination that “good cause exists to deviate from the preferences set forth in [the]
ICWA”).
358. Walters, supra note 357, at 272.
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ultimately resolved when the non-Indian adoptive couple agreed to sign a
“cultural connectedness agreement” obligating them “to establish and
maintain contact with [the child’s] Tribal culture and his extended
family.”360 The court determined that this promise was sufficient “good
cause” to permit deviation from the ICWA’s placement preference. 361
Indian law scholars, such as Professor Barbara Atwood, have long
recognized the potential benefits of permitting open adoption to serve as
good cause to deviate from the placement preferences. As Professor
Atwood explains, continued contact agreements “allow state courts to
fashion remedies that accommodate the child’s interest in remaining with
psychological parents while maintaining ties with her cultural community.
Through continued contact, the child’s identity as a member of the tribe
would remain vital, thus benefiting the child as well as the tribe.”362
Historically, the biggest hurdle to permitting open adoption to constitute
“good cause” for deviating from the placement preference was that open
adoption agreements were frequently unenforceable. For example, in the
2008 case In re Jesse, the Choctaw Nation was amenable to permitting an
359.
Christian’s adoptive parents appeared on Dr. Phil after a judge had ordered
them to return Christian to his mother in 45 days. Dr. Phil: Adoption
Controversy (CBS television broadcast Jan. 28, 2005) (transcript on file with
the author). While the Hofers were still expecting that they would have to
return Christian, Dr. Phil suggested that the situation might best be resolved
extrajudicially. The litigation settled soon thereafter.
Id. at 270 n.2.
360. Id. at 272.
361. The Goodbird case is not unique. See, e.g., Baby Boy J., 944 N.Y.S.2d at 877 (using
a post adoption contract agreement as part of its determination that “good cause exists to
deviate from the preferences set forth in [the] ICWA.”); In re Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d
1361, 1363 (Alaska 1993) (citing the “‘open adoption’ petition allowing E.P.D. access to
F.H. and possibly giving F.H. exposure to her Native American heritage”); see also Native
Vill. of Napaimute Traditional Council v. Terence W. (In re Adoption of Keith M.W.), 79
P.3d 623, 631 (Alaska 2003) (finding that reliance on adoption structure can serve as part of
the basis for finding good cause to deviate from the Act’s placement preferences); Jeff O. v.
Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., No. 1 CA-JV 11-0019, 2011 WL 3820513, at *7 (Ariz. Ct. App.
Aug. 30, 2011) (citing “[t]he open adoption/relationship between the placement and
biological parents and extended family” as part of its good cause determination).
362. Atwood, Flashpoints, supra note 89, at 670 (describing the Indian Child Welfare
Act Amendments of 2001, H.R. 2644, 107th Cong. (2001)). The revisions “would authorize
state courts to approve of post-adoption visitation agreements as part of an adoption decree”
and these agreements “would grant enforceable rights of visitation or contact with the child
by birth parents, extended family members, or a child’s tribe.” Id. at 669.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021

74

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

open adoption to serve as “good cause” to deviate from the preferences, but
the agreement fell through when the child’s birth father informed the Tribe
that there was “no such thing as an open adoption in California.” 363 Today,
that is no longer the case.364 California’s current law permits post-adoption
contact agreements and assumes such contact may be beneficial for all
adopted children. The provision also specifically includes tribal contact. It
states:
The Legislature finds and declares that some adoptive children
may benefit from either direct or indirect contact with birth
relatives, including the birth parent or parents . . . or an Indian
tribe, after being adopted. Postadoption contact agreements are
intended to ensure children of an achievable level of continuing
contact when contact is beneficial to the children and the
agreements are voluntarily executed by birth relatives, including
the birth parent or parents . . . or an Indian tribe, and adoptive
parents.365
California is not alone. Over the past twenty years, many states have
“revised their statutory schemes regarding open adoption”; the majority
provide “for some form of enforceable agreement between birth parents and

363. In re Jesse E., No. B200426, 2008 WL 651692, at *11 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 12,
2008).
364. This view changed in the 1980s, when courts began to
take account of developing shifts in law and in sentiment regarding open
adoption, and they began to reassess the nonenforceability of visitation
agreements. Most of the cases from the period involved mothers who had
existing relationships with their children prior to the adoption; the adopted
children were children, not newborns, who had lived with their birthmothers for
some time.
Sanger, supra note 352, at 316. This reasoning is now being applied to the adoption of
infants as well as older children. Today, most statutes apply to any adopted child but there
remain some exceptions. For example, “Connecticut and Nebraska permit visitation only
with children adopted from foster care; while Indiana limits coverage to foster children who
are two and over.” Id. at 319 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-715 (West 2004); IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-19-16.5-1 (West 2008); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-162 (LexisNexis
2011)).
365. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5(a) (West 2017). It is also telling that the California law
does not only pertain to birth parents but also provides for information sharing with extended
relatives.
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adoptive parents.”366 In fact, as Professor Carol Sanger notes, “[M]ost
adoptions in the United States are now open in some respect.” 367 Moreover,
while all open adoption statutes include the birth parents, several include
other birth relatives, such as siblings, grandparents, aunts, uncles, foster
parents, and some states—like California—specifically include members of
an Indian child’s tribe. 368
The inclusion of Indian tribes in open adoption statutes is significant.
States with these provisions recognize the similarity between open adoption
and tribal preference. Both keep children connected to their birth families
and communities, but that is not the only similarity between the ICWA’s
tribal preference and open adoption. In fact, the most important parallel
between open adoption and tribal preference may be that both can be
imposed against the wishes of the child’s parents. 369
366. Sanger, supra note 352, at 319 (“By 2011, twenty-six states and the District of
Columbia had enacted laws providing for some form of enforceable agreement . . . . While
the statutes differ in interesting ways, each provides that postadoption visitation agreements
are legal so long as the agreement is in writing and approved by the court, most often by
being incorporated into the final order of adoption. The statutes also specify the type of
contact to which the parties may agree. These include actual visitation, the sharing of
information (identifying or non-identifying), and other forms of communication, such as
letters and photographs. Information may be exchanged directly or through an adoption
agency.”).
367. Id. at 321 (“[O]pen adoption is now a familiar and expected part of adoption
practice and culture.”); see also Appell, Increasing Options, supra note 348, at 4 (“Open
adoption has now become the norm in practice for all types of adoption.”).
368. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5(b)(1) (“Nothing in the adoption laws of this state
shall be construed to prevent the adopting parent or parents, the birth relatives, including the
birth parent or parents . . . or an Indian tribe, and the child from voluntarily executing a
written agreement to permit continuing contact between the birth relatives, including the
birth parent or parents . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also Sophie Mashburn, Comment,
Mediating A Family: The Use of Mediation in the Formation and Enforcement of PostAdoption Contact Agreements, 2015 J. DISP. RESOL. 383, 388 (“California, Minnesota, and
Oklahoma, children adopted from an Indian tribe are allowed continued contact with
members of that tribe if they have a pre-existing relationship with the tribe from which they
were adopted.”).
369. Annette R. Appell, Enforceable Post Adoption Contact Statutes, Part II: CourtImposed Post Adoption Contact, 4 ADOPTION Q. 101, 101 (2000) [hereinafter Appell,
Enforceable]; see also Annette Ruth Appell, Blending Families Through Adoption:
Implications for Collaborative Adoption Law and Practice, 75 B.U. L. REV. 997, 1040
(1995) (noting that some courts have ordered post adoption contact over adoptive parents’
objections); In re Adoption of Vito, 728 N.E.2d 292, 300 (Mass. 2000) (citing Massachusetts
law permitting the court to order visitation regardless of the wishes of the parties).
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Several states have court-imposed post-adoption contact statutes that
empower courts to order visits at the request of third parties and over the
objections of the adoptive parents.370 As Professor Annette Appell notes,
such orders “can be useful, particularly when there are people important to
the child, but whose importance the adoptive parents do not appreciate.” 371
Similar to the ICWA placement preferences, these statutes permit parental
wishes to be ignored in order to ensure a child has contact with their birth
family and community. These statutes are significant, because one of the
most common criticisms of the tribal placement preferences is that they
promote a child’s familial and cultural connections regardless of the birth
parent’s wishes.
Court-imposed post-adoption contact is similar. Like the ICWA’s tribal
placement preferences, court-imposed post-adoption contact orders assume
that maintaining a child’s connection to family and community is important
enough to override a biological parent’s desire to sever this connection.
4. Any Other Indian
The third ICWA placement preference gives preference to “Indian
families” over any non-Indian families seeking to adopt an Indian child. 372
The ICWA’s critics claim this provision promotes race matching. 373 As
explained in Section II.E of this Article, this preference is not racematching because “Indian” is a political, rather than racial, category.
370. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 3 (LexisNexis 2012) (stating that a court may
dispense with need for consent to adoption in the best interests of a child); see also Appell,
Enforceable, supra note 369, at 101–02.
371. Appell, Reflections, supra note 349, at 6. For example,
. . . Massachusetts’ relatively longstanding and robust practice of court-ordered
post-adoption and post-termination family contact. In fact, so rooted is this
practice that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Adoption of Vito,
explicitly rejected the argument that statutory amendments providing for
adoption with contact and post-termination contact agreements removed the
judiciary’s equitable authority to impose post-termination and post-adoption
contact. It is not surprising, then, that there continues to be litigation regarding
the court’s discretion to order post-adoption contact, which is limited only by
the best interests of the child standard, a notoriously indefinite measure.
Id. at 12.
372. 25 U.S.C. § 1915 (“In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State law, a
preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement
with . . . (3) other Indian families.”).
373. See supra Section II.E (discussing the Brackeen case and the plaintiff’s—and their
supporters’—arguments that the ICWA is unconstitutional racial discrimination).
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Regardless, even if “Indian” was a racial category, this provision would still
be permissible. Despite the perception that racial considerations in child
welfare are forbidden, this contention is false. There are strong arguments
that race-matching is undesirable, but it is far from prohibited.
a) MEPA and the Illusion of Color Blindness
The perception that racial considerations should be barred from child
placement decisions gained nationwide prominence with the passage of the
Multi-Ethnic Placement Act (MEPA). 374 The MEPA was Congress’
response to growing criticism that the preference for placing black children
with black parents prevented these children from being adopted and forced
them to languish in foster care. 375 As it was originally enacted, the MEPA
prohibited officials from delaying or denying the placement of a child
“solely on the basis of race.”376 The “solely” language led to public outcry
that the statute did not go far enough and, in 1996, Congress amended the
MEPA to remove the “solely” language. 377
The passage of the MEPA and its amendments created the perception
that race-matching is both harmful and prohibited; yet, it remains legal and
widespread. The most common example of modern race-matching is
“facilitative accommodation,” the policy of considering a potential adoptive
couple’s racial preference.
b) Facilitative Accommodation
“Facilitative accommodation” refers to the practice of categorizing
children by race and placing them with parents according to the adoptive
parents’ racial preference. 378 Facilitative accommodation occurs in both

374. 42 U.S.C. § 5115a (1994) (repealed 1996).
375. Ralph Richard Banks, The Multiethnic Placement Act and the Troubling Persistence
of Race Matching, 38 CAP. U. L. REV. 271, 272 (2009) [hereinafter Banks, Multiethnic
Placement Act]. It should be noted that MEPA has not succeeded in its goals of creating
equality in adoption rates. Is MEPA/TEP Working for African American Children?, 27
CHILD L. PRAC. 79 (2008) (“Adoption rates of African American children remain lower than
those of other racial/ethnic groups.”).
376. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 5115a(a)(1)(A)–(B) (1994) (repealed)). This language
permitted child placement decisions in which race was one factor among many, ironically
making MEPA the first federal statute to condone race matching.
377. Banks, Multiethnic Placement Act, supra note 375, at 272–73.
378. For an example of how race matching works, see Banks, Multiethnic Placement Act,
supra note 375, at 275–76 (describing South Carolina’s policy which asked parents if they
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private adoptions, which do not receive federal funds and are not subject to
the MEPA, and in public adoptions, which are subject to the MEPA.
c) Private Adoptions
In private adoptions, race-matching is open and notorious. As Professor
Dov Fox notes, “Some private agencies still openly make placement
decisions based primarily on race and prominently highlight the racial
backgrounds of adoptive children in online advertising and other
promotional materials, while charging higher fees to adopt white children
than black ones.”379 This practice is compounded by the fact that, over the
past four decades, the cost of adoption skyrocketed. “Estimates in the late
1980s put the average agency fee between $7,000 and $10,000.”380 By
2015, many agencies were charging more than $50,000 per adoption and
added substantial additional fees for facilitating the adoption of Caucasian
children. 381
Many scholars have criticized these racial premiums. As Professor
Margaret Radin notes, pricing adoptions based on race creates both a literal
and a rhetorical market in which there exists inferior and superior
children. 382 Similarly, Professor Michele Goodwin notes that “altruism as a
primary goal in adoption has been overshadowed by supplication to

were willing to “accept children who are Black, White, Black/White, or Other” and then
used these answers to determine a child’s potential placement).
379. Dov Fox, Race Sorting in Family Formation, 49 FAM. L.Q. 55, 60 (2015) (citing
Martha M. Ertman, What’s Wrong with a Parenthood Market? A New and Improved Theory
of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1, 27–30 (2003)); Solangel Maldonado, Discouraging
Racial Preferences in Adoptions, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1415, 1423 (2006); Barbara
Fedders, Race and Market Values in Domestic Infant Adoption, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1687, 1696–
97 (2010); Michele Goodwin, The Free-Market Approach to Adoption: The Value of a Baby,
26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 61, 65–66 (2006); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Altruism and
Intermediation in the Market for Babies, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 203, 248 (2009).
380. Jack Darcher, Market Forces in Domestic Adoptions: Advocating A Quantitative
Limit on Private Agency Adoption Fees, 8 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 729, 737 (2010).
381. Id.
382. See M ARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 156 (1996)
(“[P]ersons . . . possess objects that they may control or manipulate to achieve their
ends . . . . Objectification is improper treatment of persons because it makes them means, not
ends . . . . As means, objects may be bought and sold in markets, to achieve satisfaction of
persons’ needs and desires. Objects, but not persons, may be commodified.”); see also
Darcher, supra note 380, at 745 (“When a baby or child is objectified, all of its attributes—
sex, race, hair color, predicted intelligence, predicted height—become part of its ‘worth.’”).
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parental desires.”383 Despite such criticisms, today’s adoption market
remains a highly racialized one.
Adoption agencies establish fees with adoptive parents based on racial
and other characteristics these parents find most desirable. 384 In the U.S.,
white children or other lighter skinned children are more highly valued than
black children and command a higher price. 385 As Professor Jessica Dixon
Weaver explains, “In many ways the process of adoption reinforces the
privilege and status representative of the potential parent’s identity.
Potential adoptive parents can choose what race child they are willing to
raise, yet the average child awaiting adoption, regardless of ethnicity, is
unable to state a racial preference.”386
There are multiples reasons to criticize an adoption system that
accommodates potential parents’ racial preferences and objectifies children.
Nevertheless, race-matching in private adoptions remains both legal and
common. 387

383. Goodwin, supra note 379, at 75.
384. Id. at 68–69.
385. Id. (“In U.S. adoptions, white children are more highly valued than black children
by both adoption agencies and by those who seek to adopt them. Further, adoptive parents
are acutely aware that competition is involved in free-market adoptions. Thus, those serious
about adopting a white baby, and with the resources to do so, realize balking at the high
costs associated with those adoptions would prove futile.”).
386. Weaver, supra note 274, at 175.
387. Some states have attempted to combat the market in babies by enacting laws
intended to curb the profit of private adoption.
For example, the UAA forbids the exchange of money or any items of value for
the express placement of a minor for adoption. The UAA also explicitly forbids
any payment for the birth parents’ consent or relinquishment. However, the act
does allow payment to agencies for their services in connection with the
adoption, including those incurred in locating the child—such as advertising
costs. More importantly, it allows for several categories of compensation to the
birth parents: (1) the medical, pharmaceutical, and traveling expenses incurred
by the birth mother in connection with the birth (or any illness to the child); (2)
any counseling services for the parent(s) for a reasonable time before or after
the adoption placement; (3) living expenses for the mother within a reasonable
time before the birth and for no more than six weeks after the birth; and (4) any
legal costs incurred by the birth parents.
Darcher, supra note 380, at 749. Consequently, it is not hard to get around these
prohibitions.
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d) Public Adoptions
Public adoptions are governed by the MEPA, but the statute’s
applicability doesn’t prevent race-matching. States continue to use racial
preferences when determining potential placements for children in state
care, and children who do not match the prospective parent’s preferred race
are not listed as potential matches. 388 Consequently, two decades after the
MEPA’s passage, a child’s probability of being adopted remains strongly
affected by his or her race; for African American children, this means a
significantly lower likelihood of adoption.389 In their study on racematching in adoption, Mariagiovanna Baccara, Allan Collard-Wexler,
Leonardo Felli, and Leeat Yariv demonstrated that “children’s aggregate
probability of receiving an application is considerably affected by their
race” and that “the probability that a 100 percent African American [baby]
(of unknown gender) receives an application is 1.8 percent in contrast to a
probability of 13.1 percent for a 0 percent African American child.”390
Professor Ralph Richard Banks is one of the most vocal critics of
facilitative accommodation and believes it is just as harmful as prohibited
forms of race-matching.391 Still, such views remain rare.392 Courts and
legislatures do not consider facilitative accommodation harmful. 393 As a
388. See Banks, Multiethnic Placement Act, supra note 375, at 275–76; see also Fox,
supra note 379, at 60 (noting adoptive parents’ racial preferences in adoption is given
significant weight) (“Even in public agencies, however, social workers use the broad
discretion afforded them to facilitate through quiet practice the very kind of race-matching
that MEPA bars them from imposing.”); see also RACHEL F. MORAN, INTERRACIAL
INTIMACY : THE REGULATION OF RACE AND ROMANCE 134 (2001) (noting that even after
MEPA, “agencies could consider the attitudes and preferences of prospective parents to
decide whether placement was in a child’s best interest”).
389. Mariagiovanna Baccara et al., Child-Adoption Matching: Preferences for Gender
and Race, 6 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 133, 153 (2014)).
390. Id.
391. R. Richard Banks, The Color of Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive Parents’ Racial
Preferences Through Discriminatory State Action, 107 YALE L.J. 875 (1998) (asserting that
race preferences in adoption are damaging because they limit the possibility of adoption and
arguing in favor of a non-accommodation policy that would preclude adoption agencies from
facilitating these racial preferences).
392. See, e.g., Maldonado, supra note 379, at 1470 (“Although there is a vast literature
condemning race-matching practices, only recently have scholars begun to view adoptive
parents’ racial preferences as problematic.”).
393. For example, when states are found to have violated MEPA it tends to be for
denying a parent’s racial preferences as in the case of parents willing to adopt transracially
rather than for abiding by it. See Schlueter, supra note 378, at 271 (“DHHS found illegal the

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol45/iss1/2

No. 1]

ICWA’S IRONY

81

result, states prohibit racial considerations that delay or deny an adoption,
but most allow other racial considerations. For example, Missouri law states
that “[p]lacement of a child in an adoptive home may not be delayed or
denied on the basis of race, color or national origin.”394 Yet, the law also
accommodates race-matching through the “diligent recruitment of potential
adoptive homes that reflect the ethnic and racial diversity of children in the
state for whom adoptive homes are needed.”395 Similarly, both Vermont
and New Jersey prohibit an agency from racially discriminating in the
adoptive parent selection process but allow agencies to consider race when
determining the best placement for a child. 396 In Connecticut and Michigan,
agencies are simply prohibited from making placement decisions “solely”
based on race397 and, in Kentucky, race-matching is facilitated through a
[South Carolina] agency’s practice of treating transracial adoptions with greater scrutiny,
faulting, for example, the inquiries into prospective parents’ ability to adopt transracially,
and ability to nurture a child of a different race, as well as inquiries into the racial makeup of
such parents’ friends, neighborhoods, and available schools.”) (quoting Elizabeth Bartholet,
Commentary, Cultural Stereotypes Can and Do Die: It's Time to Move on With Transracial
Adoption, 34 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 315, 316 (2006)); see also Eyer, supra note 247,
at 580 n.201 (“Since MEPA was amended in 1996, only two courts have addressed the
constitutionality of relying on race in adoptive or foster care placements, with opposite
results.”). Eyer compared In re Andrea Lynn Carpenter, 1999 Mich. App. LEXIS 2140, at
*8–10, n.3 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 1999), in which the court found “the trial court’s reliance
on race was constitutionally unproblematic where race was not the sole consideration,” with
Kenny A. v. Perdue, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27025, at *21–22 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 11, 2004), in
which the court allowed “a claim of unconstitutional racial discrimination, in a case where
the circumstantial evidence supported the conclusion that the agency had a virtually
categorical policy of race-matching, to survive summary judgment . . . .” Id.
394. MO. ANN. STAT. § 453.005(3) (West 2014)
395. Id. § 453.005(2).
396. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 2-203(d) (West 1997) (“A preplacement evaluation
shall contain the following information about the person being evaluated:(1) age and date of
birth, nationality, racial or ethnic background, and any religious affiliation.”); see also N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 9:3-40 (West 2006) (“[A]n approved agency shall not discriminate with regard
to the selection of adoptive parents for any child on the basis of age, sex, race, national
origin, religion or marital status provided, however, that these factors may be considered in
determining whether the best interests of a child would be served by a particular placement
for adoption or adoption.”).
397. “[T]he commissioner or such agency shall not refuse to place or delay placement of
such child with any prospective adoptive parent solely on the basis of a difference in race,
color or national origin.” CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-726(a) (West 2000); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 722.957 (West 1995) (“[A]n adoption facilitator shall not refuse to provide
services to a potential adoptive parent based solely on age, race, religious affiliation,

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021

82

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

statute permitting genetic parents to disapprove a placement for any reason
and without any explanation.398
The above laws comply with the MEPA, which simply prohibits
agencies from delaying or denying an adoptive placement based on race. 399
They are also consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Palmore v.
Sidoti, which held only that race may not be the sole factor in determining
the best interests of the child for purposes of custody. 400 Palmore prohibits
courts from relying exclusively on race and racial concerns as the basis for
their decisions, but it does not prohibit racial considerations in general. 401
Palmore is a very low standard. Professor Katie Eyer notes that “only the
most unsophisticated government actor would be unable to demonstrate
compliance” with Palmore.402 As a result, race is a permissible and
common consideration in custody decisions. 403
Tellingly, objections to the use of race in custody decisions is primarily
confined to the cases where a potential adoptive couple is prevented from
adopting a different race child when no same-race parent is available. As
Professor Banks wrote:

disability, or income level. A child placing agency shall not make placement decisions based
solely on age, race, religious affiliation, disability, or income level.”) (emphasis added).
398.
The cabinet may refuse to approve the placement of a child for adoption if the
child’s custodial parent is unwilling for the child to be placed for adoption with
the proposed adoptive family. The cabinet may approve or deny the placement,
in spite of the fact that the custodial parent or parents are unwilling to be
interviewed by the cabinet or other approving entity . . . .
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.473 (West 2018).
399. In facilitative adoption the denial of the placement is based on the prospective
parents’ decision not the agency’s. However, the decision to accommodate parental
preferences, which are primarily for white children, arguably delays and may even deny a
placement based on race. Leigh, supra note 72, at 396 (“By the child-placing agency helping
parents exclude children of other races, it is actually delaying the adoption of minority
children by making it easier for these minority children to be overlooked, and in turn, not be
adopted in a timely manner.”).
400. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
401. See id. at 432–34.
402. Eyer, supra note 247, at 575.
403. Gloria G. v. State Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 833 P.2d 979, 984 (Kan. 1992)
(finding that race could be used as a factor in adoption decisions if it is not the sole factor);
In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 2633, 646 A.2d 1036, 1036 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994)
(affirming circuit court’s holding that “determination that placement of child with same race
family was in best interest of child was not abuse of discretion”).
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I often raise this issue in my family law class by asking the
students to imagine that there are black children and white
children available for adoption, and that there are so many
prospective parents of each race that all the children could be
placed with suitable families even if none were placed across
racial lines. It is striking to see how opposition to race matching
diminishes once its effect is no longer to delay or preclude the
adoption of some children. Many students are all too happy to
race match, so long as there are enough families of each race for
all the available children.404
If “Indian” is considered a race, then § 1915(c) of the ICWA permits the
scenario described by Professor Banks and should elicit the same general
approval. The “any other Indian” requirement preferences an Indian parent
over a non-Indian parent only when both are available and qualified. A
racial preference under such circumstances is not prohibited by the MEPA
and, as previously noted, is frequently encouraged under state law.
Consequently, the fact that these placements have garnered such fierce
opposition is more likely due to adoptive parents’ desire to adopt Indian
children rather than an objection to race-matching in general. The
objections to race-matching in the international adoption context reveals
similar motivations.
E. International Adoption
International adoptions are now commonplace in the United States. 405
The United States is the number one country for international adoptions
and, at its peak, in 2004, the United States accounted for nearly half of all
transnational adoptions.406 However, since then, the numbers of
international adoptions have been declining.407 This reduction is not due to
404. Banks, Multiethnic Placement Act, supra note 375, at 287.
405. See, e.g., Barbara Yngvesson, Transnational Adoption and European Immigration
Politics: Producing the National Body in Sweden, 19 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 327, 331–
32 (2012) (describing the United States as “[t]he principal adopting nation today, as it has
been for the past five decades”).
406. Id. (noting that the United States received 22,884 children that year).
407. See, e.g., Deleith Duke Gossett, If Charity Begins at Home, Why Do We Go
Searching Abroad? Why the Federal Adoption Tax Credit Should Not Subsidize
International Adoptions, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 839, 857 n.118 (2013) (“Recent figures
show a decline of approximately 60%, from 22,991 international adoptions in 2004 to
8,668 international adoptions in 2012.”).
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a reduction in demand, which remains high, 408 but is the result of increased
restrictions and prohibitions on foreign adoptions.409 Not surprisingly,
potential adoptive parents are often vocal opponents of these increased
restrictions, many of which require racial and cultural similarities between
the child and adoptive parent.410
1. Adoption Prohibitions
Foreign countries frequently prohibit adoptions by persons not deemed
similar enough to the potential adoptive child. In some countries, this
means adoptive parents must be the same religion as the child. For example,
in Tunisia and Morocco, a Muslim child may only be adopted by another
Muslim411 and, in Bangladesh, a Hindu child may only be adopted by
another Hindu.412 However, international law also permits adoption
restrictions to be ethnically or culturally based. For example, the preamble

408. See, e.g., Who Will Fill the Empty Cribs?, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 26, 2008, 8:26 AM),
http://www.newsweek.com/id/105530.
409. See, e.g., James G. Dwyer, Inter-Country Adoption and the Special Rights Fallacy,
35 U. PA. J. INT 'L L. 189, 191 (2013) (explains that the decline in adoptions is due to the fact
that “many countries that have been major ‘sending countries’ have imposed new procedural
and substantive restrictions on foreign adoption or have foreclosed the practice altogether.”);
Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, Review of the Year 2015-2016 in Family Law:
Domestic Dockets Stay Busy, 50 FAM. L.Q. 501, 514 (2017) (“International adoptions have
declined partly because of the Hague Convention on Cooperation with Respect
to International Adoption and because several countries, including Russia, Romania, and
Guatemala, have ended adoption programs or have diminished numbers of children
available.”).
410. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Permanency Is Not Enough: Children Need the Nurturing
Parents Found in International Adoption, 55 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 781, 782 (2010–11)
(arguing against adoption restrictions to help increase international adoptions); Paulo
Barrozo, Finding Home in the World: A Deontological Theory of the Right to Be Adopted,
55 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 701, 704–05 (2010–11) (opposing restrictions on inter-country
adoption).
411. See, e.g., Cantonal Court of Tunis, Decision No. 2272, Dec. 26, 1974, 1975 REVUE
TUNISIENNE DE DROIT, no. 2, at 117, cited in Nadjma Yassari, Adding by Choice: Adoption
and Functional Equivalents in Islamic and Middle Eastern Law, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 927,
946 n.130 (2015); Morocco Adoption, RAINBOW KIDS: ADOPTION & CHILD WELFARE
ADVOC., https://www.rainbowkids.com/international-adoption/country-programs/morocco
(last visited Sept. 14, 2020).
412. See SARAH B. IGNATIUS & ELISABETH S. STICKNEY, IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE
FAMILY app. G (2020 ed.), IMLF APP G (Westlaw) (“Laws of Selected Foreign Countries
on Adoptions”).
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to the Convention on the Rights of the Child413 asserts that the parties to the
treaty must consider the “importance of the traditions and cultural values of
each people for the protection and harmonious development of the child.” 414
Article 8 of the Convention requires that these parties “undertake to respect
the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, including nationality,
name and family relations as recognized by law without unlawful
interference.”415 Most importantly, Article 21 states that intercountry
adoption as a means of placement is only permitted “if the child cannot be
placed in a foster or an adoptive family or cannot in any suitable manner be
cared for in the child’s country of origin.” 416
The Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in
Respect of Intercountry Adoption417 also supports international adoption
restrictions based on ethnic or cultural considerations. Specifically, Article
16 states that, when considering foreign adoptions, the Central Authority of

413. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 2; see also
Richard R. Carlson, A Child’s Right to A Family Versus A State’s Discretion to
Institutionalize the Child, 47 GEO. J. INT’L L. 937, 978 (2016) (noting the Hague Adoption
Conference has reaffirmed a principle of subsidiarity, which holds that intercountry adoption
should be pursued only if a suitable family cannot be found in the child’s country of origin).
414. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 413, at 2.
415. Id. at 3.
416. Id. at 6. This may mean, as many intercountry adoption advocates note with
concern, that the convention might require preference for local institutional care over an
international placement. See Carlson, supra note 413, at 976 (“A more disturbing version of
subsidiarity allows or even requires a state to place a child in a ‘suitable’ institution if local
family placement is not possible, even if family placement outside the community is possible
and the child is too young to have an emotional or psychological connection to the local
community.”) (citing Laura McKinney, International Adoption and the Hague Convention:
Does Implementation of the Convention Protect the Best Interests of Children?, 6 WHITTIER
J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 361, 379 (2007)). However, others have argued this is not the case,
citing the Hague Adoption Convention, which states that a child, “for the full and
harmonious development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family environment,
in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding” and recognizes “that intercountry
adoption may offer the advantage of a permanent family to a child for whom a suitable
family cannot be found in his or her State of origin.” Hague Conference on Private
International Law: Final Act of the 17th Session, Including the Convention on Protection of
Children and Co-operation in Respect to Intercountry Adoption at pmbl., May 29, 1993, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 105-51, 1870 U.N.T.S. 167, https://assets.hcch.net/docs/77e12f23-d3dc4851-8f0b-050f71a16947.pdf [hereinafter Hague Convention].
417. Hague Convention, supra note 416.
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the State of origin shall “give due consideration to the child’s upbringing
and to his or her ethnic, religious and cultural background.”418
2. International Adoption Proponents and Race Matching
International adoption proponents criticize international laws that
prohibit or discourage cross race or cross-cultural adoptions. Ironically,
these critics are also some of the biggest proponents of race-matching, at
least when it comes to their own adoptive children.
The increase in American parents seeking international adoptions is a
direct result of the decline in white children available for adoption in the
United States. White parents unwilling to adopt from a primarily AfricanAmerican adoption pool are now using international adoption to seek more
racially similar children. 419 Foreign children who are white, or believed to
be capable of passing as white, have become increasingly desired.420 In fact,
the desire to adopt such children is so great that it nearly resulted in federal
legislation conditioning U.S. aid on the increased availability of foreign
children for adoption.
The proposed legislation was the Children and Families First Act
(CHIFF),421 which sought to eliminate the Hague Convention’s preference
for in-country care solutions in return for U.S. aid. 422 Critics of the CHIFF

418. Id. art. 16 § (1)(b).
419. Maldonado, supra note 379, at 1423–26 (examining the myths surrounding
domestic and international adoptions and demonstrating how racial preferences are an
important factor in many adoptive parents’ decision to pursue an international adoption); see
also Kim H. Pearson, Displaced Mothers, Absent and Unnatural Fathers: LGBT Transracial
Adoption, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 149, 159, 165–67 (2012) (noting such policies have the
“effect of leaving more Black children in foster care”).
420. Pearson, supra note 419, at 159, 165–67.
421. S. 1530, 113th Cong.
422. CHIFF imported the “concurrent planning” concept championed by Professor
Bartholet and put it on equal footing with the Hague subsidiarity principle:
The principle of subsidiarity, which gives preference to in-country
solutions, should be implemented within the context of a concurrent
planning strategy, exploring in- and out-of-country options simultaneously.
If an in-country placement serving the child’s best interest and providing
appropriate, protective, and permanent care is not quickly available, and
such an international home is available, the child should be placed in that
international home without delay.
DeLeith Duke Gossett, Take Off the [Color] Blinders: How Ignoring the Hague
Convention’s Subsidiarity Principle Furthers Structural Racism Against Black American
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argued that the legislation treats children as a commodity. 423 Professor
Deleith Gosset described the CHIFF as serving “the interests of privileged
families from wealthy nations at the expense of the poorest.”424
Ultimately, the proposed legislation failed. 425 However, the CHIFF fight
demonstrated there is strong support for race-matching when it increases
the number of white or passing-for-white children available for adoption.
Indian children have often fallen into this category. Consequently, the real
objection to the ICWA’s third preference category, “any other Indian
family,” may not be that it promotes-race matching, but that it thwarts,
rather than benefits, the race-matching desires of white adoptive families.426
IV. Conclusion
Twenty years after its enactment, it is clear the ASFA is not the panacea
that was promised. 427 State and federal policy is increasingly turning away
Children, 55 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 261, 304 (2015) (quoting 2014 CHIFF § 2475; 2013
CHIFF § 1530) (emphasis added by Gossett).
423. Id. at 305–06 (“Critics stated that CHIEF . . . actually aimed to tie foreign assistance
to a country’s willingness to participate in intercountry adoption for the benefit of
Americans who want to adopt . . . . However, tying federal aid to a country’s willingness to
deliver its children for adoption is treating children as a commodity.”).
424. Id. at 306; see also Sarah Sargent, Suspended Animation: The Implementation of the
Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption in the United States and Romania, 10 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 351, 373 (2004) (“The [Adoption Institute] report noted that the ‘market
forces inherent in international adoption pose a potential threat to the welfare of children
being considered for adoption, as well as their birth parents and prospective adoptive
parents.’”) (quoting Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Inst., Recommendations to the State
Department & Acton Burnell Re: Implementation of the Intercountry Adoption Act 2000
(May 24, 2001)).
425. See CHIFF Is Dead: A Post-Mortem, LIGHT OF DAY STORIES (Jan. 11, 2015),
https://lightofdaystories.com/2015/01/11/chiff-is-dead-a-post-mortem/.
426. The ICWA helps take wealth out of the adoption equation. See, e.g., Berger, supra
note 192, at 356 (describing one particularly “outrageous recent case, [in which] a private
adoption agency even claimed ‘good cause’ for deviation from the placement preferences
after demanding that, to be eligible, any families from the child’s tribe had to be able to pay
the agency’s $27,500 fee”).
427.
In sum, after more than twenty years of state and federal initiatives aimed at
bettering the prospects of abused and neglected children, there is no sign that
those prospects have significantly improved. Children who enter foster care are
at serious risk of remaining there, in unstable and impermanent placements,
until adulthood. Neither intensive pre-placement services nor in-placement
reunification efforts are currently adequate to provide safe and reliable homes
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from the ASFA’s goals of quick removals and speedy terminations and
focusing on family preservation. As a result, the ICWA’s provisions once
again reflect state and federal child welfare policies applicable to nonIndian children. Nevertheless, while these protections are expanding for
non-Indian children, their continued applicability to Indian children is
threatened.
This Article has demonstrated that current ICWA challenges are
unjustified.428 The goal of the ICWA is to protect Indian children and
families by ensuring Indian children are not removed from their families
without justification, aiding their return when removal was necessary, and
finding them safe and loving homes when they cannot be returned. This is
also the goal of non-Indian child welfare legislation. Today, more than ever,
the application of the ICWA ensures Indian children are being treated the
same as their non-Indian peers and, ironically, it is the ICWA challenges
that pose the biggest threat to the continuation of this equal treatment.

for many children at risk. Adoptive homes are not available for many children
who need them. Increased caseloads have also strained an already overtaxed
system to the breaking point. Foster homes are available for less than half of
the children who need temporary care, a shortfall that often leads to placement
in an institution or with poorly prepared relatives.
Garrison, supra note 10, at 593–94.
428. In Yavapai-Apache Tribe v. Mejia, 906 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995), the Court
of Appeals of Texas explained that “[u]nder the ICWA, what is best for an Indian child is to
maintain ties with the Indian Tribe, culture, and family.” Id. at 169. Similarly, in Chester
County Department of Social Services v. Coleman, 372 S.E.2d 912 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988), the
Court of Appeals of South Carolina specifically noted, “The Act is based on the assumption
that protection of the Indian child’s relationship to the tribe is in the child’s best interest.” Id.
at 914.
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